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Abstract 
This thesis analyzes the campaign rhetoric of John McCain and Barack Obama 
in the context of Lynn Vavreck's theory of clarifying and insurgent campaigns, 
and finds that the onset of the Great Recession of 2008 constrained the ability of 
the campaigns to freely choose the issues on which to run, as well as 
significantly benefitted Barack Obama's presidential campaign as compared to 
John McCain's. Furthermore, it uses Jonathan Haidt's Moral Foundations 
Theory to provide content analysis of the specific electioneering rhetoric of the 
two campaigns, and finds that the two candidates increasingly relied on morally 
charged language as the campaign went on. In sum, it finds that although the 
Financial Crisis alone was unlikely to sink one campaign or salvage the other, 
the combination of the onset of the crisis, the historical context of the election, 
and the nature of the news media had significant effects on both campaigns 
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Introduction 
 
As the public approached the voting urns on November 4, 2008, it was on the eve of a 
historic election, and hot on the heels of a campaign unlike any before it. Not only was it the 
most expensive campaign in the history of American politics, with close to $600,000,000 
spent on presidential campaign advertisements alone ("Political Advertising in 2008"). The 
two major parties also drummed up a heretofore unseen diversity of primary candidates: the 
Democratic party had an unprecedented run-off between a female and an African-American 
presumptive Presidential nominee, and the Republican party featured its first female Vice 
Presidential candidate. However, the circumstances surrounding the election were arguably 
as remarkable as the candidates themselves. As the Presidential campaign rolled into its final 
few months, the economy of the United States took a decided turn for the worse. According 
to the National Bureau of Economic Research, the US had a period of economic expansion 
from late 2001 until it peaked in December 2007 (National Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
Determination of...) leading into the "Great Recession" of 2008-2009.  The economy is rarely 
far from the voter's mind – especially in times of economic downturn, as evidenced by such 
successful campaign rhetoric as Bill Clinton's "It's the Economy, Stupid" and Ronald 
Reagan's famous 1980 rhetorical question, asking "Are you better off now than you were four 
years ago?" (Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation). As candidates bowed out of the 2008 
Presidential race one by one, and the Democratic and Republican parties eventually 
nominated Barack Obama and John McCain for their respective ballots, it became 
increasingly clear that the deepening recession was going to last at least as long as the 
campaign. In fact, the recession proved to be the most drawn-out and most severe period of 
economic downturn since the Great Depression of the 1930s (National Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, Annual Report... 25) and took on a crescendo-like quality as the financial markets 
crumbled throughout the campaign season. From Bear Stearns in March to Lehman Brothers 
in September, venerable old bastions of the financial world revealed hands that were far 
poorer than suspected, and by the so-called "Black Monday" of September 15, 2008, even 
Wall Street traders found themselves in a world without a roadmap (Twin). 
This thesis will examine the 2008 Presidential campaign and how it was shaped by the drastic 
economic downturn of mid to late 2008, focusing in particular on the period leading up to and 
around the Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy. It will consider political advertising as well as 
political speeches from the two candidates as political acts, and analyze them in light  
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of relevant theories and research from the fields of political science and especially 
political psychology. The ultimate goal for a serious candidate running in any election is, 
after all, to achieve the office he or she is running for. When a candidate seeks to gain the 
Presidency, for instance, it is not only a matter of convincing the voting public that he or she 
is the best candidate, but also to inculcate the idea that the opponent is, at best, less qualified. 
Voters may choose to cast their vote in support of a candidate for a variety of reasons, not 
only because they like the candidate and the policies they support. Voters might vote to 
support their party, or they might vote not because they support the candidate, but because 
they want to keep the opponent out of office. Any candidate looking to win would be wise to 
appeal to voters with varying motivations, not just the true believers.  
Our modern society is rife with information, and the richness and availability of that 
information only increases with each new technological innovation. In the Western world, 
knowledge has leapfrogged with technology: from the radio to the television broadcast 
system to the internet, the way we obtain, share and disseminate information has been one of 
ever expanding reach and speed. However, quantity is irredeemably separate from quality. 
Considering that we live in a world where most American voters can bring up a mountain of 
information on a given candidate with a few strokes of a keyboard, or a press of a TV remote, 
does this change a person's attitude toward this information? What does it mean when voters 
attain much of their information through the mass-media outlets upon which the electorate is 
becoming more and more dependent for its information? In a 24-hour news cycle, wherein 
candidates are becoming more and more attuned to the sound-byte – the short, snappy 
comment meant to be replayed over and over on every newscast and radio show to hammer a 
message through to the voter – what are the effects on the candidate's ability to get his or her 
message out? And what are the effects on the voter, asked to make a real decision between 
candidates who are both working hard to make the opposing party look bad, when arguably 
the most accessible and most common political information available to the public is a 30-
second ad made with all the bells and whistles of modern advertising? Questions like these 
provide fertile ground for an analysis of the 2008 election. 
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The Structure of the Thesis 
 
This thesis sprung out from a simple question. The financial crisis of 2008 caused 
shockwaves that spread not only through the United States, but that reverberated around the 
world. Surely, it must also have affected the election – but how?  
To answer this, the hypothesis put forth rests on three assumptions. First, campaigns 
make a difference. What the candidates say, and how they say it, is not insignificant to the 
outcome of the election. Not only does it affect how the electorate cast their votes, but the 
effects last beyond Election Night: what the winning candidate campaigns on is not only 
what gets them into office, but also becomes the basis for evaluating the candidate's 
performance once inaugurated. Second, that political advertising matters the state of the news 
media and news consumption increase the efficacy and predominance of political advertising.  
And third, that the financial crisis of 2008 was of such a nature – sudden, complicated, and 
requiring a fairly high level of technical financial knowledge and numeracy to understand – 
that most of the electorate could not be reasonably expected to fully understand it, and were 
therefore more likely to rely on the candidate's interpretations of events in order to make 
sense of what happened and how best to correct the situation. This is what compels 
candidates to respond, and how they respond has lasting effects beyond the Tuesday after the 
first Monday of November. The question then becomes: how did the candidates respond to 
the crisis?  
The structure of the thesis is roughly chronological, where the events of the 
presidential election campaign is considered alongside the developments in the financial 
sector. It analyzes the message and theme of the campaigns and how these changed in 
response to the financial crisis. To this end, the speeches and political advertising put forth by 
the two candidates are considered as strategic political acts, carried out to fulfill three major 
goals for each candidate: to define their own image according to their own ends, to define the 
opposition in terms that support their own claim, and to motivate the voter to cast their ballot 
either with the candidate or against the opposition.  
Chapter One introduces the theories and research relevant for this thesis. It discusses 
the meaning and role of campaigns and fundamentals, and provides a theory for analyzing the 
specific content of ads and speeches. This chapter also provides discussion on the topic, 
relevant terminology, sources, and methodology. In this chapter, Lynn Vavreck's campaign 
typology and Jonathan Haidt's Moral Foundations theory are introduced.  
	   4	  
Chapter Two discusses the role of the mass media in the dissemination of news and 
political information to the public. It examines how the modern media shapes and influences 
politics, with a particular focus on political advertisements as information providers, and 
considers the changes in the mass media that have contributed to the rise of political televised 
advertisement. It also discusses the current state of political advertising, criticisms towards 
content and financing, and possible benefits of political advertisements. 
Chapter Three looks at the historical context of the 2008 election in terms of politics 
and finance. It discusses the McCain and Obama campaigns in terms of Vavreck's campaign 
typology and Moral Foundations theory based on the nomination speeches and the ads aired 
before the Lehman bankruptcy, which marked the onset of the financial crisis in true form. 
Chapter Four briefly covers the nomination process for both major parties before 
delving into the analysis of the campaigns themselves. In this chapter, the relevant speeches 
and ads, as well as how they are coded for the analysis, are presented and analyzed. 
Chapter Five analyzes the candidates' campaign speeches and advertisements 
following "Black Monday" and up until Election Night. It examines how the candidates' 
strategies towards the economy shifted, and whether or not they conformed to Lynn 
Vavreck's campaign typology. Finally, it summarizes the findings and provides some 
concluding remarks. 
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Chapter One: Fundamental Building Blocks 
 
1.1 A Pause for Deliberation 
At this point, some deliberation is warranted. Before advancing to the specific theory, 
methodology and context of this thesis, an elaboration and discussion of the relevant terms 
should prove helpful. Perhaps most importantly, the speeches and advertisements that 
comprise the source material in this thesis will be considered as more than an impassive 
information service from the candidate informing the voter of where they stand on the issues, 
or why they are better suited for the Presidency. These statements are, by their very nature, 
deliberate political acts. There is little left to chance, especially in a Presidential campaign, 
during which most candidates have the clout and financial resources to hire highly qualified 
advisers and staff members. By the same token, though on a lesser scale, voting itself will be 
considered, and referred to, as a political action undertaken by the voter. There is little to 
suggest that voting is a task undertaken at random: Civic duty though it may be, the fact that 
only 61.6% of the voting-eligible population cast their vote for the Presidential candidates in 
2008 suggests that some motivating factors are at play which go beyond the obligation and 
right of a member of a democratic society (McDonald, "2008 General Election..."). Certainly, 
some cast their vote purely out of a social obligation – few states track blank votes, however, 
and only Nevada offers a "None of these Candidates" option on the ballot (McDonald "Voter 
Turnout...") – but when more than a third of the voting-eligible population choose to stay 
home during a general election, it becomes clear that voting is a conscious, voluntary act, and 
presumably one that satisfies some desire in the voter that overrides the relative effort and 
difficulty involved in casting their vote (selecting a candidate, getting to the voting locale, 
likely having to wait in line, and so forth). As such, this thesis will be based on the following 
three premises. First, advertisements and prepared statements made by a political candidate 
are overtly political by their nature and can be analyzed as such. Secondly, the majority of the 
voting-eligible population who choose to actually vote, do so for reasons that go beyond the 
mere fact that they are able to and live in a society in which voting is expected of them (as 
implied above, one would expect to see much higher rates of participation if the mere 
expectation of voting was enough.) The third premise is that serious candidates for a high 
political office, and certainly for the presidency, will use every tool at their disposal to 
convince the voting public to support their candidacy, and that the selection of one candidate 
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over another reflects the winning candidate's success at utilizing political tools, the losing 
candidate's failure to do the same, or both.  
Furthermore, this thesis concerns itself with the general phase of a United States 
presidential election. This means that the findings are limited to the American context, which 
also colors the text. Specifically, the thesis will avail itself of American definitions, 
specifically of the term liberal, which holds separate meanings in American politics 
compared to the rest of the world. A liberal, in this text, refers to someone placed left of 
center on the political spectrum. As such, they will be relatively friendly to the federal 
government and relatively favorable towards government regulation to serve the common 
good. The term conservative is less problematic, but for the sake of clarity will be used to 
refer to an individual belonging right of center: they will tend to favor limited government 
and a high degree of personal freedom, seeing the government's role as doing as little as 
possible while maintaining its most basic functions. 
Finally, the thesis will use some rather common phrases in a specific way. When 
analyzing and discussing the advertisements, candidate refers to the candidate responsible for 
the ad, and opponent refers to the other candidate. In an advertisement by Barack Obama's 
campaign, Obama himself is the candidate, and McCain is the opponent, and vice versa for a 
McCain campaign ad. This may seem self-explanatory, but as the meaning of the terms is not 
fixed, but rather shifts depending on which campaign released the specific ad, it seemed 
prudent to make that clear. When speaking of content, this refers to the different aspects of 
what is usually called the message of the ad: the specific things intended to sway the watcher 
towards the candidate and away from the opponent. The differences between the categories 
of content are discussed in more detail below.  
 
1.2 Sources 
There are several tools in the candidate's toolbox: mass-mailing campaign material, 
robocalling (automated telephone calls to deliver a recorded message), stump speeches, 
creating and maintaining an online presence (through websites, email lists and social media,) 
recruiting and organizing volunteers for canvassing efforts, public and broadcast debates, and 
creating and distributing ads through mass media as well as social media. Analyzing all of 
these campaign strategies would reveal a dataset much too large for the time and page count 
allotted to a master's thesis, not to mention that some of the data might have proven difficult 
to unearth. Narrowing the analysis to televised political advertising and candidate speeches 
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provides as set of primary sources that is both large and important enough to warrant a closer 
look, while not becoming too broad to impart a deeper understanding. The choice of primary 
media outlet, television over the Internet, is driven by two factors. The first is the fact that the 
Internet is inherently an interactive medium, and through interactiveness, the Internet breeds 
self-selection: people actively choose to seek out political advertising online (for instance by 
clicking on a link or searching for it on Youtube.com). One may argue that television also 
involves a certain interaction, as the viewer is free to change channels when they are bored or 
displeased, or to selectively view channels that they expect to give them what they want. 
However, the similarity ends at choosing to switch on the receiving device (TV or computer); 
the television consumer is asked to accept or reject an entire package of media pre-selected 
by the channel executives, whereas the internet requires one to not only actively seek out 
information, but to know where to look. Though switching channels likely makes one less of 
a captive audience, it is still less interactive than taking in a wide range of options (be they 
websites, video clips or individual news articles) and deciding to actively pursue the one that 
catches one's fancy. 
Secondly, as is discussed below, in 2008, more Americans had access to a TV than 
had access to a computer with a high-speed Internet connection. According to Nielsen, 98 
percent of American homes had at least one television set (Nielsen, Television Audience 2008 
3), whereas just under 62 percent of US households had Internet access of some form in 
2007, with 29 percent of householders having no Internet access at work or at home (United 
States, "Households Using the Internet"). While social media and online presence is 
becoming increasingly important as an information channel between candidate and voter, in 
2008 it had not quite achieved the mass distribution of television. Therefore, television ads 
have been chosen as the primary source to analyze. There is an added benefit in that the 
advent of YouTube and other video sharing sites have made it increasingly easy for 
candidates to spread their message further at virtually no extra cost. However, these ads have 
been created first and foremost with the television viewer in mind, and will therefore be 
considered primarily as televised advertisements, though they were accessed online for the 
research undertaken. Furthermore, speeches by the candidates will be analyzed to give a 
richer picture of the ideological and rhetorical positioning of both candidates. Speeches have 
been accessed from the vast collection of election documents at the American Presidency 
Project's site, hosted by the University of California, Santa Barbara. The advertisements 
come from Stanford University's Political Communication Lab's comprehensive collection. 
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 Voter motivation and ideology are complicated subjects. Lacking the kind of large 
quantitative primary sources such as polling and questionnaire datasets, the focus is instead 
on a broader set of secondary sources and insights to anchor the findings and conclusions of 
the thesis. The secondary sources will provide the analytical tools and theoretical insight to 
make sense of the findings. The two foundational theories that will underpin this thesis are 
Lynn Vavreck's work on the effects of the state of the economy on presidential campaigns, 
and Jonathan Haidt's Moral Foundations theory, or MF theory. These theories will be 
explored in more detail below: for the purposes of this section, a very basic summary will 
suffice. Lynn Vavreck divides campaigns into clarifying and insurgent campaigns. The state 
of the economy naturally tends to disadvantage one party and benefit the other, and the 
campaigns are categorized as clarifying, if they are benefitted by the state of the economy, or 
insurgent if they are disadvantaged by the economy. Moral Foundations theory posits that 
there are six basic foundations for evaluating (in this case) political action and policy, and 
that understanding these foundations provides a relatively simple explanation for the culture 
wars in modern Western societies: research shows that liberals and conservatives place 
different relative emphasis on the six foundations. This, in turn, leads to discussions where 
conservatives and liberals end up seemingly not even talking about the same topic any more, 
because they are discussing the topics from separate moral vantage points.1 Other secondary 
sources include books and peer-reviewed articles, as well as news articles. The news articles 
do not include opinion articles, as they have been chosen mostly to reflect the changes in 
public opinion and attention as the presidential election progressed. 
 
1.3 Methodology 
Ultimately, this thesis does not seek to pinpoint the terms on which the presidential election 
was won – or lost. Elections cannot be determined by a single variable – if they could, 
predicting election outcomes would not be so notoriously hard. There would likely not be so 
many different approaches, methods, and experts if a single one of them would suffice to 
reliably make the correct prediction. An election campaign is a complex, fluid affair, 
responsive to the present moment and to changes in the political, economic or social realities 
of its day. A plausible study of causation would need sophisticated tests and questionnaires, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 It should be noted that the findings for Moral Foundations theory apply to conservatives and liberals in 
countries selected from all continents, which suggests that Moral Foundations as an explanatory model 
functions independently of the American political and cultural context. 
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not to mention access to the voting public at the time surrounding the election in question. 
Such tools are not available to this author, and this thesis must therefore "stand on the 
shoulder of giants" and rely on the work done by others before this. Therefore, the focus is 
not on the voting outcome as such, but rather on the political rhetoric espoused by the 
candidates. The voting outcome becomes a secondary measure, in effect one of several 
yardsticks by which to measure the effectiveness of the rhetorical output. A major-party 
candidate who is successful at communicating a political standpoint and vision in a 
persuasive manner should see the proof of the pudding in the eating, or rather the voting. 
That is not to say that Obama winning the election means that his rhetorical approach was 
necessarily always the most effective, and certainly not that it is the only or the largest 
determining factor. It does, however, mean that this thesis considers McCain's loss as a 
reflection, at least in part, on his unsuccessful rhetorical approach.  
The advertisement research in this thesis is based on the ads released by the 
candidates themselves. Advertisements created by the Republican and Democratic National 
Committees and third-party interest groups are not included, as the thesis concerns itself with 
the actual candidates' statements. Though one may argue that the national committees' 
advertisements are de facto also the candidates', and that the fact that the candidates represent 
the party in addition to themselves means there is an implicit endorsement of one by the 
other, the national committee ads have nonetheless not been taken into account. This is 
partially due to time constraints, but most of all to create a well-defined dataset, considering 
the fact that the analysis will involve both advertisements and speeches. The criteria for the 
dataset are as follows: First, the entity (speech or advertisement) should be deliberate and 
planned, to avoid gaffes or slips of the tongue, in order to avoid, in a term, plausible 
deniability on the part of the candidate. Second, it should be endorsed by the candidate 
themselves, and a product of the campaign staff or candidate, which disqualifies third-party 
ads. Third, it should be a discrete message; e.g. not an interview. What is left by these 
categories is a communicative message for which the candidate alone is accountable and 
responsible, by either creating or approving the message. All told, the dataset ended up 
containing 329 separate entries, comprised of 185 speeches (of which two were the 
nomination speeches) and 144 television ads. Of these, 108 of the speeches and 64 of the 
advertisements were given or aired before September 15, and 75 speeches and 80 of the ads 
were delivered after September 15. Though it is by no means an overwhelming amount of 
data, it still presented a sizeable amount of work – and, arguably, a sample size large enough 
to draw some meaningful conclusions. 
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Building on this dataset, one of the most important concerns throughout has been to 
avoid having to make judgement calls as much as possible. In research done by, for instance, 
the Wisconsin Advertising Project and the Wesleyan Media Project, ads have been coded by 
a large group of individual coders, often in separate teams, in order to negate the influence of 
personal biases and other such possible statistical noisemaking. However, this is more 
challenging when it comes to a graduate thesis: the coding and analysis put forth here is the 
work of a single individual, and as such, a possible error in judgment in deciding how to 
classify an ad would not be corrected in the aggregate. Therefore, when ads may arguably be 
classified in more than one category, the categorization will depend on which category is 
most prominent when judged by the amount of time devoted to the subject. Take for instance 
a hypothetical 30-second advertisement that spends 22 seconds lambasting the opponent, five 
seconds pointing out that the candidate's positions are different, and the last three seconds on 
the candidate message approval. This ad could be classified as negative, or as comparative; 
after all, the candidate certainly paints himself in a positive light by comparison. On the other 
hand, in this case more than two-thirds of the ad time is spent either on negative coverage of 
the opponent, so the argument could certainly be made that whatever positive information 
that is brought to light about the candidate is a drop in the bucket compared to the negative 
information that preceded it. Nonetheless, in the interest of avoiding judgment calls and 
creating as rigid a framework as possible, such an ad will be counted as comparative if 
meaningful policy information is brought up. As an example, an advertisement may spend 
two-thirds of its time claiming that the opponent's lacking foreign policy experience threatens 
America's safety internationally, before spending the last five seconds mentioning a specific 
policy approach that the candidate has endorsed ("Candidate Y voted to increase military 
support for Israel!") This would properly count as a comparative ad, as it gives specific 
information on where the candidates differ. However, if the ad ended by stating, for instance, 
that Candidate Y "has always supported out troops", that would be counted as a negative ad: 
one would be hard pressed to find a major-party candidate that was unsupportive of the men 
and women who serve in the military, regardless of their foreign policy approach. Such 
general statements offer no meaningful basis of comparison or evaluation of the candidates. 
 A second point to be made is that ads are analyzed on two levels. The levels are the 
categories of content that each individual advertisement provides: full-ad content and 
reference content. Full-ad content refers to the advertisement seen as a whole: is the ad about 
the candidate? The economy? Social issues? Foreign policy? Again, advertisements are 
classified according to majority content. Reference content is meant to give more depth to the 
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analysis. Whereas full-ad content represents what the ad is concerned with, for instance the 
economy, it does not provide any information beyond that. Reference content encompasses 
the many facets of a single issue, and tells the outside observer what a candidate believes to 
be the most politically expedient issues at any given point in time, as well as trying to 
impress on the electorate which topics they ought to take into consideration. Consider two 
hypothetical ads. The first spends ten seconds dissecting the opponent's record on the subject 
of tax cuts for middle-class families, the following ten seconds on a hypothetical scenario 
describing what will happen if the opponent wins the election, and the last ten seconds on a 
glowing description of the candidate's vastly preferable stance on taxes. The second ad 
spends the first twenty seconds alleging that the opponent's close ties with Corporation X 
means that their economic policy approach is weighted in favor of said corporation, and the 
last ten seconds explaining that the candidate's policy proposal is driven by their concern for 
the middle class worker rather than the CEO. While both of these advertisements are 
accurately classified as economic ads when seen as a whole, they are still different ads with 
different references, which are most properly understood in the historical context of the ad. 
Consider the infamous "Daisy" ad without the context of the Cold War nuclear arms race. Or, 
in the scenario above, consider the second advertisement aired against a political candidate 
with ties to Enron, in the days after the Enron scandal unfurled. It seems clear that the 
historical context of an ad, as well as the way the ad references the context, greatly influences 
the meaning of the ad beyond simply denoting it as an advertisement about economic issues, 
or about foreign policy, or any other political topic. However, whereas an ad may only fall 
within one full-ad content category, it will almost certainly contain more than one particular 
set of reference content. It may discuss the economy in terms of both taxes and jobs, for 
instance, or a single ad may span several topics, such as healthcare and government spending, 
or tax policy and outsourcing. Taken together, full-ad content and reference content tells us 
not only what the candidate believes is important in the election cycle, such as the economy, 
but it also indicates which dimensions of a topic they anticipate will resonate most strongly 
with the electorate.  
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1.4 The Two Modes of Campaigns 
Campaigns may be seen to work on two distinct levels.2 The first is simply to get the most 
votes. The campaigns are motivated to win, and in order to achieve that goal, they need to 
gain the support of slightly more than half of the electorate. Though it is by all means 
possible to win the election without winning the popular vote, this is a rare event: 
traditionally, winning the popular vote and winning the electorate college go hand in hand. 
On this level, the campaign and candidate messages matter due to how well they influence 
voters to move away from their opponent or to remain in the candidate's camp. This is the 
level where polling and ads matter the most, and where the campaigns are more flexible to 
respond to the day-to-day changes of the election season. The campaigns engage in a 
dialogue, of sorts – a message is put forth, and the other side responds to refute or negate the 
point. The campaigns may shift their message – the slogan, the essential information – to fit 
the circumstances, but they often adhere to a larger theme.  
This larger theme is the second level, which is somewhat more abstract: contending 
campaigns, taken as a whole, may be seen as an ideological, large-scale discussion over time 
of the proper role of government in relation to the nation and its citizens. Should America 
follow an interventionist foreign policy, or should America largely remain isolationist? Is the 
nature and proper role of government to protect the weak and ensure an even playing field for 
all, no matter their starting point in life? Or is a national government, in its essence, 
dependent upon coercion and infringement of the rights of its citizens to live their lives 
freely, and should it therefore focus its effort on protecting citizens from violence, nation-
state aggression and crime? What is the proper role of laws and punishment? May a citizen 
take the life of another in self-defense, and if so, under what circumstances? May a nation 
decree that discrimination based on gender, sexual orientation or age is unjust and enforce 
private citizens and corporations to comply? A relatively sophisticated or knowledgeable 
observer may readily classify the responses to such questions into the appropriate ideological 
category. However, being unable to place the statements within the correct political 
dimension does not preclude participation in the discussion: one does so by voting. In 
discussing the function of party platforms, Larry David Smith writes:  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 A problematic aspect in this type of analysis is the dual meaning of the word "campaign". In this analytical 
context, it can mean either the candidate themselves, as well as their staff and whomever else is responsible to 
running the electioneering effort, or it can mean the rhetorical output of the candidate in the form of speeches, 
advertisements, debates, interviews, mass mailings, et c. In this thesis, the former meaning will be the most 
common. 
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Through their capacity to consolidate diverse interests, the Democrat and Republican 
parties not only define the American approach to governance, they perpetuate that 
strategy. This systemic need for coalition formation created the conventions and, over 
time, an institutional rhetoric through which these quadrennial syntheses may be  
built. (532)  
 
This, it seems reasonable to conclude, is no less true for the campaigns as a whole than for 
the party conventions in particular. That is, much like conventions consolidate the range of 
political sentiment within a party to one (relatively) unified whole, campaigns consolidate the 
range of political sentiment within the electorate into two (relatively) unified camps that go 
toe to toe on how to govern the nation every two years. Note that this implication does not 
mean that all who voted one party over the other necessarily agree with all their chosen party 
espouses politically: Libertarians, for instance, may choose to vote Republican simply 
because the Republican party is more in line with their beliefs than the Democrats. Moreover, 
third parties and factions may rise to grab a nationally significant portion of the electorate 
based on a given issue if the two major parties fail to include this under their banner. 
However, this was not the case in 2008. 
 Whether as a vote-getting machine or a policy discussion, campaigns do not exist in a 
vacuum. The context of the election, such as the state of the economy, America's current role 
in the world, or the most pressing domestic policy issues, affects the campaigns as the 
candidates often take different positions on the subjects. Likewise, aspects of the candidates, 
and of the electorate, may also affect how the campaign moves forward. These are often 
referred to as the fundamentals. How the candidates choose to respond to the fundamentals – 
for instance by focusing on one topic over another, or emphasizing some aspects of their life 
and personality while passing over others – determine their campaigns. 
 
1.5 Fundamentals and Campaigns 
These, then, are the two major elements of an election: the fundamentals and the campaigns. 
Consider an election as an historical moment, a snapshot in time: a confluence of different 
elements makes up the particular situation that candidates find themselves within. The 
economy may be booming or limping; the nation may be at war or enjoying a long period of 
peace; tensions between different demographic groups may be high or virtually non-existent. 
The candidate may hold an unpopular view on a particular area of domestic policy; they may 
be of a particular race or religion; they may have served in the military or have a particularly 
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long (or short) career in politics. All these elements may conceivably matter to the prospects 
of a candidate wishing to run for President, but how much weight they have varies from 
election to election. The fundamentals of an election may be seen as the issues that exist 
separate from the election itself, such as the state of the economy or the current political 
environment. Some (e.g. Fair 1978; Fair 1996; Hibbs 2000) see the fundamentals as the most 
important determinants of the outcome of a presidential election. In Hibbs' Bread and Peace 
model, the aggregate vote count for the President is determined by observable change in 
personal income level and the number of American military personnel lost as a result of 
American military intervention abroad. In Fair's model, which is regularly updated to include 
variable changes in economic performance, voters evaluate the candidates based solely on the 
performance of the incumbent party, without comparison with the performance of the 
opposing party the last time it held power.  Furthermore, the model suggests that voters only 
evaluate in terms of the change of economic per capita growth over the past year (Fair 1996). 
These tend to represent the extreme view of the fundamentals-based approach to elections: A 
candidate may never talk their way out of the hole left them by poor economic performance; 
conversely, if the economy is good, there is little that will slow the pace of the incumbent 
party towards winning another term. The common factor for models based on fundamentals 
is that they tend to take the long view of an election contest: the factors that determine the 
outcome are already present (for the most part) before the candidates are even announced, 
and the election outcome inevitably follows some 60 or so days later. Voters are seen to act 
on their own self-interest, and thus the outcome may be predicted from how the fundamentals 
fit that self-interest. 
 The natural counterpoint at the other extreme would be traditional news media. Where 
fundamentals-based models assume that very little the candidates do or say once the 
fundamentals are set down will shift the vote one way or the other, traditional news media 
tend to focus almost to the point of exclusion on the temporal minutia of the election: the 
gaffes, the debates, the latest polls; where the candidates went, who they met with, and why. 
If one was to pick, at random, an American newspaper (or, certainly, most any national 
newspaper in the Western world) on any given day from the time of the national conventions 
up until Election night, it is almost certain that one would quickly find an article detailing 
some new poll or statement that is said to potentially change the race. This somewhat myopic 
view of the election tends to have some drawbacks. For instance, reporting based mostly on 
recent polling data has a tendency to over-represent the insignificant: of all represented 
information, some portion of it is signal – that is, meaningful – and the rest is noise. Polling is 
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not always accurate, and when every new poll is represented, so are the biases and 
methodological flaws hidden in the results. A cynic might suggest that news media tend to 
favor such detail-driven reporting because it is to their benefit – an election where the 
outcome was decided months ago of time is not a very newsworthy event, after all. A more 
benevolent view may be that the news is exactly that: new. The job of newspapers and 
evening shows is to report what is happening currently, and the polls of the night are a 
snapshot of the present day, as the polls of tomorrow night will be a snapshot of tomorrow.  
 Others, still, fall somewhere in the middle: It seems reasonable to assume that no 
candidate is so politically gifted that they can afford to ignore the state of the nation, and it 
also seems reasonable to assume that politics is more than meaningless puppetry, and that the 
election calls for more than the candidates simply stating to which party they belong and 
allowing the voters to draw their own inferences. Some combine the best of both worlds, as it 
were, creating models that reflect the long-term effects of the fundamentals while allowing 
for campaign events that prove to outlast the news cycle. Erikson and Wliezen, for instance, 
identify the fundamentals "not by their content but by their persistence" (5). Moreover, they 
distinguish between the external and internal fundamentals. Internal fundamentals become 
salient to voters because of the voters themselves: personal characteristics, such as group 
membership, partisanship, or ideology may influence their support for a candidate. External 
fundamentals are those that are inherent to the election itself: the economy, the candidates, 
party incumbency, the current president's approval ratings and so forth (Erikson and Wliezen 
6-7). They find that the period during which most voters cleave to either side of the party 
divide is during the late summer, in the period leading up to and surrounding the major party 
conventions, generally falling within the last 120 to 90 days before the election. They ascribe 
this effect to the educational potential of the convention, and posit that the knowledge voters 
gain from conventions trigger their latent internal fundamentals – voting record, party 
identification, demographics – which guide them to the party that falls most in line with their 
preferences. They do note that this summer boost did not hold for the convention season of 
2008, and suggest that the long campaign between Senators Barack Obama and Hillary 
Clinton may have already hardened preferences ahead of the summer period (31). Ultimately, 
they argue, the fundamentals matter to the extent that they are made evident to the voting 
public through campaigns, being "neither crucial nor irrelevant" to the eventual outcome. 
However, they also note that 2008 was one of three anomalous years (the other two being 
1980 and 1992) where the electorate perceived the economy to be performing poorly, yet 
favored the incumbent party in mid-April and later changed their preference: "The campaigns 
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in these years somehow brought home the economy to the voters." (Erikson and Wliezen 
118).  
 How, then, may the campaigns succeed in bringing the economy home to roost? In 
Lynn Vavreck's campaign typology, the campaigns' issue choices are constrained by the 
economic conditions of the election year. The campaigns are constrained by the economy in 
one of two ways: Either the campaign is clarifying, or it is insurgent.3 Clarifying campaings 
ought to focus on the economy, and apply to the party that has the advantage on the current 
economy (the incumbent party during prosperity, the out party in adverse economic 
circumstances). The insurgent campaign is the party that is disadvantaged by the economy 
and ought to campaign on other issues, such as the personal qualities of the candidate, 
domestic politics, or foreign policy. This does not mean that every incumbent party campaign 
in an economically adverse election chooses an insurgent strategy, or that the party with the 
advantage of the economy must necessarily choose a clarifying strategy. The campaigns fall 
into either the clarifying or the insurgent category based on the state of the economy, rather 
than based on their choice of campaign strategy. Ideally, the election will have only one 
clarifying campaign, as the benefit/disadvantage is seen as a binary choice; the two parties, 
being ideologically different, may not both benefit. However, in the case of a mixed 
economy, where the relative growth or decline is slight enough that the economy is 
essentially stagnant, both campaigns may decide to pursue the same strategy (Vavreck 34-
35). However, this was decidedly not the case in 2008. As will be discussed, there were 
significant markers of economic decline well over a year before Election Night, and as such, 
Vavreck's model predicts that Obama's would be the clarifying campaign, whereas McCain 
would go the insurgent route. However, merely predicting which candidate would choose 
which campaign strategy does not elucidate whether the campaign typology actually affects 
the outcome. In all but four of the presidential elections from 1952 to 2008, the clarifying 
candidate won, but that could arguably be merely because they were favored by the economic 
conditions and pointed this out, thus prodding the electorate to evaluate the candidates on this 
basis. Vavreck, however, finds that "candidates and campaigns matter despite – or alongside 
– the importance of the nation's economy" (158) in two important ways.4 First, accurate 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Vavreck notes that the use of the term "insurgent" is somewhat unorthodox. In this theory, the insurgent label 
is meant to imply that the candidate rebels against the "structural conditions that predetermine the contest in 
which he or she is about to compete" (32) rather than as a rebellion against the party leadership. 
4 It bears mentioning that Vavreck's research is far more statistically sophisticated than the research done for this 
thesis, due in part to time and resource constraints. However, there should be no reason why the effects 
demonstrated by Vavreck do not also hold during the 2008 campaign.  
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candidate behavior in campaigns far improves the accuracy of economy-based forecasting 
models: 
 
Put more clearly, knowing whether a candidate leverages the nation’s economic 
conditions or refocuses the election onto some other issue explains two-thirds of the 
random noise in basic forecasting models. It turns out the noise is not random at all —
it captures the behavior of candidates in campaigns and the messages they send, which 
political scientists rarely measure. (Vavreck 109) 
 
Secondly, accurately choosing themes in accordance with the proper campaign typology 
affects how the voters perceive the campaign, as well as how they relate campaign 
information to the current state of the economy: 
 
Clarifying candidates who talk about the economy more than anything else and more 
than their opponents reduce voters’ levels of uncertainty about economic issues like 
jobs and unemployment by substantial amounts. These effects are amplified for 
people who report paying a lot of attention to campaign news in general.   
…  
Insurgent candidates can prime issues over the course of the campaign if they choose 
issues on which they have a solid advantage (they are closer to most voters, and their 
opponent is constrained to an unpopular position). Voters increasingly think these 
issues are important problems in the country and these assessments affect vote choice 
in important ways. All of this is particularly true for voters with low levels of political 
information or sophistication, and for self-identified independents. (Vavreck 155) 
 
 One may conclude, then, that the choice of issues for candidate's campaign matter. 
Campaign themes are not merely a drop in the bucket of the fundamentals, destined to only 
make a very small splash and then disappear. When a campaign chooses the right theme and 
the right strategy, they may expect to see very real effects. Those effects may not be enough 
to win an election in adverse times, but in terms of party politics, reducing the lead of the 
opponent may also be desirable: In a free and fair election, the winner does not only gain the 
right to hold office, they are also seen as having been given a mandate by the electorate. If a 
party does not win office, they may at least hope to make it a close race. Choosing to vote for 
one party and candidate over another is, in essence, to entrust that candidate or party to rule 
in their stead, according to the voter's preferences: the mandate is the fountainhead of the 
winning party's clout.5 The winner may point to their policy proposals and call for them to be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5The idea of a mandate is especially powerful in a two-party system such as the in United States, wherein the 
winner is usually the majority candidate (though, as in 2000, not always). In a multi-party system, the winner 
may be a coalition of parties rather than a single majority party, and the mandate is then subject to negotiation 
between coalition member parties. Of course, in a two-party system, some will inevitably cast their vote not in 
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enacted, not because it is the candidate's will, but because it is the will of the people. 
Moreover, the fundamentals do not deliver the specifics of the candidate's political approach 
– the campaigns do. Therefore, it is worth looking not only at what the candidates choose to 
talk about, but how they choose to talk about it.  
 Jonathan Haidt's Moral Foundations theory may provide some help in this regard. 
Haidt posits that subconscious moral evaluations underlie conscious decision-making. A 
central argument to Haidt's Moral Foundations theory is that intuition and reasoning work 
together as part of the human cognitive process, the way the human brain processes 
information. According to Haidt, when put in a situation that triggers our moral intuition, it 
gives us instant feedback, while moral rationality subsequently provides us with logical 
reasoning for our preferences, if it is able to (Haidt 42, 65-71). Haidt identifies six 
foundations of moral intuition, and shows that though all six foundations are available to 
individuals, their tendency to value some more strongly over others predicts their political 
standing, and that these differences in moral intuition help explain the so-called culture wars 
to a great extent. The six foundations are Care/harm, Fairness/cheating, Liberty/oppression, 
Loyalty/betrayal, Authority/subversion6, and Sanctity/degradation (Haidt 131-152, 170)7. The 
foundations are triggers, setting off a feeling of positive or negative sentiment, depending on 
how they are activated. Though the triggers of the foundations are generally apparent from 
the titles, some aspects should be noted.  
First, though all six bases are present in all people, their inherent moral value may 
express itself differently along the political spectrum. In other words, the same moral value 
may take on different expressions in practice. For instance, Fairness8 tends to revolve around 
proportionality among both political liberals and conservatives, but for liberals, 
proportionality matters only so far as it does not violate the Care or Liberty foundations. 
Consider, in the instance of tax policy, the concept of redistribution of wealth. For a liberal, 
there is probably nothing wrong with taxing the wealthy – they will, after all, still be left with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
support of a candidate, but in opposition to the other. However, one may still see this as a mandate granted in 
accordance with preferences, with the distinction that this mandate is not necessarily in confluence with the 
voter's true, ideal preference, but more akin to the idea of the lesser of two evils. 
6 Authority, in this case, is more about acknowledging, accepting, and respecting social hierarchies, rather than 
simply an expression of one entity's power over another. Authority in human society "is not just raw power 
backed by force. Human authorities take on responsibility for maintaining order and justice." (143) 
7 See also Haidt and Graham 2007, as well as Graham, Haidt and Nosek 2009 
8 For ease of reference as well as ease of reading, the foundations will mostly be referred to by their first clause, 
i.e. Fairness instead of Fairness/Cheating. 
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more than the average American – to fund schools or the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
Program. After all, it is unfair that those who are already poor or working class should be 
additionally disadvantaged by poor living standards or lack of access to education. In a 
conservative moral matrix, however, it is unfair to take more from those who have worked 
harder (presumptively) to gather that wealth, and social policies easily become government 
handouts, coerced by the government from those who have earned it and given freely to those 
who are unwilling (or perhaps unmotivated, as the government is there to bail them out, as it 
were) to work harder to pull themselves out of a bad situation.9 Liberty may also take on 
different meanings on opposite sides of the spectrum. This might sound odd, especially in an 
American context, where liberty and freedom from oppression is enshrined in the very 
founding documents of the nation (though, originally only for those lucky enough to be born 
male and white.) However, as Haidt points out, liberals weigh Care comparatively much 
heavier, and are spurred to see liberty and oppression in terms of "underdogs, victims, and 
powerless groups..."(175) 
[The Liberty/oppression foundation] leads liberals (but not others) to sacralize 
equality, which is then pursued by fighting for civil rights and human rights. Liberals 
sometimes go beyond equality of rights to pursue equality of outcomes, which cannot 
be obtained in a capitalist system. This may be why the left usually favors higher 
taxes on the rich, high levels of services provided to the poor, and sometimes a 
guaranteed minimum income for everyone. (175) 
 
Conservatives, on the other hand, rely more heavily on Loyalty towards their own group: 
 
For them, the Liberty/oppression foundation and the hatred of tyranny supports many 
of the tenets of economic conservatism: don't tread on me (with your liberal nanny 
state and its high taxes), don't tread on my business (with your oppressive 
regulations), and don't tread on my nation (with your United Nations and your 
sovereignty-reducing international treaties). American conservatives, therefore, 
sacralize the word liberty, not the word equality. (175-176) 
 
Furthermore, because they are less likely to use all six moral foundations, those on the 
political left may sometimes find themselves baffled when their political counterparts 
evaluate morality in terms of loyalty, sanctity and authority. Why get so upset about burning 
a flag? It is only a piece of cloth with an at best symbolic meaning; it does not actually hurt 
anyone, right? However, if one's moral intuitions include considerations of respect for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 In The Righteous Mind, Haidt uses the example of the Occupy Wall Street and Tea Party movements as 
examples of fairness in a liberal and conservative matrix, pointing out that OWS movement tended to excoriate 
the wealthy elite for earning their millions by exploiting the less well-to-do, whereas Tea Party activists carried 
signs that read "Spread my work ethic, not my wealth" (137-138)  
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authority and loyalty to one's in-group (in this case, by nationality), it is easier to see why 
someone would find it morally provocative.  
Finally, the fact that conservatives have a wider basis for moral intuition does not 
mean they are more moral (it is easy to imagine a liberal making the contrary argument), but 
rather that aspects such as harm or fairness must sometimes take a backseat to other moral 
concerns. Someone who is opposed to abortion may well concede that asking a 16 year old 
girl, who desperately does not want a child, to carry that child to term may cause her harm: 
she may have to drop out of school, or anguish over having to give the child up for adoption. 
They might even concede that it is unfair. However, if they also believe that life begins at 
conception, the moral value of the sanctity of that life outweighs concern for harm or fairness 
to the mother. Likewise, someone who is opposed to abortion because life is a sacred gift 
may also be in favor of the death penalty: In this case, the punishment being proportional to 
the crime may weigh more heavily on the moral scales than the sanctity of the criminal's life. 
In other words, the weight of some moral foundations may forfeit others. 
Haidt describes what he calls a "moral matrix" which is composed of the moral 
foundations, and through which lens we evaluate the world. According to Haidt's research, 
political liberals mainly tend to base their evaluation of morality on the first Harm/care and 
Liberty/oppression as well as Fairness/cheating, but less so. Conservatives, on the other hand, 
place weight on all six foundations, with extremely conservative respondents tending to value 
Liberty, Loyalty, Authority and Sanctity most. As an example, consider the topic of marriage 
rights for gay couples. The liberal argument for equal marriage rights often cites the fact that 
no one will get hurt if two people who love one another are allowed to marry, and that the 
right to enjoy a spousal relationship with your loved one should not be contingent upon one 
partner being a man and the other being a woman. As long as no one is getting hurt, what's 
the harm? Should free, consenting people not have the opportunity to spend their lives 
together (and their tax breaks), regardless of their sexuality? In fact, is it not more harmful 
when gay couples are denied the same health care benefits as heterosexual couples, or denied 
the right to make medical decisions on behalf of their loved one because they are of the same 
sex? When considered in the context of moral foundations, it is clear that these arguments 
trigger the Care, Liberty, and Fairness foundations. It is immoral to deny same-sex couples 
the rights that are granted heterosexual couples: they are not harming anyone, they should be 
allowed to live their lives the same as everyone else, and they ought to enjoy the same 
societal benefits – such as tax deductions, next-of-kin status and health care benefits – as 
heterosexual couples. 
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The conservative moral counterarguments weigh just as heavily on the moral 
foundations. Consider some arguments taken from the National Organization for Marriage. 
From their "Marriage Talking Points", "Gays and lesbians have a right to live how they 
choose; they don't have the right to redefine marriage for the rest of us." Under the heading of 
"The Threat to Marriage", one may read that "swiftly and soon, more than a third of 
Americans will be living under legal same-sex marriage regimes." Others may cite, more 
explicitly, that same-sex marriage is an affront to God, that homosexuality is a sin, or that 
marriage is a traditional institution between a man and a woman. The argument about 
redefining marriage may properly be seen as relying on Fairness and Liberty: The beliefs of a 
select group should not be enforced on the whole of society, as it is both oppressive and 
disproportionate (moreover, the use of the word regime is also highly likely to trigger the 
Liberty moral foundation). It is morally wrong to impose the views of a few select 
individuals on the whole of society, especially when they are already allowed to live how 
they choose. For some, it is morally wrong to allow same-sex marriage because it goes 
against tradition and violates the law of God (and thus, Authority) and it is a sin (and thus 
opposed to Sanctity). Seen in light of the Moral Foundations theory, there is a reason why 
liberals and conservatives often seem to be talking past one another when discussing divisive 
issues: Liberals neglect to relate their argument to the moral foundations valued by 
conservatives, and may consequently present arguments that ring hollow: If one is concerned 
about the preservation of tradition and community, appeals based solely on the rights of the 
individual may provide more questions than answers. Conversely, conservatives appeal to 
moral foundations that liberals either do not recognize, or do not consider a part of morality. 
When liberals and conservatives appeal to others based on their own moral matrix, they run 
into the boundaries of moral intuition: what seems right and just to one side often misses the 
point entirely to those on the other side. 
The election campaign is an appeal to voters. According to Vavreck, the tone and 
theme of the campaign matters: even when the fundamentals are not in their favor, candidates 
may alter the race by picking the right strategy and theme. And how they talk about their 
chosen theme also matters. Campaigns wish to garner the support of as many voters as 
possible, and should therefore take care to talk about their policy proposals and theme in a 
way that appeals beyond their own moral base. This is all well and good in theory, but how is 
it practiced? Elections do not occur in a vacuum. They are influenced by the aforementioned 
fundamentals, but there is also a second factor to consider: the societal context. With every 
technological leap forward – the telephone, radio, television – new demands are made of a 
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campaign that wishes to succeed. The next chapter will examine the state of the news media 
in 2008, and discuss the arguably most prominent campaign tool of all: the political 
advertisement.        	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Chapter Two: Selling Democracy 
 
2.1 Media and Democracy 
 
Politics seem irrevocably tied to the media, and to the news media in particular. It does not 
seem likely that the average voter is completely uninformed about the election and the 
candidates, given that the easier option for someone with no investment in an election is to 
abstain from voting altogether. If one reasons that a voter's decision to participate is 
motivated at least in part by information, then it is worth considering where that information 
comes from. The answer to that is becoming increasingly clear: the media, particularly the 
television media, and at a growing (though not yet dominant) rate, the Internet.  
There is no denying that the birth and subsequent evolution of mass media has 
profoundly affected the political realm in the United States. Newspapers colonized the 
Frontier along with the settlers, as new newspapers appeared in new towns. Newspapers 
catered efficiently to specialized needs: local newspapers could respond quickly and 
efficiently to local matters, or provided a source of information and a touch of their native 
tongue to immigrant communities. Some, such as California-based Danish language 
newspaper Bien, established in 1882, still exist today. However, with the rise of radio and 
television, the print media gradually waned from its position as pre-eminent news source for 
the (literate) majority of Americans. What is now called mass media is commonly understood 
as media that broadcasts to an ever-expanding public, using a singular broadcast source (for 
instance a TV channel, newspaper, or radio station) to reach a vast audience in separate 
locations at once. However, as Joseph S. Tuman points out, "...mass media as a term is less of 
an end unto itself and more of a conduit, or series of conduits, through which the information 
about culture, shared and/or shaped, may be transmitted and received" (192). In other words, 
mass media communicate not only concrete cultural artifacts such as movies, songs or news 
items, they also transmit the more effervescent facets of culture: fashion, morals, ideals, 
values, cultural commentary and more. Tuman uses four dichotomies to refine and clarify the 
different roles of media: entertainment media/news media, broadcast media/print media, old 
media/new media, and paid/free media (193-203). Conceptualizing media along these lines 
helps clarify what the consuming public expect when they choose to partake of a media 
category, either explicitly or implicitly. For instance, few people would expect to be 
enlightened on some news item or political proposition by tuning in to the latest episode of 
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"American Idol" but they would likely expect so from watching the nightly news. Likewise, 
we have different expectations of an interview with a political candidate (free media) and an 
advertisement for the same political candidate (paid media).  
 The mass media outlets also serve core democratic functions. Shanto Iyengar and 
Jennifer A. McGrady provide the following summary: 
 
First, they provide an electoral forum in which all candidates can solicit support from 
voters. In the United States, the forum is a combination of paid and free media 
appearances, but primarily the former... Second, the news media are expected to erect 
a "public sphere" where voters can sample from a variety of perspectives on the issues 
that concern them... Third, the press is expected to act as an agent of the public by 
policing the behavior of government officials. Citizens lack the resources to monitor 
the actions of their leaders on a daily basis; they delegate this "watchdog" task to the 
media. (Iyengar and McGrady 4) 
 
Iyengar and McGrady argue that the American news sphere differs from the one in most 
other Western countries in that almost all news outlets are privately owned, and thus come 
under pressure for profits to secure and retain the largest possible share of the viewers. Thus, 
according to them, compared to the largely license-financed broadcast systems of other 
Western democracies, the American media is less shielded from market forces and therefore 
less able to provide "serious (rather than entertaining) news content" (20). This appears to be 
a truth with some modifications, especially when considering the 2008 election.  
Though many of the news providers in the American media market are indeed 
privately owned, that does not mean that there are no alternatives. The Public Broadcasting 
Act of 1967 established the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, or CPB. The CPB is tasked 
with allocating federal funds to the two major public broadcast systems in the United States, 
the Public Broadcasting System (PBS) and National Public Radio (NPR) in order to insulate 
the actual broadcasters from the political world (Waldman 152). However, it is true that there 
are some fundamental differences between the public broadcast systems in the United States 
and other Western nations. As Waldman points out, the "public" in public broadcasting 
system refers to government funding in most other countries, whereas American public 
broadcasting gets the majority of its funds from non-governmental revenue sources: Federal 
funding through the CPB provided only 14 percent of public broadcasting revenue in 2008, 
while other government support (state and local, as well as colleges and grants) provided 
another 13.6 percent (Waldman 152-154). The government funding for public broadcasting in 
the United States is granted through appropriations, with each taxpayer contributing roughly 
$1.35 in funding per year. In comparison, other nations tend to fund their public broadcasting 
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through licensing fees, at a much higher per-capita rate: $24.88 in Canada; $58.86 in Japan; 
$80.36 in the United Kingdom, and $101 in Denmark (Waldman 318). While one may 
certainly argue the conclusion that the American public broadcast model is somehow less 
serious and less civically minded than its European counterparts, it is true that the American 
funding model leaves the public broadcasters more susceptible to market changes. In 
particular, many public broadcast stations faced drastic cuts in their budgets as a result of the 
economic recession, as so much of the funding comes from private donations and corporate 
underwriting (Waldman 154). 
 Iyengar and McGrady suggest that the current American media system is one wherein 
party politics have been replaced by media politics: the path to success is no longer laid 
behind the scenes by party elites, but is in much larger part decided by the candidates' ability 
to navigate the media landscape. They suggest that this shift from backroom deals to 
newsroom candidacies happened in the aftermath of the tumultuous 1968 Democratic 
nomination. The Democratic Party decided to change the way it nominated presidential 
candidates: Instead of relying on the clout of local and state political organizations and the 
party elites, delegates to the national convention would now be chosen by state primaries. 
This left the news media in a prime position to fill the void left by the weakened influence of 
the party organizations (Iyengar and McGrady 21-22; Polsby 1983). As both major parties 
started moving towards candidate selection through primaries and caucuses, politicians 
hoping to gain the nomination now found themselves having to appeal directly to the voting 
public, rather than negotiate the power structures of the political parties and gain the support 
of party insiders and elites. Iyengar and McGrady, following Polsby's argument, support the 
view that the nomination reforms following the 1968 Democratic nomination debacle 
"fundamentally altered the incentives of presidential hopefuls in such a way as to diminish 
the role of party organizations and increase the importance of the media" (21).  According to 
Paul Allen Beck:  
The parties have devised strategies to retain some influence in the [presidential 
nomination] process – Democrats by selecting super delegates, Republicans by 
continuing some of the old rules – but the truth is that their efforts have borne little 
fruit. It is now difficult for the party organizations to exert much influence over the 
presidential nominations. (quoted in Cohen et al., 4) 	  
Others, such as Steger and Cohen et al., have challenged this view. Steger finds that 
endorsements by party elites strongly predicts which candidate is eventually selected: the 
"collective behaviors" of party elites matters, as party elites send signals to their partisan 
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electorates through endorsements, particularly during pre-primary season, the so-called 
invisible primary (Steger 2007, 98). Cohen et al. further this claim, suggesting that "party 
insiders use the invisible primary to coordinate behind a preferred candidate and to endow 
that candidate with the resources and prestige necessary to prevail in the state-by-state 
contests" (9). In other words, party elites buoy the chances of their preferred candidates, by 
increasing their media exposure, name recognition and fundraising odds. While one may 
subscribe to the idea of the resurgent party, as proposed by Steger and Cohen et al., or 
Iyengar and McGrady's concept of media politics, it is clear that the media play a significant 
role in the political process. After all, only a very small minority of the population has a 
chance to meet and converse with the candidates in a national election. If they want 
information, they will likely get it from the media. 
 The mass media may be seen as one side of a triangle consisting of the media, the 
voting public, and the political party or candidate. Increasingly, the political candidate relies 
on the media to reach voters, either through purchased advertising space or airtime, or 
through news coverage or political debates. The media, on their side, rely on the candidates 
for revenue, both from advertisements and from news value; access to a candidate becomes 
increasingly important to news companies in order to stay relevant as the campaign 
progresses. The candidates rely on the voter to attain office, and the media rely on the voter 
to obtain or retain market shares. And last, but far from least, the voters rely on the candidate 
for whom they vote to run the country to what the voters feel is their best interest, and they 
rely on the media to help them figure out which candidate that is. Joseph Tuman utilizes a 
model that regards the interaction between candidate, voter and media as a discursive 
process; an elliptical loop of chain kept in perpetual motion by three sprockets: the voter, the 
candidate's political campaign and the central sprocket being the media (9). At either end of 
the ellipse is the voter and the campaign; the media sprocket elicits speeches, ads, debates 
and news events from the campaign and transmits these to the voter, and then prompts 
consent or dissent, awareness or ignorance, apathy or action from the voting public and 
transmits this back to the campaign. According to Tuman, it is "the discursive process by 
which political information is shared and promotes awareness, ignorance, manipulation, 
consent, dissent, action or passivity" (8-9).  
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2.2 Old News, New News 
Though the main subject of this thesis will be televised advertising, it would be remiss not to 
briefly discuss the changes that transform our news reality, especially with regard to the 
Internet, as our daily life becomes increasingly infused with technology and information. As 
more and more people choose to pay for access to high-speed internet, or buy smartphones 
that are in effect palm-sized fully functional computers, the way we interact with the media 
that surrounds us and the news that inform our society is changing. Certainly, the booming 
growth of the Internet allows for an increase in the information available to the public; 
however, according to a report published by the Federal Communications Commission, the 
primary beneficiary of this information glut is hyperlocal information, i.e. information that 
primarily concerns itself with a single neighborhood or city block (Waldman 16). Moreover, 
the report notes that the media outlets of today are increasingly displaying a different quality 
– that of spreading and interpreting the news – at the cost of the most prominent function of 
the news media outlets of the past, namely information gathering. In other words, the media 
outlets most people are now familiar with are more focused on referring to and interpreting 
other news stories, rather than gathering and creating their own, than the news media of the 
preceding decades (Waldman 16). A third factor that further complicates the new information 
reality for voters is that while the increased availability of media has lead to a higher media 
consumption among the public, the number of people who report that they go newsless – 
which means that they reported not taking in a single news item the day before they were 
surveyed – rose from 13% to 17% in the span of a decade. Nearly a third of those who went 
newsless were 18-24 years old (Waldman 225-226).  
 By 2008, the percentage of the public that reported getting their news of television 
had declined to 60%, with the number of people getting their news from radio and print 
newspapers also on a downward curve. The number of people getting their news from online 
sources, however, was on a rise: close to 40% of the public as a whole said they had found 
their news online in the previous day, while among 18-29 year olds, the numbers for TV and 
online news were equally large, with 60% of respondents citing either source10. These 
numbers continue to climb, and in 2010, online news surpassed the traditional printed 
newspapers as a reported news source (Waldman 117). While the Internet's arguably greatest 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Waldman notes that the figures add up to more than 100%, as respondents were allowed to volunteer up to 
two sources. 
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asset is the openness and richness of its resources, providing a seemingly bottomless and 
growing pool of information about most anything under the sun, this presents some rather 
serious inherent challenges as well. On the one hand, as it has no overall editors and no 
inherent political or ideological affiliation as a whole, the Internet can provide a microphone 
(or soapbox) to anyone who is technologically literate enough to access the web. At the cost 
of a personal computer and an Internet connection, or even just a visit to the local library, a 
surfeit of information lays ready at one's fingertips. On the other hand, information may not 
be presented neutrally, or is even truthfully, and being able to tell the difference requires a 
good deal of sophistication. Some information may be presented as a neutral and unbiased 
source, and prove to be anything but. The inherently uncurated and anarchic structure of the 
Internet demands that its users understand that very little of the information they may have 
access to has been subject to any manner of quality control. Thus, this wealth of information 
is not an undivided positive; rather, it presents some inherent challenges to those who wish to 
make use of it. 
Moreover, despite the Internet becoming an increasingly important source of news 
and information for more and more people, it still has a long way to go before eclipsing the 
more traditional media as a news source. For one thing, most of the Internet-based news 
services are owned by or affiliated with major traditional media news outlets (Waldman 233-
235). Even if a person is more likely to turn to the Internet for his or her news needs, chances 
are that they will still receive more or less the same news they would have found had they 
opened a newspaper or turned on their TV. And secondly, though the Internet can provide a 
virtual rumpus room for likeminded individuals, one could well argue that with the advent of 
24/7 television channels with a political twist, such as Fox News and its liberal counterpart 
MSNBC, television news programs have become as much of an echo chamber as the Internet 
ever was. A study by the Pew Research Center's Project for Excellence in Journalism found 
that during the 2008 election, there was a distinct ideological in the campaign coverage of the 
major cable news channels. On Fox News, the stories presented John McCain noticably more 
favorably and were far more negative of Barack Obama, whereas the opposite was true of 
MSNBC's newscasts, with CNN falling somewhere in the middle. The network news 
channels – ABC, CBS and NBC – showed no such ideological leanings (Project for 
Excellence in Journalism, "The Color of News"). 
It is indisputable that for most people, interaction with some form of media is a 
considerable part of their daily lives. Whether they look to the media for news or 
entertainment, they are likely to be exposed to political advertising during an election cycle 
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as a consequence. What role does political advertisements serve? Some researchers have 
claimed that they poison the political well by turning the electorate against both the 
candidates and the political system, while others have refuted their claims and suggested that 
advertisements serve to engage, inform and motivate the electorate toward political 
participation.  
 
2.3 Ads and their Malcontents 
 
When discussing political advertising on television, many recall the truly iconic ads: The 
Daisy ad by President Lyndon B. Johnson in 1964; Ronald Reagan's "Morning in America" 
ad from the 1984 campaign; George H. W. Bush's "Weekend Passes", also known as the 
Willie Horton ad of 1988; Bill Clinton's "Journey", based on the biographical movie "The 
Man from Hope" which was aired at the 1992 Democratic Convention; "Windsurfing", the ad 
the Bush campaign released in 2004 which helped brand John Kerry a flip-flopper in the 
public discourse. Though these ads concern a variety of issues and candidates, they all seek 
the same goal: eliciting an emotional reaction in the viewer. Whether that reaction is fear, 
hope, contempt, or admiration, persuasion and emotion go hand in hand, and persuasion is 
one of the tasks of a good campaign.  
 In the bid for the 1952 Presidential election, the Republican Party hired three 
advertising companies to handle their media strategy, for three distinct markets. The 
Republican campaign combined research (studies showed that political speeches were too 
dense and lengthy for the average voter to comprehend and recall much of the overall 
message, whereas the brief and pointed advertisement yielded excellent message retention) 
and media savvy (pre-empting popular TV broadcasts with high-cost, but short ads in key 
media markets, instead of purchasing cheaper, but lengthier airtime slots for political 
speeches, as the Democratic campaign did) to shape a campaign unlike any before it. As 
Stephen Wood summarizes,  
A planned advertising campaign, conceived as a response to Harry Truman's slogan 
"You Never Had it So Good!", financed by Citizens for Eisenhower, produced by 
Madison Avenue ad-men, and diffused to key television markets – a first in American 
political television – was complete. (275) 
 
They were not without detractors, however: the Campaign Director for Volunteers for 
Stevenson accused the Republicans of marketing a presidential candidate "precisely the way 
they sell soap, ammoniated toothpaste, hair tonic or bubble gum" (Wood 272). The 
Democrats charged that the Eisenhower camp was swamping the airwaves with "G.O.P. 
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propaganda" designed to crowd out Stevenson in the final days before Election Night (Wood 
273), and even brought a complaint to the F.C.C. that the Eisenhower ad assault violated the 
Equal Time Provision of the Communication Act of 1934. The complaint was turned down 
by the F.C.C. and the Democrats abandoned their attempt to stop the ads (Wood 272-273). 
 The Democratic complaints, however, may sound familiar even to modern ears. The 
use of television advertising, particularly the negative or attack ads, has been roundly 
condemned by politicians and academics alike, to say nothing of the electorate in general. 
Political advertisements are generally divided into three categories: positive, contrastive and 
negative. Positive ads, also known as affirmative ads, are made to reflect well on the 
candidate it describes, and typically involve lauding their achievements if the candidate is an 
incumbent, or emphasizing the candidate's background, accomplishments or other personal 
qualities that make them a cut above the rest of the field. Contrastive ads, as the name 
implies, are set up to highlight the difference between candidates. Contrastive ads can be 
positive or negative, and often they are a blend of the two: the first half may condemn the 
supposedly deleterious consequences of electing one candidate, before extolling the virtues of 
the alternative in the second half. Negative ads, often called attack ads, are often seen as the 
bullies of the bunch: their main objective is to make the candidate in question look an ill fit 
for the position, at best. Though negative advertising in a political campaign is nothing new, 
it has never been quite as prevalent, nor arguably as powerful, as today. The 2008 cycle was 
both the most expensive and the most negative to date presidential campaign to date 
("Political Advertising in 2008" 4-5). 
Shanto Iyengar and Jennifer McGrady call attack ads "the hallmark of political 
advertising" (137) while Joseph Tuman refers to them as "rhetorical weapons of mass 
destruction" (235). Others argue, as John G. Geer does in In Defense of Negativity: Attack 
Ads in Presidential Campaigns, that attack ads are no more manipulative than positive ads, 
but rather a natural and necessary part of the contest for the highest office in the nation: 
political advertising is propaganda, and propaganda will always exaggerate, hyperbolize, and 
distort. The propaganda label fits positive advertising just as well as it fits attack ads, as when 
George Dukakis took credit for balancing the budget in Massachusetts without mentioning 
that a balanced budget is a requirement according to the state's constitution (In Defense of 
Negativity 5-6) As Geer writes:  
No candidate can be expected to be a neutral observer, judiciously weighing the key 
points of contention. They are highly motivated partisans seeking control of the 
government, making their best case for holding that office. (In Defense of Negativity 
5) 
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Yet, critics tend to focus primarily on the negative advertisement and largely ignore the 
positive ads, or regard them as less problematic. In his book, Geer contends that negativity is 
a vital part of a healthy democracy: it challenges candidates and their policies and subjects 
them to the scrutiny of the voters, of pundits and of the news media. Ultimately, Geer argues, 
the tone of the advertisement should not matter; the real matter of concern is whether or not 
the ad in question misleads the voter (In Defense of Negativity 3) Ads are about relaying 
information to the voter, either about yourself or your opponent, and the quality of that 
information is what distinguishes the benign from the detrimental. 
 The claim that negative advertising is detrimental to a politically engaged public, and 
thereby a healthy democracy, followed a development in advertising campaigns (and 
particularly television ads) of the late 1980s wherein political advertising was becoming 
increasingly negative (Tuman 34). In the 1960s, the dawn of the television age, negative 
advertisements constituted around a tenth of all ads. By 1990, roughly 40% of all political ads 
were negative in tone; by the 2008 election, that number had grown to over 60% (Geer, 
"Fanning the Flames" 4). Geer sees the rise of attack ads in the last 25 years as a consequence 
not only of the increasing polarization of the two major parties, but also as a consequence of 
the changing news media ("Fanning the Flames" 4-5). Politicals consultants not only believe 
that negative ads work better than positive ads, they also know that the news media will pay 
more attention to a negative ad than a positive one, creating further incentive to go on the 
attack. As Geer points out, the fact that politicians want to educate children or create a better 
America for the future is nothing newsworthy – it would be more newsworthy if they 
admitted they did not want that ("Fanning the Flames" 5) Airing a negative ad with a 
controversial accusation is much more likely to get the attention of the media, resulting in a 
news segment which not only gets the message out there, but may even reach voters who did 
not see the ad. A negative spot ad in a single competitive district may get broadcast nationally 
on the news that same evening, for free. The example used by Geer is that of the now-
infamous "Swift Boat" ads against John Kerry in 2004: Aired in only three states, they 
reached an estimated total of 1 million viewers, not even 1% of the voting-age population. 
However, the prominent news coverage following the ads assured that the entire nation knew 
about them and turned the term Swift Boat into a staple of the national political vocabulary 
(Geer, "Fanning the Flames" 5-6). It is clear that negative advertisements have a potential 
benefit to the campaign running them – visibility and newsworthiness, and thereby perhaps 
even massive, free publicity – but the benefits to voters is less clear. According to Geer, 
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political advertising on the presidential level (particularly negative political advertising) is no 
longer so much about directly affecting voters, but is more about shaping and controlling the 
news media's coverage ("Fanning the Flames" 15-16). However, if attack ads attempt to alter 
the direction of the political discourse by making headline-grabbing statements, then to what 
purpose? The end benefit to a serious candidate would be to enhance their chances at getting 
elected, as the news media do not vote, citizens do. Whether attack ads that receive media 
attention affect voters seems less a matter of if than of how. 
 In 1994, Ansolabehere et al. found that when viewers were exposed to an attack ad, 
they were less likely to indicate an intention to vote in an upcoming election compared to 
those who saw the positive version of the ad. They then compared the experimental results 
with actual turnout in the 1992 Senate elections, and found that turnout was 4% lower where 
the candidate's campaigns had been relatively negative (Ansolabehere et al. 833). In their 
1995 book Going Negative: How Political Advertisements Shrink and Polarize the 
Electorate, Ansolabehere and Iyengar claim that political advertising in itself increased 
polarization among voters, and that negative advertising reduced the number of likely voters, 
especially among independent voters (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 10-12). Their findings were 
widely publicized, and much of the research on political advertising and voter motivation 
since has answered back to the conclusions drawn by Ansolabehere and Iyengar in one way 
or another. Wattenberg and Brians, for instance, found no conclusive support for Going 
Negative in the data gathered from the National Election Survey and Federal Election 
Commission. They point out that this does not invalidate the experimental research, but calls 
into question the validity of the findings outside of the experimental setting (Wattenberg and 
Brians 896-897). 
 Ansolabehere and Iyengar proposed the following reasoning to explain why negative 
advertisement supposedly demobilizes the electorate: When they are exposed to negative 
advertisement, the content of the ads not only maligns the candidate in question, but in fact 
the entire political process. Countless nasty accusations serve to delegitimize both candidates, 
not only the one being targeted, and decrease people's feeling of political efficacy: in effect, 
negative advertising makes voting feel less useful or worthwhile (Ansolabehere et al. 835).  
However, people do vote: Something must be motivating them to do so. Freedman et al. 
found that exposure to political ads for presidential candidates increased the rate at which 
people were able to correctly identify the candidate's political positions on a left-right 
political spectrum, whereas House ads did not increase the voters' knowledge on issues 
(Freedman et al. 730-731). They further found that when individuals were asked to name 
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things they liked or disliked about a candidate (up to five items on each of the like and dislike 
questions), those who were exposed to more advertisements offered more responses, with the 
increase being slightly more pronounced on negative/dislike responses than positive/like. 
Furthermore, they found that the benefits of exposure to ads – higher candidate recognition, 
more knowledge about issues – were more pronounced in low-information voters (Freedman 
et al. 730-734). In sum,  
...there are good theoretical reasons to suspect that campaign ads – rich in information 
and laden with emotional content – have the potential to bring about a more attentive, 
more informed, and more participatory citizenry. Television advertisements can help 
increase the aggregate store of politically relevant information that voters have at their 
disposal, which in turn can help activate the heuristics that voters use in making 
decisions and making sense of the political world. (Freedman et al. 734) 
 
 As Robert A. Jackson, Jeffery J. Mondak and Robert Huckfeldt remark, much of the 
research following the publication of Ansolabehere and Iyengar's findings has focused on 
negative advertising's possible demobilizing impact on voters, while less attention has been 
paid to the claim that attack ads make the electorate feel less positive about the political 
system as a whole (55-56). Their study reveals no evidence to support the hypothesis that 
negative advertisement cause negative attitudes towards the political system as a whole. In 
fact, they found that neither exposure to attack ads, nor exposure to contrast ads that were 
primarily negative in tone, had any statistically significant effect on respondents' views on 
government (Jackson et al. 61). 
 Some caveats should be drawn from the research. For instance, they note that 
controlling for variables like age, gender, race, educational level, party identification or 
political interest all have a larger impact on political attitudes in the electorate than exposure 
to political advertising (Jackson et al., 57; Freedman et al., 734; Wattenberg and Brians, 893). 
Jackson et al. note that though their research did not turn up any evidence to support the 
claim that negative political advertising is damaging to the political system as a whole –
 either through demobilization or through decreasing feelings of trust in the political system 
and the politicians within it – it does not mean that no such adverse effects occur. The effect 
may simply be of such a nature that approaches so far have been insufficiently fine-tuned, or 
too perhaps narrow in scope, to pick up on it. Or, they suggest, perhaps voters are politically 
sophisticated enough to know not to throw the baby out with the bathwater. After all, politics 
happens not just during campaigns: it is a part of day-to-day life, and political advertising is 
not the only source of information on which voters rely (Jackson et al. 66-67). 
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 Moreover, information is not always an objective, quantifiable entity. One may only 
look to the term spin doctor to know that most people are at least nominally aware that 
information from a political candidate often comes with some kind of slant; fewer may be 
aware that people sometimes serve as their own distorting filter on information. A study done 
by Jeffrey W. Koch emphasizes the fact that though citizens may report to feel more 
knowledgeable after being exposed to political ads, that does not necessarily mean that they 
actually are: citizens may end up using the presence of a political ad to support and 
strengthen their political beliefs, rather than to actually use the informational in the ad to 
control and correct the accuracy of their political beliefs and insights (Koch 610). His 
research shows that higher exposure to negative ads made voters more certain that they knew 
the ideological position of the candidate being targeted, whereas positive ads did not have the 
same effect. However, this confidence betrays them: "as issue attack ads increases, 
misperception of the candidate's position increases..." (Koch 616). Moreover, it turns out that 
while a higher level of political knowledge increases the objective accuracy of an individual's 
evaluation of where a candidate stands on the ideological spectrum, partisanship does not. 
While citizens report that they are more confident that they know where their candidate 
stands on the issues, this does not translate into an actual increase in the accuracy of their 
beliefs. According to Koch, 
...an increase from the minimum to the maximum number of Republican negative 
issue ads broadcast increases the likelihood of perceiving a Democratic candidate who 
is a moderate as a liberal by 42 percent; a similar increase in the number of 
Democratic attack ads increases the likelihood of misperceiving a Republican who is a 
moderate as a conservative by 38 percent. (616) 
 
Koch suggests that the disparity in effectiveness may be because Democratic 
candidates are seen as more closely connected with government, and that the negative ads 
may work in tandem with citizens' pre-existing skepticism towards the government for an 
additional effect (614). Though this research was based on political advertising for candidates 
for the House of Representatives, Koch still notes that the findings are likely to affect other 
electoral contests. He notes the "pernicious" role political ads may play in primary elections 
in particular: "Absent the partisan heuristic, citizens may find themselves far more likely to 
make false inferences when having to choose among candidates of the same political party" 
(Koch 619). Ultimately, though the research suggests that advertising serves a democratic 
function – such as to mobilize the electorate, or to inform and engage voters, or to serve as a 
kind of communal vetting by exposing the possible weak points of a candidacy to public 
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criticism – advertising is costly, and yet, no campaign can foster even the most remote hope 
of success without it.  
 
2.4 Financing the Ad Cycle 
No matter how one regards political advertising in general and attack ads in particular, the 
fact is that both are a large, and ever growing, part of elections: as candidates run ever 
increasing number of ads, the cost of the ads are swallowing up more and more of the 
campaign coffers. When political campaigns reach dizzying heights in terms of costs, two 
major concerns arise. The first is the cost of the campaign to the candidates themselves – 
when some candidates can dip into their own personal fortunes to bolster their efforts, they 
put those who are not quite so well off at a disadvantage, potentially turning a political 
candidacy into an affluent man's game. The second, and more insidious question: Where does 
the money come from? Certainly, some of the funding comes from the people, but when the 
Presidential candidates in 2008 raised over $1 billion ("Banking on Becoming President"), it 
seems likely that not all of this money came from the grass roots. Rather, the business of 
fundraising is becoming an ever more important part of the job description for any politician. 
Whether or not money actually buys votes is up for debate. On the one hand, most politicians 
accept donations from both sides of any issue, so politicians and lobbyists themselves often 
make claims that the money, in effect, cancels itself out in terms of influence: As Barney 
Frank says in an interview, " If the voters have a position, the voters will kick money's rear 
end every time" (Take the Money..."). On the other hand, it's unlikely that voters will have a 
position on every item on a politician's agenda. The people who do have a position are the 
ones who devote their days to understanding and affecting public policy: lobbyists and their 
clients, who are willing to pay to have their positions heard on even the smallest policy detail. 
According to the Federal Election Committee, Barack Obama raised a total of 
$778,642,962, of which almost $665 million came from a total of 687,545 individual 
contributors ("Candidate Summary ... Barack Obama"). John McCain raised a total of 
$399,826,088, of which just shy of $206 million was given by 236,344 individual donors 
("Candidate Summary ... John S. McCain"). Though Obama outspent John McCain in total 
advertisement spending, such figures are somewhat misleading, as they include both 
spending for the primaries as well as the general election. The Democratic primaries were 
competitive well into June, whereas John McCain clinched the Republican nomination by 
early March. Furthermore, Barack Obama opted out of the Presidential Election Campaign 
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Fund's (PECF) federal matching funds, whereas John McCain chose to opt in. Neither 
candidate participated in the primary matching funds program, though McCain's decision to 
opt out was subject to discussion, due to a loan contract that seemed to suggest participation 
in, and funds received from, the primary matching funds program would serve as collateral 
for the loan ("Letter to..."). Barack Obama became the first major party presidential nominee 
to opt out of the federal funding program for the general elections since Watergate, and was 
able to vastly outspend John McCain; part of the process to qualify for federal funding is to 
agree to only spend a limited amount, set at $84.1 million in 2008 (Salant). Over the course of 
the general election campaign, Barack Obama outspent McCain three times over, and five 
times over in the period between September 1 and November 1 ("Advertising Money"). 
During the primaries, McCain accused Obama of going back on his commitment to receive 
public funding in the general campaign, and suggested he might have to reconsider his own 
commitment toward public funding ("McCain attacks Obama"). McCain eventually went 
forwards with support from the PECF, likely due in large part to his years' long dedication to 
campaign finance reform, culminating in 2002's Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), 
also known as McCain-Feingold, named for its Senate sponsors John McCain and Russell 
Feingold. 
The public funding system has its roots in legislation passed by Congress in 1971, 
namely the Federal Election Campaign Act and the Revenue Act, which established the 
Presidential Fund and allowed tax payers to designate $1 from their taxes to fund presidential 
elections. However, with the passing of Watergate, it became clear that this legislation was 
insufficient: Andrew Rudalevige writes that "the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) of 
1971 was violated in every particular by the subsequent campaigns of 1972" (131). As a 
response to the revelations of the Nixon campaign's slush money excesses, Congress passed 
strict amendments in 1974, intended to reign in spending and enhance oversight of campaign 
funding and financial resources (Rudalevige 131-132). However, subsequent Supreme Court 
decisions such as Buckley v. Valeo in 1976 struck down limitations on expenditures for 
candidates (except Presidential candidates receiving public funding) as well as limitations on 
expenditures from candidates' personal funds, citing limitations on spending as a violation of 
the candidate's right to free speech ("FEC Litigation"; Rudalevige 161). According to 
Rudalevige, Buckley v. Valeo was crucial to the rise of the Political Action Committee, or 
PAC. Donations to a candidate was limited to $1000, whereas PACs could accept donations 
up to $5000 (which the PAC could then donate to the candidate) and faced no limits on their 
advertising expenditures, so long as they did not employ the terms vote for or vote against. 
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By 1979, the Federal Election Commission had approved legislation that donations to state 
political parties would be governed by state rules, and that state parties could support 
candidates in federal elections (Rudalevige 162-163). 
Thus was born the "soft money" loophole. Money given to the state parties under state 
rules could now be spent in those states to promote presidential candidates, outside 
the federal "hard" caps on contributions. Until 1991 such "soft" donations did not 
even have to be disclosed. (Rudalevige 163) 
 
The glut of soft money increased with time: in 1996, the Republican and Democratic parties 
spent a total of $260 million in soft money, and by 2000, that number had reached $495 
million (Rudalevige 164) A large portion of this was spent on advertising. 
 In an attempt to curb the increasingly vast and convoluted financial contributions 
towards campaigns, Congress passed the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act in 2002. The 
BCRA stated that political parties and candidates' campaign committees could only spend 
hard money raised from individuals and PACs, ruling out donations by corporations and 
labor organizations. Furthermore, it raised the contribution limits and ensured that the limits 
would be adjusted for inflation. Additionally, the legislation sought to create new restrictions 
on PAC expenditures, and created the umbrella term "electioneering communications" to 
denote expenses that could be paid for with funds donated by corporations or labor 
organizations (Hollihan 264-265; "Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act"). The law was 
challenged in the Supreme Court in 2003 on First Amendment grounds, but a 5-to-4 decision 
upheld most of the limitations on spending and donations. By 2007, however, the court had a 
new Chief Justice and a new member on the bench. In a new 5-to-4 decision, the Court left 
the soft money ban intact, but struck down limitations on ads funded by corporations and 
labor organizations (Greenhouse and Kirkpatrick). 
 In effect, this served to undermine the ban on soft money, central to the BCRA; 
however, money did not need to wait for the Supreme Court to find a way around the ban. In 
early 2004, liberal activists started funneling money into what became known as 527 
organizations (named after a section in the Internal Revenue Code), which were allowed to 
engage in political acts "short of expressly advocating the election or defeat of a federal 
candidate" (Hollihan 258). Bush-Cheney, Inc. lodged two administrative complaints with the 
FEC in March 2004, but was not given an official ruling, which prompted conservatives to 
start utilizing their own set of 527s ("Federal Election Commission Record"; 
"Racicot/Gillespie"). The FEC did eventually penalize three of the major 527s, ordering them 
to pay penalties of $630,000 – but not until December 2006 ("The 527 Page"). Shortly 
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thereafter, a different loophole in the federal tax code allowed 527s to reorganize as 
501(c)(4)s. As Thomas A. Hollihan points out,  
When soft money contributions could no longer be sent directly to candidates or 
parties, the use of 527 groups increased. Attempts to regulate 527 groups led to 
expanded use of 501(c)(4) groups... The 501 groups may pose even greater danger 
than have the 527s, for as long as the 501(c) groups can claim that "political campaign 
intervention" or "federal campaign activity" is not their primary purpose, their 
contributions and expenditures may remain largely undisclosed. (Hollihan 262) 
 
The efforts to control campaign spending are rooted in the legitimate concern that money will 
distort the political process. If money should become the deciding factor in the outcome of an 
election, it might open the gates wide to potential corruption, as the access to funding would 
be a prime concern for candidates hoping to win office.  Considering the vast sums of money 
spent on campaigns and advertisements, and the vast effort put in by candidates to gather 
these funds, it must be concluded that the candidates believe that it serves a purpose. If 
nothing else, at this point campaigns are likely a zero-sum game: should one candidate decide 
to forgo campaigning, he or she effectively ends their own candidacy by doing so, unless they 
can somehow persuade their opponent to abstain from campaigning as well.  
 
2.5 How Ads Serve Candidates 
As it turns out, ads serve candidates in more ways than simply encouraging voters to vote for 
them, or against the opposition. Advertisements provide a pulpit and a market stand, from 
which to sermonize to the true believers and proselytize to the undecided and independents. 
In his 2007 book The Political Brain: The Role of Emotion in Deciding the Fate of the 
Nation, Drew Westen argues that contrary to conventional wisdom, political advertising does 
not only buy access to the marketplace of ideas, but also to the marketplace of emotions. He 
argues that this is the more important aspect of political campaigns: Republicans have eagerly 
created emotional appeals – save the flag, protect life, keep marriage sacred – while 
Democrats for the most part seemed content to peddle facts and figures in the marketplace of 
ideas (Westen 36). This may look good on paper, but in practice it stirs neither the heart, nor 
the mind. Relying on reason alone, Westen argues, fundamentally misrepresents how the 
brain actually works. Numbers, statistics, and analyses only work when they are hung as 
ornaments on emotional hooks that rouse emotional responses, be they hope or dismay, fear 
or elation (87-88, 133-141). The role of emotion in politics is an important one, and is 
explored further below. For now, Westen's idea of a marketplace of emotion will serve as the 
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foundation for the various ways in which candidates may use advertising, beyond the obvious 
solicitation for votes. 
 Candidates may use ads for agenda-setting, through framing and priming. These are 
effects of how the media alter our perception of the world around us, which derive from the 
power given to relatively sparse news segments. Even in an age of 24-hour news broadcasts, 
most people dedicate roughly an hour or so of their daily life to watching the news. Data 
from the Federal Communications Commission indicate that in 2008, the average American 
consumed 11.8 hours of some form of media, of which 70 minutes was spent on taking in 
news: 57 minutes of traditional media, 13 minutes of searching for news online (Waldman 
226). It follows that a news broadcast will return to the stories most likely to grab viewers' 
attention and keep them tuned in at different points during the day for a 24-hour news 
channel, and in each major news broadcast for local and traditional network news. Thus, most 
news broadcasters transmit the same top stories several times a day. If candidates can manage 
to affect the news coverage with their advertising, this allows them an opportunity to try to 
alter the electorate's perception of their candidacy or their opponent.  
 Agenda-setting refers to the power of the media to direct topics into public attention 
and discussion, and consequently to exclude other topics, as column space and broadcast slots 
are inevitably limited. Thomas A. Hollihan cites mass communication scholars Maxwell 
McCombs and Donald Shaw: 
Both the selection of objects for attention and the selection of frames for thinking 
about those objects are powerful agenda-setting roles. Central to the news agenda and 
its daily set of objects  – issues, personalities, events, etc. – are the perspectives that 
journalists and consequently members of the public employ to think about each 
object. The perspectives direct attention toward certain attributes and away from 
others. (quoted in Hollihan 116) 
 
In other words, by selecting some news items for attention, the news media in effect obscure 
other news stories. This power can be compared to that of a spotlight in a darkened theater, 
illuminating and directing the audience's attention to some actors while leaving the others in 
comparative darkness. In addition, the way a news story is presented can alter how the facts 
of the story are perceived: context can affect content. This is typically referred to as framing, 
a concept that proves to be somewhat nebulous in practice. 
 According to James N. Druckman, there are two distinct concepts of framing: Frames 
in communication and frames in thought. Frames in communication focus on how a message 
is presented to an audience: The choice of "words, images, phrases and presentation styles" 
(Druckman 227) is deliberate, and may betray what the speaker thinks is the most important 
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aspect of the topic. Frames in thought focus on the recepient of the message, and how they 
understand what they are being told: it is not specifically a part of communication itself, but a 
subjective cognitive property. Both framing concepts often work in tandem, and the 
communicative frame a speaker chooses may alter the cognitive frame of the recipient, which 
is referred to as a framing effect. (Druckman 227-228) A speaker may, for instance, talk 
about an 8% unemployment rate, as opposed to a 92% employment rate. The two are 
logically equivalent, but they do not seem to communicate the same thing: the former is 
negative and the latter is positive. When framing a story, the presenter (be they politician or 
news dispatcher) puts the content of the story, the facts or figures, into a particular context. 
One can, for instance, frame the issue of abortion as womens' right to control their own 
bodies and their future, or on the other hand, as killing an unborn life. Increasing taxes on the 
rich could be framed as every citizen putting in their fair share to society's collective pot, or 
as wealth redistribution that punishes the affluent for their material success and discourages 
and devalues hard work and sacrifice. Most news stories and political issues are complex and 
multi-faceted, and it is very hard indeed to discuss them without framing in one sense or 
another, especially when time is limited and brevity is of the essence. Framing not only 
provides a context within which to understand what is being told, but it also "...promotes a 
particular definition of a problem, offers an interpretation of likely causation, possibly 
suggests a moral evaluation, and perhaps recommends a certain policy to respond to the 
problem" (Hollihan 121). 
Priming occurs when the news media choose to focus on some subjects over others, 
and affect the public by "planting the seed of an idea in their minds" (Hollihan 117-118). In 
an experiment on priming and presidential evaluations, Shanto Iyengar, Mark D. Peters and 
Donald R. Kinder show that evaluations of President Carter's overall performance, 
competence, and integrity fluctuate remarkably in correlation with the kind of news coverage 
respondents were shown. According to them, "Problems prominently positioned in television 
broadcasts loom large in evaluations of presidential performance" (Iyengar et al. 146). 
Following this experimental data, Jon A. Krosnick and Donald R. Kinder found that "citizens 
questioned after the [Iran-Contra] revelations held President Reagan to an altered set of 
standards, and these alterations can be directly traced to the changes in the media's agenda 
provoked by the Iran-Contra revelations" (Krosnick and Kinder 160). In sum, because the 
news media – on television, radio, in print or on the Internet – is the public's chief source of 
news items and issues relevant to an election, they have the power to shape the shared news 
reality of the public. They direct our attention to issues and breaking news, give us context in 
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which to understand the content of the stories, and influence the way we evaluate political 
candidates. The media do not necessarily suggest what citizens should think, but rather what 
they should think about. It is no big stretch to posit that advertisements, and their increasingly 
symbiotic relationship with the news media, may serve some of the same function. In 
particular, both Vavreck and Erikson and Wliezen see priming as the main tool by which 
candidates may alter how they are judged (Vavreck 16-18, Erikson and Wliezen 8-9). 
 Advertising is also an important part of a candidate's toolkit for building an image. As 
Thomas Hollihan points out, very few among the electorate are priviledged enough to 
personally get to know a presidential candidate. Instead, we are reliant on the information 
they choose to divulge, and the image they create of themselves (Hollihan 76). In the 
campaign ad called "Journey" from the 1992 elections, Bill Clinton was the Man From Hope, 
who, upon graduation "...didn't care about making a lot of money, I just wanted to go home 
and see if I could make a difference" (Clinton-Gore). In the 2000 ad "Successful Leader", 
George W. Bush was called a "compassionate conservative leader" and a "fresh start for 
America" (Maverick Media, "Successful Leader); In "Priorities", he awoved that only when 
his priorities had been funded ("preserving" social security and Medicare and to "strengthen" 
education and the military), his administration would "pass money back to the taxpayers" 
(Maverick Media, "Priorities). Not only would Bush be the candidate to improve America, he 
would in effect refund taxpayers while doing so. The image candidates seek to create is just 
that: the construct they want us to see when looking at them. However, they may also be 
subject to an image created by their opponent; all the same, the image constructs work the 
same way, by creating a positive or negative media likeness of a political candidate to be 
dispersed among the electorate. 
Lastly, advertisements help create a common policy shorthand: a set of shared cues 
that help to build opinions before and election, and upon which the electorate may judge the 
performance of an incumbent or a major party during their administration and towards the 
next election cycle. They are the perfect medium – provided they work as intended, which 
they do not always do – to create a brief summary of a candidate, whether with malicious or 
benevolent intent. Ads are short, snappy and to-the-point: they are made to invoke emotions 
and create reactions in the viewers. As it turns out, emotions can play a crucial part in 
politics. 
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2.6 Emotion and Voting 
Political science has traditionally taken a decidedly rational approach to how citizens 
participate politically. When Anthony Downs published his touchstone article "An Economic 
Theory of Political Action in a Democracy" in 1957, the notion of Homo politicus as a 
rational creature became the accepted standard upon which to evaluate political behavior. 
Downs built his theory on a set of axioms: Candidates are driven to politics solely to enjoy 
privilege, power and income; the winning party has complete governmental control; the 
government's economic powers are unlimited; the government's only limit on power is that it 
may only restrict political freedom to avoid a coup d'état; and finally and most critically, 
every agent within the system acts completely rationally at all times, pursuing its goals at a 
minimum of cost and only making decisions where the "marginal return exceeds marginal 
cost" (Downs 137). In this system, political parties only formulate the kinds of policies that 
will maximize their votes, and citizens only vote for the candidates that will prove most 
advantageous to them. The only condition on which Downs acknowledges that citizens may 
in fact vote against their most advantageous alternative is when they are suffering from 
imperfect information. By this he means that parties may not know what citizens want, 
citizens may not know what the government is doing, and the information to correct either of 
these knowledge gaps may be too costly to gather, compared to the benefit of attaining it. 
(Downs 139) In his view, most, if not all peculiarities of a political system may be explained 
by imperfect information. For instance, party ideologies exist because they spare citizens the 
resource cost of analyzing every possible issue to ensure his or her maximum benefit, as this 
is already embedded in the ideology of the party, where ideology is defined as "verbal images 
of 'good society' " (Downs 141). Furthermore, what have been considered irrational aspects 
of modern democracies are all rooted in the logic of economically rational responses: 
Apathy among citizens toward elections, ignorance of the issues, the tendency of 
parties in a two-party system to resemble each other, and the anti-consumer bias of 
government action can all be explained logically as efficient reactions to imperfect 
information in large democracies. (Downs 149) 
 
The cost of information keeps society perpetually in a cycle of imperfect knowledge on 
behalf of both government and citizens.  
A second model of rationality in politics comes from the limitations of citizens 
themselves, rather than from the all-encompassing rationality based more or less on cost-
benefit analyses. This bounded rationality sees the citizen as a limited organism, lacking the 
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computer-like analytical power needed to make the optimal decision in every complex 
situation. Bounded rational behavior (also called procedural rationality) occurs when the 
decision-maker tries to act as efficiently as possible within the limits inherent in their human 
nature. (Simon 294) In Simon's words, bounded rationality is "... behavior that is adaptive 
within the constraints imposed both by the external situation and by the capacities of the 
decision-maker" (294). Bounded rationality has its roots in behaviorism, but unlike its 
intellectual roots, it embraces the inner workings of its subjects and expects its theories to 
describe the many and complex processes of the information-processing human mind. 
(Simon 295) However, neither economic rationality nor bounded rationality hold very much 
predictive power over political situations without extensive empirical research to determine 
the specifics of any situation; simply applying the principles will not be enough (Simon 303). 
However, the notion of political action as a decision motivated purely by rationality, whether 
bounded or otherwise, has come under fire. 
 
In The Political Brain, Drew Westen argues persuasively for the power of emotion, 
rather than rationality, to inform our voting decisions. He argues that the structure of our 
brains grants emotions primacy over reason, likening the two to a horse and rider: reasoning 
may pro and pull on the reins, but ultimately, emotion is the one actually moving forwards. 
(62-63) Appealing to the emotional part of the political brain, he writes, is the central reason 
why Republicans have, overall, done better than Democrats in recent history: while 
Democrats have leaned on facts and figures – the cold, hard, cerebral evidence of a rational 
appeal – Republicans have painted with a broader brush, putting the stuff of rational 
decisions into an emotional context and appealing to people's wishes, fears and values. In 
order to appeal more effectively to the people whose votes you wish to garner, Westen 
suggests four goals for the aspiring electoral champion: 
The first goal transcends any given candidate: to define the party and its principles in 
a way that is emotionally compelling and tells a coherent story of what its members 
believe in, and to define the other party and its values in ways that undermine its 
capacity to resonate emotionally with voters. This is the first goal of any campaign 
because the way voters experience the party is the first influence on the way they will 
experience the candidate. The second goal of an effective campaign is to maximize 
positive and minimize negative feelings toward its candidate, and to encourage the 
opposite set of feelings toward the opponent. ... The third goal of a campaign is to 
manage feelings towards the candidate's personal characteristics. ... The fourth goal is 
to manage positive and negative feelings toward the candidate's policies and positions. 
This goal is not only fourth but a distant fourth. (137-140) 
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Few topics on an electoral agenda are as complicated, cerebral and laden with statistics as the 
economy. Complex economic theories and dense statistical analyses are highly unlikely to 
stoke much emotion in the average voter, one way or the other. A good electoral strategy 
would be one that plays towards this, and creates a narrative that is both coherent and 
emotionally appealing, rather than intimidate with dry numbers and percentage-driven 
appeals. To Westen, marketing and advertising is the key analogy to make sense of modern 
political strategy; in fact, he remarks of the overall Democratic electoral approaches of recent 
history, "If this is how Coke marketed itself, we would all be drinking Pepsi" (169). 
 Evidence suggests that emotional responses are a motivating factor when it comes to 
participation in the political process. Jost and Sidanius write that research on cognitive 
processes and social cognition "... has so dominated political psychology and neighboring 
fields for the last 20 years or more ... [that] the role of affect and emotion has been given 
relatively short shrift in research on candidate perception and voting behavior" ("Mass Media 
and Candidate Perception" 136). Marcus and MacKuen have found that emotional response 
greatly correlate with political learning and political participation: Enthusiasm towards a 
candidate directly affected voting choice, whereas anxiety about a candidate caused 
respondents to focus more on learning about the situation or candidate. This emotional 
response guides our behavior in the time before and during an election, they argue: 
Because a political campaign is a struggle between competing partisans, some 
citizens, though not all, experience the cut-and-thrust of politics as threatening. People 
unaroused will safely vote their standing choice while those pricked by anxiety will 
perk up, gather new information, and perhaps abandon their old habits. (Marcus and 
MacKuen 170) 
 
A later study by Leonie Huddy, Stanley Feldman, Charles Taber and Gallya Lahav suggests 
that there is a distinction between anxiety and threat: anxiety caused people to be more wary 
of interventionist government policies, preferring a less direct and thus less risky approach. 
Threat, on the other hand, is linked with a preference for more a more active policy approach.  
 
2.7 Ideology and Morality 
There is a vast array of complex issues that may affect how a citizen casts their vote. The 
obvious differences between people (age, gender, race, educational level, income) as well as 
somewhat less obvious differences (political socialization, peer groups, family situation, 
religious affiliation) may all influence how an individual votes. In The American Voter 
Revisited, Lewis-Beck et al. use a model they call the "funnel of causality" to encompass all 
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the aspects pertaining to a citizen's final decision to vote for a certain candidate (22-23). The 
funnel starts out wide and narrows as it moves along the axis of time: At the widest, top part 
of the funnel is socio-demographics; below that, party identification; then the issues; and at 
the narrowest part of the funnel, the candidates. The funnel ends on Election Day, with a vote 
decision.  Lewis-Beck et al. see party identification not as being active in or a member of a 
political party, but rather as a psychological identification to a party, its candidates, and the 
broad ideological strokes it represents. Unlike in political systems where a multitude of 
smaller parties represent more narrowly segmented electorates and often rule by coalition, the 
two major parties in the United States are often seen as big tents that allow for a diversity of 
opinion within its larger conservative or liberal umbrella.  
Party identification and ideology are seen as largely stable features of a person's 
political make-up: though both may change throughout an individual's life, they are less 
likely to fluctuate from election to election (Lewis-Beck et al). Ideology, however, spans 
wider than party identification. As they write of ideology, 
 
These fundamental principles imply the institutional arrangements appropriate for 
governance, along with values to guide political action. In this manner, an ideology 
summarizes a person's overall stance toward the political world. But it does far more 
than this. An ideology can also give political meaning to an enormous variety of 
observations, events and experiences that fall outside the immediate realm of politics. 
Ideological principles may underlie a person's ideas about appropriate family 
structures, the specific content of educational curriculums, the role of religion in 
society, and the sources of economic stress. (Lewis-Beck et al 207) 
 
 
They refer to ideology as a "subjective lens" through which outside events are seen, colored, 
and made relevant to a person's political reality (207). In the past, political science and 
psychology usually saw ideology as something that mostly arose from and was influenced by 
structures and events external to the individual, such as political socialization (the acquisition 
of political attitudes from family and peers) or major historical events, e.g. the Civil War or 
the Civil Rights movement (Lewis-Beck et. al). Others view political affiliation and 
ideological preference in terms of innate traits, of which Openness to Experience and 
Conscientiousness is usually seen to be the determinant factor separating liberals from 
conservatives (e.g. Gerber et al; Carney et al.)  
Haidt employs an elephant-and-rider metaphor, similar to Westen's idea of a horse 
and rider described above. He suggests further that whichever way the elephant (our 
subconscious and near-instant moral intuitions) starts to lean, the rider (the conscious, 
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cognitive reasoning) starts looking in that direction, and ignores everything off to the other 
side (Haidt 56). In other words, the instant feedback from our moral intuition narrows a 
potentially infinite field of information to a more manageable size, as the information which 
contradicts the intuitive decision is set aside or outright discarded: Our gut feeling says, "I 
don't like this!" and the brain follows up, "And here's why not!" Furthermore, Haidt writes,  
 
[...] if you want to change someone's mind about a moral or political issue, talk to the 
elephant first. If you ask people to believe something that violates their intuitions, 
they will devote their efforts to finding an escape hatch – a reason to doubt your 
argument or conclusions. They will almost always succeed. (50) 
 
 
If an individual already has an indication of what they want to believe, they will look for 
reasons why they should believe it, and not for any reason why they should not. Conversely, 
if they have an indication of what they do not want to believe, they will search for reasons 
why they should not believe it, and not for any reason why they should. In both cases, finding 
even a single reason to support their decision is tantamount to justification. (Haidt 84)  
This is where the foundations of morality become vital: people will want to vote for 
what they believe is morally right, that which corresponds with their internal sense of right 
and wrong. Haidt likens our moral minds to a "tongue with six taste receptors" (114): in this 
metaphor, liberals taste only sweet (Harm/Care) and salty (Fairness/Cheating), whereas 
conservatives use the whole tongue. Accordingly, if one is used to tasting the bitter, sour and 
savory as well, a dish that is merely salty and sweet may easily come across as bland, or even 
distasteful. According to Haidt, people tend to fall into a moral matrix that provides them a 
"complete, unified and emotionally compelling world view" (107). These moral matrices 
vary from culture to culture, and there may also be several distinct matrices within any given 
culture, but they all build on the same moral foundations: as such, liberal and conservative 
policies may be seen as "deeply conflicting but equally heartfelt visions of the good society" 
(Haidt 109). Without understanding the moral foundations on which liberals and 
conservatives build their ideological worlds, and which inform the motivations for their 
policy preferences, one remains trapped in a conversation which is nominally about the same 
issue – such as Social Security, national defense, or tax policy – but where the participants in 
effect talk past one another as though they were speaking separate languages. Understanding 
moral motivation is essential to bridging the gap between "welfare queens" and "The Great 
Society", or between "tax-and-spend liberals" and "right-wing nutjobs". As Jonathan Haidt 
rightly points out, what was the matter with Kansas might not be that Republicans 
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hoodwinked rural voters into betraying their own interests, but rather that Democrats asked 
them to vote for policies that clashed with their own moral beliefs. It is not hard to imagine 
that anyone would vote against their wallet if they felt the moral character of their country 
was at stake (185-186). 
In sum, then, this is what the evidence suggests. There are two main dimensions to an 
election: the fundamentals and the candidates' campaigns. The fundamentals are, for the most 
part, already set in place as before the campaigns begin. They consist of the historical and 
sociological setting of the election, as well as certain aspects of the candidates and the voters, 
such as the demographical and ideological makeup of the electorate. Of the different aspects 
of the fundamentals, the economy is generally regarded as the most important. There is very 
little the candidates can do to change the fundamentals: if they wish to win the election, their 
response to the fundamentals is key. Major party candidates are seen to be motivated, above 
all, by winning the election, and in order to do so, they must influence voters to vote in their 
favor. Of the different ways a candidate has to reach the voters and impart their message, 
political advertisements are likely quite effective, both due to the nature of the advertisements 
themselves, and as a consequence of the state of the news media and how the voting public 
obtains information. When deciding to vote for one candidate over another, it is unlikely that 
the voter evaluates all salient aspects of the two candidates in order to rationally calculate 
which candidate will benefit the voter the most. Rather, it is more likely that the decision is in 
part a consequence of internal factors, such as ideology and party affiliation. However, votes 
are not cast in isolation, and candidates devote significant time and resources to try and sway 
voters to their side. Candidates tend to try to achieve this goal by campaigning on issues, 
such as domestic policy or the economy, in an attempt to prime the electorate to evaluate both 
candidates on certain topics. Candidates, therefore, can be considered to choose their 
campaign themes in order to prime the voters to evaluate the election on terms that are 
beneficial to the candidate and detrimental to their opponent. However, simply causing the 
voters evaluate the election on the terms a candidate desires is not the only thing that needs 
doing. In order to ensure that the voters evaluate them positively on their chosen subject, 
candidates should also approach the subject in a way that appeals intuitively, as well as 
intellectually, to the voters they wish to reach.   
In the next chapter, the analysis of the election will begin by discussing the most 
salient fundamentals going into the campaign season: the previous president, the primaries, 
and the roots of the economic crisis that would come roaring into view in mid-September. 	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Chapter Three: The Long Campaign 
 
Setting the stage for the 2008 presidential election requires discussing the context in which 
the election existed: the previous presidency, the primaries leading up to the selection of the 
candidates, and the burgeoning economic crisis that would become an outstanding issue in 
the last months before the election. In a general election, the candidates will find themselves 
facing the historical record of their predecessor, as well as their own record in the primaries. 
Regardless of their party affiliation, candidates are bound to address the previous president. If 
the current president is popular and times are good, the candidates will profit from being seen 
in the same beneficial light, and if times are bad and the president is floundering, the 
candidates will wish to distance themselves and appear as credible alternatives, promising 
success and prosperity.  
Furthermore, they will be faced with their own, very public statements from the 
primary season immediately preceding the general election. During a primary election, the 
candidates appeal to their own base: a candidate must first garner the most possible votes 
from his or her ideological peers in order to reach the point where they can focus on the 
general election. Moreover, they will attempt to differentiate themselves from other primary 
candidates and hopefully woo voters from the opposition's camps. It is generally assumed 
that candidates will appeal to their party base during primaries, and thereafter moderate their 
statements in the general election in order to appeal to the median voter in the populace. 
However, they are also constrained by their primary performance in how much they may 
moderate their positions (Adams and Merrill 2008, 345-46). Once the primaries end, both 
candidates leave a wake of party-centric policy statements and erstwhile opponents who must 
now appear as credible supporters.  
Finally, the economic crisis that became so central to the election was long in the 
making. As will be discussed, the roots of the financial crisis were decades old, vast, and 
complex. There would be no simple answer to give to the question of how it could happen, 
and no single company, agency, or administration on which to heap the blame. However, for 
all its complexity the crisis became more salient, rather than less: when no simple answer 
could be found, the candidates' positions were thrown that much more into stark contrast. 
Given the seemingly overnight collapse of Wall Street, an icon of wealth and prosperity in 
popular culture and politics alike, Senators McCain and Obama faced the task of explaining 
to the voters not only what had gone wrong, but also how they would make it right. Though 
the summary provided here is by no means exhaustive, it is nonetheless a considerable 
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section. The goal of this section is two-fold: First and foremost, it is provided to underscore 
just how complex the situation really was on Black Monday. As time passed and much 
research and analysis has been done into the economic crisis, it is easy to wonder how those 
involved could not see the calamity coming. The fact of the matter is, however, that very few 
did. The second goal is to provide a concise summary of what, exactly, went wrong, in order 
to illustrate not only the challenges the candidates faced in trying to come to grips with what 
was happening, but also to show just how difficult it would be for the electorate to gain an 
accurate understanding of the situation. The candidates are assumed to have been motivated, 
at least in part, to understand the crisis in order to stake their political claim on the situation. 
In a crisis, the candidate who is best able to convince the public that they understand the 
problem will most likely have a considerable advantage going forwards in the campaign, 
especially if they can also persuade the voters that their opponent does not understand. 
However, there are also mitigating forces: It will likely not benefit the candidate to make a 
statement that is later proven to be wrong, or that betrays a misunderstanding of the situation 
on their part. This consideration likely moderates the candidates' incentive to speak up for the 
sole reason of being the first to respond.  
 
3.1 The Bush Years 
 
On January 20th 2001, George W. Bush was inaugurated as the 43rd President of the United 
States, after an increasingly close election that was only finally decided in the Supreme 
Court. Less than eight months into his first term, President Bush found himself the head of a 
nation horror-struck at the September 11 terrorist attacks. Following this, Bush created a 
cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security and committed United States Armed Forces 
to Afghanistan in order to dismantle the Taliban and capture Osama bin Laden, who had soon 
claimed credit for the 9/11 attacks. In order to avert any future attacks, the Bush 
administration set out to streamline the intelligence agencies and military. To deliver on his 
campaign promises, President Bush also enacted large tax cuts (United States, "George W. 
Bush").  
Due to what Marc J. Hetherington and Michael Nelson identify as a rally around the 
flag effect, President Bush's popularity surged following the 9/11 attacks and well into 2002, 
allowing him to bolster the Republican performance in the midterms that year (42). As they 
point out, the Democratic congressional leaders and candidates continued to support the 
president on his policies in the War on Terror, despite criticizing the administration on other, 
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non-war related topics (38). With a newly minted Republican-controlled Congress at his 
back, President Bush acted on the principles laid down in the 2002 National Security 
Strategy, which declared that the United States would "...not hesitate to act alone, if 
necessary, to exercise our right of self defense by acting preemptively..." against its enemies 
(United States, "National Security Strategy" Chapter III). The Bush administration invaded 
Iraq on March 19, 2003, on the claim that Saddam Hussein was stockpiling weapons of mass 
destruction. However, no such stockpiles would come to be discovered, and the final CIA 
report noted that most of the WMD's and nuclear programs in Iraq had effectively ceased 
functioning after 1991 ("Key Findings"). Though the U.S. armed forces quickly captured 
Saddam Hussein, and George W. Bush declared the end of major combat operations in Iraq 
on May 1, the continued U.S. presence in Iraq would become one of many things to haunt 
George W. Bush's second term. 
 According to Gallup, George W. Bush's first-term average approval rating was 62 
percent, with a high of 90 percent immediately following 9/11. His second-term average, 
however, was a mere 37 percent (Gallup "Presidential Approval"). In their review of George 
W. Bush's presidency, Pew Research Center notes that Bush's approval ratings sunk across 
both demographic and political groups, and notes that the drop was most severe among 
Republicans. The report ties the second term slide to policy shortcomings such as the failed 
bids for Social Security and immigration reform, as well as  
 
...his administration's mixed record of competent governance. Between Iraq, the 
government’s flawed relief effort in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, and more 
minor missteps over the Dubai ports issue and other matters, the government “brand” 
deteriorated badly during the Bush years. In late April 2008, just 37% expressed a 
favorable view of the federal government, about half of the percentage of five years 
earlier (73%). ("Bush and Public Opinion") 
 
 
By the time the primary season rolled around, the President's approval ratings stood at a 
dismal 32%.  
 
3.2 The Primaries 
The parties did not disappoint in their display of candidates who were decidedly not George 
W. Bush. The Republican contenders included Mitt Romney, Mormon and former governor 
of notably liberal Massachusetts; Mike Huckabee, former Baptist minister and former 
governor of Arkansas, Bill Clinton's home turf; Rudy Giuliani, who, as Mayor of New York 
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City, pushed for equal rights for gay and lesbian partnerships; and Senator John McCain, 
regarded as a Republican with an independent streak, who had worked across the aisle to 
champion the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act. The Democratic contenders included Hillary 
Clinton, former First Lady and New York Senator; Barack Obama, junior Senator of Illinois 
and former attorney and lecturer at the University of Chicago Law School; and John 
Edwards, who ran against Bush in 2004 as John Kerry's vice presidential nominee.   
As representatives of the opposing party, the Democratic candidates already had a 
head start in distancing themselves from the incumbent, George W. Bush. However, the 
Democratic primary campaign was far more significant in that, by January 2008, it was clear 
that the front runners included a black man and a woman, as well as the more commonly seen 
well-off white middle-aged male candidate. By the time John Edwards suspended his 
campaign on January 30, Hillary Clinton had a sizeable delegate lead on Barack Obama for 
the Democratic National Convention. In the following weeks, however, the two traded caucus 
and primary victories, which contributed to the unusually long primary campaign for both 
candidates.  
Meanwhile, as the election year started, Senator John McCain was slowly rebounding. 
Following a funding shortage in mid-2007, his campaign was forced to cut staff and 
expenses, with remaining key members accepting reduced pay, or forgoing pay 
altogether (Yoon). By the end of December, the tide seemed to have turned, as McCain 
gained a number of endorsements, from newspapers and notably from Senator Joseph 
Lieberman of Connecticut. In January of 2008, Mike Huckabee and John McCain put serious 
dents in Mitt Romney's campaign machinery by winning Iowa and New Hampshire, 
respectively. A string of primary victories on Super Tuesday, February 5, put John McCain 
back in the lead and revitalised Mike Huckabee's campaign (Cooper). Mitt Romney put his 
campaign on hold days later, citing concerns that remaining in the race would hamper the 
Republican effort to win the presidency and unwittingly aid the Democratic candidates (CNN 
"Romney suspends"). Though Mike Huckabee elected to remain in the race until 
"mathematically eliminated" from the contest, he too would exit the race less than a month 
later (CNN "Huckabee bows").  
 Mitt Romney's reservations about remaining in the race betrayed a common concern 
about the primary races. Though there may be a wide variance among candidates from the 
same party – as for instance between a solidly Evangelical candidate, who appeals to so-
called value voters, and a fiscal conservative who is more concerned with the size and 
effectiveness of government than the idea of America as a Christian nation – at the end of the 
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day, both candidates represent the same side of the liberal-conservative divide in American 
politics. If one candidate spends too much time and resources attacking a fellow party 
candidate, even when the nomination seems a foregone conclusion, they may risk 
cannibalizing the party's chance of winning the general election. Moreover, if the candidates 
persist in negative attacks on one another in the effort to gain the nomination, they may 
ultimately end up providing ammunition for the other party's candidate, and at worst, poison 
the well for any kind of convincing reconciliation. By the end of the day, the nominee of 
either party will want not only their opponents, but also their opponents' supporters, at their 
back. 
Certainly, as the Democratic nomination process stretched on, it seemed rife with the 
pitfalls of a long campaign: the ads and speeches from both candidates frequently attempted 
to undermine one another. In an interview with Time, for instance, a Republican strategist 
saw a Clinton ad, which questioned Obama's capacity to handle sudden crises, as ready-made 
for GOP purposes: "All we have to do ... is run her ad and put a tag on the end: 'Paid for by 
the Republican National Committee' " (Scherer). As the weeks turned into months, there was 
an ever-larger chance that any attempt at reconciliation between candidates might come off 
hollow and do little towards bringing supporters back into the fold. On June 7, Hillary 
Clinton suspended her campaign and endorsed Barack Obama, at which point McCain had 
already been the de facto Republican nominee for three months.  
One point to note: As the two major party candidates for the 2008 presidential 
election became clear, it was also obvious that this would be an election unlike any other. 
Issues such as race, gender, and religion came to the forefront; clearly, there are a multitude 
of aspects worthy of discussion and academic analysis. However, as this thesis focuses 
mainly on the candidates' response to the burgeoning economic crisis, the topics of race, 
gender, and religion will not be considered. Suffice to say, this does not mean they did not 
have an impact on the election or the campaigning leading up it, but rather that they deserve 
more space and consideration than is available for them here. 
 
3.3 The Roots of the Economic Crisis 
Though the economic crisis would take many by surprise, seemingly erupting in full force on 
Black Monday, it was in reality a crisis many years in the making. In their 2010 book, All the 
Devils Are Here, Bethany McLean and Joe Nocera detail the foundations of the mortgage 
crisis. No single entity is entirely at fault: rather, it resulted from a series of market and 
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regulation failures spanning back several decades, spreading across companies and 
government entities to create an unsustainable bubble.  
 The advent of the mortgage-backed security commodity was the start of a 
fundamental change in how American mortgages were created and financed. Up until then, 
mortgages had been primarily financed by the thrift industry – savings and loans – whose 
fixed 5¾ percent could not keep up with the high inflation of the late 1970s. As customers 
moved their capital out of the thrifts in favor of higher interest financial vehicles, there was 
no longer any money to back the mortgages (McLean and Nocera 4). The solution would 
come to be called securitization: by dividing the mortgages into separate parts, the parts were 
then bundled together into tranches and sold off to investors. Thus, a single mortgage could 
end up spread across several different tranches, and a single mortgage-backed security could 
contain any number of different mortgages. No longer simply a contract between a borrower 
and a lender residing in the same part of the country, mortgages had now evolved into a 
financial product that could be traded nationally (4-5). The meat of these products were often 
subprime mortgages, so called because they were created as an alternative to prime 
mortgages, the standard 30-year fixed rate loan offered to borrowers with a good credit rating 
and an adequate income. However, a lowered credit rating did not necessarily mean that one 
ought not to qualify for a mortgage, and lenders created the subprime loan, which offset the 
higher risk of default with a higher interest rate and added the mortgaged house as collateral. 
Legislators and finance businessmen alike depended on two factors to maintain the 
health of the mortgage trade: the market forces and government legislation. The market is 
typically trusted to reward sound financial decisions and punish those companies whose 
finances, structure, or business practices were not viable.  The government, on the other hand, 
would intercede when actions rewarded with profit by the market worked against the 
common good. Historically, the U.S. government has stepped in to correct such 
discrepancies, for instance by passing child labor laws, regulating food purity, or limiting the 
use and release of pollutants or chemicals. The government mostly steps in to regulate when 
the market suffers from externalities, which are costs sustained by one party due to the 
actions of another. Due to the fact that the party responsible for the externality does not suffer 
the cost of it (or suffers disproportionally little), there is no immediate disincentive to stop 
creating the externality, as opposed to a cost incurred directly. And so it was with the banking 
and the mortgage industry: when profit margins worked against the common good, the 
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government was expected to step in to correct the imbalance, either through legislation, as a 
disincentive, or subsidies, as an incentive.11 
Republicans and Democrats alike typically viewed homeownership as an undivided 
good for the country. As McLean and Nocera point out, owning one's own home is an 
integral part of the American dream: homeownership is more than having a roof over ones 
head, it also serves as a "statement of values" (6). Being able to own your own home suggests 
independence (as opposed to renting from a landlord) and putting your money and hard work 
into something permanent. The first page following the title page of the Blueprint for the 
American Dream, an initiative by the George W. Bush administration to increase 
homeownership among minorities, features the following definition: 
 
Homeownership (noun) 
1. The fact or condition of being the owner of a house, town home, condominium, 
apartment, manufactured home, or other lasting domicile. 
Also called The American Dream 
2. An objective as in goal or ambition, with the intent of having the safety, security 
and ability to have a better life through the purchase of a home. A successful plan 
to buy a home coincidentally enables the purchasers to improve the prospects for 
success for their children, while also accumulating wealth that may be used for 
retirement or left in an estate for the family. According to the Blueprint for the 
American Dream Partnership, when accompanied by a plan of action, 
homeownership is possible for most American families. (United States, Blueprint) 
 
The idea of homeownership is solidly middle class, even if the homeowner may not 
necessarily be. Fannie Mae (The Federal National Mortgage Association) and Freddie Mac 
(The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation) were tasked with making homeownership 
attainable for as many as possible of those who wanted it, and were designated Government-
Sponsored Enterprises, or GSEs. This status was generally taken as an implicit guarantee that 
the government backed whatever mortgage debt either GSE put on their books. However, 
Fannie and Freddie were forced to participate in the private market. Fannie had been faltering 
in much the same way as the thrifts, and the implicit government guarantee meant that the 
GSEs were regarded as a safer bet by investors than other private companies, which allowed 
the GSEs to buy up mortgage-backed securities without raising questions among investors 
(McLean and Nocera 8-9). After all, the thinking went, should Fannie and Freddie run into 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 For an excellent discussion of incentives and externalities, see N. Gregory Mankiw's Principles of 
Microeconomics, e.g. Chapter 10-12 
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trouble, the government would back them up, making their debt essentially akin to 
government bonds.  
 The fact that Fannie and Freddie were regarded as having the distinct benefit of the 
U.S. government at their back gave them a distinct advantage over private companies 
(McLean and Nocera 46). However, it also sheltered them from the market forces. By 
comparison, should a publicly traded firm make too large or risky a purchase of mortgage 
debt, this might put investors off and cause a decline in share price, and the board would then 
have to answer to its stockholders. Fannie and Freddie, on the other hand, had the luxury of 
arguing that they were buying mortgage debt for the greater good, as they were creating more 
opportunities for lower and middle-income families to buy a home, empowered by the same 
logic evident in the George W. Bush administration's ideas about the American Dream 
(McLean and Nocera 9-11, 41-43). Over time, Fannie and Freddie began keeping their own 
portfolios rather than simply reselling mortgages to investors in order to increase their profits. 
From 1992 to 1996, Fannie Mae alone almost tripled its portfolio from $156 billion to $416 
billion. And though their credo was creating opportunity for those whom the private market 
may overlook, the GSEs bought fewer loans made to low-income borrowers than the market 
average (McLean and Nocera 46-48) In effect, the GSEs were operating in a market to which 
it was subject to the incentives, profit, but not the disincentives, risk. 
 In the private market, however, risk – that is, the potential financial losses a company 
stands to suffer at any given time – was the stick that was thought to keep banks and 
investors from making potentially destructive decisions. However, this was entirely reliant on 
Wall Street itself understanding the risk it assumed and acting accordingly. With the rise of 
securitization, wherein mortgages were compartmentalized into packages in lieu of being 
assessed as a single item, calculating the risk on a given bank's book became increasingly 
difficult. JP Morgan developed a new method to calculate risk, called Value at Risk, or VaR. 
This gained immense popularity among other banks, due to the ease with which it allowed 
risk to be calculated and represented. (McLean and Nocera 55-56). However, VaR assumed 
that any given day would be much the same as the one before it, calculating that any given 
day was statistically magnitudes more likely to yield only moderate changes in the market, 
rather than a crash. VaR was an accurate predictor 95% of the time, which helped 
overshadow the fact that VaR offered no help the other 5% of the time: in cases of unforeseen 
market crashes, so-called black swan events, the VaR loss calculations no longer apply 
(McLean and Nocera 53-55). Most banks, however, started using the VaR estimate as a 
worst-case scenario rather than a tool to track risk over time. The VaR model, technically the 
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intellectual property of JP Morgan, had been released free of charge for everyone in the 
market, under the assumption that the market would benefit from all participants having 
access to the same information calculated by the same tool. In practice, VaR became the 
blinders on the financial market. Instead of providing an accurate calculation of risk, it 
created an illusion that the potential losses on a more or less normal day on the market was 
the worst case scenario. As Wall Street started adapting the calculations underlying VaR to 
the new derivates products they conjured up, firms could purchase larger amounts of 
subprime-backed products while seemingly maintaining low risk exposure (McLean and 
Nocera 51). This would eventually lead banks to assume their potential losses were far lower 
than they actually were, and consequently that they would need far less capital stashed away 
to back their investments. 
 JP Morgan added another innovation to the financial market: derivatives. The name 
reveals the function: the value is derived from another financial trade. In a 2007 article, 
David A. Skeel and Frank Partnoy define derivatives as "financial instruments whose payoffs 
are linked in some way to a change in credit quality of an issuer or issuers" (3). Thus, the 
difference between derivatives and securitization is that derivatives are in essence a zero-sum 
game: a bet is made that the value of a transaction will change over time, and one party's loss 
is the others' gain. In securitization, on the other hand, no one stands to gain from the original 
asset losing value: when the mortgages backing a security default, the security itself becomes 
worthless. Derivatives usually fall within one of two categories: either it is a credit default 
swap, or a collateralized debt obligation (CDO). In a credit default swap, bank A grants a 
loan to company B, and hedges the loan by essentially making a bet with a third party that 
company B will default. If the company defaults, the bank's losses is offset by the gains from 
the bet with the third party, and if the company doesn't default, the bank's loss on the bet is 
offset by the profits on the loan (Skeel and Partnoy 1021-22). However, the third party would 
often also seek to hedge on their swap, entering into a secondary swap with a fourth party, 
and so on. As McLean and Nocera summarize, as companies sought to hedge their risk, it 
became "a classic example of the old Wall Street saw that 'trading begets trading.'"(52). In a 
CDO, several debt obligations are bundled within a special purpose entity, or SPE, which is 
typically a trust or company based in a tax haven. The CDO is then sold off in parcels based 
on credit rating. In some CDOs, the so-called synthetics, the SPEs do not hold actual debt 
obligations, but rather a collection of derivatives such as credit default swaps, or even other 
CDOs (Skeel and Partnoy 1022, 1027).  
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The derivatives trade had many attractive qualities for the financial market. Firstly, it 
allowed banks and traders to hedge risky investments through credit default swaps, opening 
investment opportunities that might have been passed over in the past. Secondly, it allowed 
the market to generate new sources of revenue from already existing assets, such as 
mortgages. And thirdly, it created new opportunities for diversification, that is, spreading the 
risk across several parties (Skeel and Partnoy 1027-1031). As the market logic went, 
diversification made risk less risky (McLean and Nocera 51, 63). If a borrower defaulted on a 
loan, and the entire risk of the loan was on one bank's books, this default (depending on the 
size of the loan) could have potentially catastrophic consequences for the financial health and 
viability of the bank. However, if the same bank had sold of parts of the risk to other banks or 
investors, and perhaps even offset some of the loss with profits from this trade, then several 
parties would carry the potential loss in smaller, more manageable portions. Diversification, 
it was thought, would bolster the health of the financial market in case of losses. The obverse 
was that when risk was dispersed throughout the market, it could expose the whole system to 
unbearable strain in the case of a market collapse. This would the classic black swan even, 
which was not accounted for in the VaR numbers upon which the derivatives trade was built. 
The black swan seemed an unlikely prospect, however, as derivatives and VaR served the 
market, and JP Morgan, well. By 1993, JP Morgan earned 75% of its profits in the 
derivatives trade, based in London, where only 15 years ago their profits were primarily from 
commercial loans (McLean and Nocera 52). 
 The growth of the derivatives trade in the United States would not have been possible 
without two important sets of deregulation of the financial business sector. First, as 
derivatives trading began to eclipse traditional banking, the Federal Reserve agreed to 
reinterpret the Glass-Steagall Act in order to avoid a financial trade exodus to London 
(McLean and Nocera, 52-53). Glass-Steagall ensured that commercial banks (that is, banks 
doing what most people expect of a bank: grant loans, provide savings and expense accounts 
for businesses and people, and so forth) were not allowed to do investment banking. Nor was 
any bank holding company allowed to have both commercial and investment banks under 
their wing. However, in 1999, after years of what the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 
(FCIC) called a "piecemeal process of deregulation through [government] agency rulings" 
(FCIC 54), Congress passed the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, or GLBA. It replaced what 
remained of Glass-Steagall, after the Fed reinterpretation and the 1994 Reigle-Neal Interstate 
Banking and Branching Efficiency Act, which allowed bank holding companies to operate in 
every state and superceded state regulation on out-of-state banks opening competing 
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branches. Between Reigle-Neal and GLBA, many large banks and insurance firms merged 
and absorbed ever larger shares of the market, tripling and quadrupling the value of their 
assets by several trillion dollars (FCIC 53). According to the report, deregulation "went 
beyond dismantling regulations; its supporters were also disinclined to adopt new regulations 
or challenge industry on the risks of innovations" (53). The market, as Alan Greenspan 
argued, was already regulated, regardless of whether the government was involved: market 
discipline would punish those who took undue risks, losses would eventually weed out the 
unviable companies and leave the most sound competitors to maintain the health of the 
financial system. The less government stepped in to regulate, the more the market would 
regulate itself. The question, according to Greenspan, was whether government regulation 
might not in fact make the marketplace regulate itself less efficiently, creating a net loss in 
terms of regulation (FCIC 53-54).  
A second deregulatory factor to the financial crisis was introduced by the Basel 
International Capital Accord, which created new rules for capital requirements to 
accommodate the growing trade in new financial products such as derivatives. Although the 
Basel Accord, often referred to as Basel I, required that risky loan-based assets be offset by 
higher capital requirements, it also separated mortgage-backed derivatives and mortgages 
from other commercial loans. Tellingly, the only assets with a lower capital requirement than 
Fannie and Freddie's securities were government bonds. In 1996, the Market Risk 
Amendment to Basel I altered the capital requirements even further, by allowing banks to 
offset the risk accrued from other trade by purchasing mortgage-based derivatives (FCIC 49). 
Mortgages, and the securities and derivates backed by them, were hugely incentivized as a 
result. By filling their books with mortgage-based products, financial institutions could lower 
their capital requirements, thus freeing up more capital for investments and raising their 
profits. The mortgage market jumped at the chance to fuel the growing demand. 
The mortgage market itself, however, was not behaving the way regulators and banks 
assumed. The reason why mortgages were regarded as so lucrative compared to other 
commercial loans was the generally accepted idea that consumers would avoid defaulting on 
their homes, come hell or high water. However, as McLean and Nocera point out, many 
started using their property as piggy banks, rather than homes (24). Many bought houses on 
payment option adjustable rate mortgage (pay option ARM), which allowed the buyer to 
select their own rate of repayment. Often these offered highly attractive – on paper – starter 
rates, so low that they might not even cover the full interest, to say nothing of the actual 
principal. Thus, the ARM could continue accruing interest even as the borrower believed they 
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were paying their mortgage off. Most ARMs had hidden triggers that forced the borrower to 
start paying the full rate once their loan balance grew to a certain point, which would fast 
approach if they were only paying a portion of the interest (McLean and Nocera 134). Real 
estate speculators used the pay option ARMs to their advantage, typically hoping to sell the 
house for an even higher price than the mortgage and pocket the difference before the teaser 
rate expired, which became known as flipping a property (McLean and Nocera 126). Flipping 
only worked as long as the next person in line to buy the property believed they could sell it 
for an even higher price: the moment a property hit a peak price, where no one would be 
willing to bid any higher, the cat would be out of the bag. The party stuck with the house 
would quickly realize that much of property's value was illusory, if they did not already know 
when closing the deal. Meanwhile, mortgage broker companies were growing ever larger by 
offering new forms of mortgages, almost all of them subprime. As Wall Street craved 
mortgage-backed financial products to help draw down their capital requirements, the 
mortgage business abided: from 1988 to 2006, the number of loan products in the mortgage 
market increased from a mere 3 to a mindboggling 600 (McLean and Nocera 148).  
Faced with the rapidly escalating complexity of the derivates-driven financial market, 
Wall Street started relying on ratings agencies to sort the wheat from the chaff. Moody's, 
Standard & Poor's and Fitch were given Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organization status (NRSRO's), which granted them the power to bestow financial products 
and institutions with ratings that affected their capital requirements, creditworthiness and 
trade value. Ratings determined how much and what kind of investment an entity was 
allowed to make, and schools needed to maintain a certain NRSRO rating to be eligible for 
government financial aid (McLean and Nocera 112). Ratings were ever-present and 
indispensable to the modern financial market. The ratings agencies, however, charged fees on 
a rating-by-rating basis from the very clients who relied on their favorable rating to succeed, 
and were subject to very little government oversight. The one regulatory stumbling block was 
getting recognized as an NRSRO in the first place; once this hurdle was cleared, the ratings 
agencies operated unregulated and with a "blank check" (FCIC 119). The NRSROs were in 
effect not even liable for the validity of their ratings, as the ratings were considered opinion 
rather than fact, and found by the courts to be covered by the First Amendment (FCIC 120). 
There were two major flaws in the ratings-based approach: First, the lenders in effect 
outsourced their risk management to the ratings agencies. Ratings were taken at face value, 
and a triple-A rating – the best available – was seen as so universally trustworthy that fund 
managers did little or no independent research. Secondly, it imbued the ratings agencies with 
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a legacy they had not earned: holding themselves as prognosticators that got things right most 
of the time, the agencies in actuality often got them wrong, especially in black swan cases. 
(McLean and Nocera 112-113) The problematic nature of the fee revenue system also 
compounded the declining reliability of ratings: when faced with a rating they did not like, a 
bank could simply threaten to use a different rating agency. As a result, the market discipline 
the government relied on failed: the key to earning market share was to be more lenient on 
the client, not stricter. Making it easier to obtain a favorable rating was the only way to 
increase revenue, undermining the quality of the ratings to devastating effect (McLean and 
Nocera 117). 
A final crucial point is that of human error on behalf of the mortgage brokers and 
borrowers themselves, whether intentional or not. Certainly, there was a great deal of fraud: 
for instance, financial products such as the pay option ARMs were created not to benefit the 
lender, but rather to feed the growing hunger on Wall Street for ever more mortgages to 
securitize, trade, and use to further offset their capital requirements and free up more money 
for investment and bonuses. Washington Mutual calculated that the riskiest mortgages were 
worth seven times more than the prime mortgages of old, and noted that while customers 
rightly realized that these mortgages were not in their best financial interests, most could be 
persuaded to take the plunge if the sales pitch was right (McLean and Nocera 133-134). 
Meanwhile, the brokers who acted as the middlemen between lenders and borrowers were 
compensated mostly in fees, which were not tied to whether the mortgage got paid or 
defaulted. Some fees were paid by the borrower, which might lead them to believe the broker 
was acting in their best interest; in fact, most brokers stood to gain even more from fees paid 
by the lender. A common such fee was the yield spread interest, which ensured that brokers 
were duly rewarded by the lender if they could manage to sell the borrower a high-interest 
loan (FCIC 90). In theory, this could be negated by the borrower shopping around for loans 
with different brokers and recognizing which offers are in their best interest, as the 
consumer's power of choice is considered one of the checks and balances of the free market. 
In practice, however, most Americans show a low level of financial literacy, there is a large 
gap between how much consumers think they know and how much they actually know, and 
many consumers neglect to seek out and compare different offers (Lusardi section 3.4). 
In sum, the crisis was the result of several interconnected weaknesses, which were 
either ignored or overlooked, and allowed to grow ever more serious. Government regulation 
was scaled back, on the assumption that the market could regulate better and more efficiently 
if left to its own devices. In the market itself, arguably, the left hand did not know what the 
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right hand was doing. Borrowers took on ever more debt, often on terms that they did not 
understand, in the belief that the future gains on property values would be large enough to 
pay off the debt and leave them with a profit. Banks, on the other hand, traded each other 
derivatives on the assumption that borrowers would avoid default at all costs, and that ratings 
agencies could be relied upon to do due diligence and accurately rate the financial products 
the banks were buying according to their value and risk, all the while forcing rating agencies 
to rate the products they were selling less accurately in order to stay in business. Banks took 
on increased risk with decreased capital, assuming that securitization and diversification 
would protect the market from danger, when in fact it served to amplify potential losses 
throughout the system. Everyone thought someone else was on top of the situation, and that if 
losses occured, they would be on a different bank's books, or on someone else's property. 
How does this all relate to the presidential candidates' campaigns? Voters want to 
elect someone who could solve the problem, save the market, avoid a total financial 
meltdown. There is the adage that those who cannot remember the past are doomed to repeat 
it; likewise, those who do not understand the mistakes that have been made, are unlikely to be 
able to correct them. A candidate will presumptively be rewarded with votes if they can make 
a persuasive argument for what went wrong and why, and how they can fix it (and how their 
opponent cannot). The unusual aspect of the 2008 financial crisis was how quickly it went 
from bad to worse; that is, how suddenly – practically in the span of a weekend – the 
financial market went from beleaguered, but mostly predictable, to sat on the sidelines 
watching itself unravel. Due to the intensity of the all-day political news reporting that is 
prevalent during campaigns, there is no shortage of moments – gaffes, unfavorable stories, 
leaks – that seem like game-changers at the time, but prove to be little more than a flash in 
the pan in the long run. It is far more rare for politicians to find themselves thrust into such 
chaotic and unpredictable circumstances that prevail for months and years into the next 
president's term.  
 As the election season rolled on, it was clear that the economy was in trouble. 
According to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Report, the collapse of the housing 
bubble in 2007 triggered a cascade of downgrades and devaluations of financial products 
endemic to the market, and uncertainty spread as banks and hedge funds were forced to mark 
down the value of their holdings to reflect their rapidly decreasing market price (227-228).  
By the end of 2007, the repercussions of the housing market collapsing became more and 
more evident, as Wall Street giants posted billions in losses, straining their credibility with 
investors as well as their capital and cash reserves, and consumer spending decreased (FCIC  
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256). In March 2008, Bear Stearns suffered a massive liquidity drop of $16 billion down to 
$2billion during a single week, and was acquired by JP Morgan with the government's help in 
the form of a $28.82 billion loan (FCIC 288-290). Though it served to stave off disaster at the 
time, the Bear Stearns bailout did little to alter the course of the economy. The Federal 
Reserve performed stress tests on four major investment banks, based on the same conditions 
that had caused Bear Stearns to go under: Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley were 
considered to pass the stress test relatively well, while Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch 
failed outright (Financial Crisis Inquiry Report 297-298). In July of 2008, stories began to 
appear in the Wall Street Journal and the New York Times that the Bush administration was 
considering measures to take over Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, should their financial woes 
continue; Fannie's stock had already depreciated considerably, and following the news 
reports, their stock plummeted a further 50% in two days (McLean and Nocera 351-352). As 
the Financial Crisis Inquiry Report points out, Fannie and Freddie played a crucial role in the 
mortgage market: lenders were more willing to provide affordable mortgage deals for 
borrowers if the GSEs were willing to buy those mortgages, and this allowed the GSEs to 
provide much needed liquidity to the crumbling mortgage market (309-310). Thus, Fannie 
and Freddie were allowed to purchase even more debt to bouy the mortgage market, allowing 
them to become the sole source of liquidity in that market, despite already owning 
$5.3trillion in mortgages with less than 2% capital (FCIC 309). Against a backdrop of 
increasing market insecurity and the looming shadow of Bear Stearns' March collapse, the 
two candidates approached the convention season. 	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Chapter Four: Relative Calm Before the Storm 
 
At this point, an additional dimension of campaigns may be added. The candidates, through 
their ads and speeches, seek to communicate to the voters – in general terms - what they 
intend to do once in office. This might be considered merely as a ploy to gain votes: the 
candidate makes promises in order to sway voters to their side, and will say whatever is 
necessary to win. This is a somewhat extreme version of the Downsian argument – that 
politicians will align themselves along the political spectrum according to what the electorate 
is willing to vote for – but even then, it carries some constraints on the candidate. They can 
not say whatever they think will get them elected, unless they are also prepared to carry those 
policies out. Voters may not always hold politicians accountable for everything they say, but 
it seems implausible at the very least to assume that they forget all campaign promises 
overnight once the election is decided. In fact, the opposition depends on it: Are you better 
off now than you were four years ago?  
 
 
4.1 The Convention Speeches 
Arguably the most important event of the convention is the speech given by each candidate as 
they accept their nomination: this is a prime platform for campaigning. According to a 
Nielsen report, nearly two-thirds of all U.S. households tuned in to watch the conventions in 
2008, which equates to a viewership of over 120 million. Nearly 34 percent of all households 
watched both conventions, while 15 percent watched only the Republican convention and 
15.7 percent watched only the Democratic convention ("Two-Thirds of U.S..."). Obama's 
speech alone garnered an estimated 38.4 million viewers, which was the most-viewed 
convention speech for exactly one week, when 38.9 million viewers tuned into McCain's 
acceptance speech ("McCain Tops Obama's..."). Among those who tuned in, it is unlikely 
that all were eligible voters; however, of the eligible voters in the audience, it is a fair 
assumption that they were also likely voters. After all, why bother to watch even parts of a 
political speech if one does not intend to go to the polls on Election Day? Thus, the 
convention speeches offer two distinct opportunities. The first is to win over politically 
engaged voters who have not yet settled into either camp. The second is to fire up the base: to 
convince and inspire those who have already committed to your campaign, in the hopes that 
it will not only cement their decision to give the candidate their vote, but also inspire them to 
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persuade friends and acquaintances to do the same. Conversely, a speech also carries the risk 
of negatively affecting the opponent's supporters, solidifying their decision to cast a vote in 
opposition to the candidate and possibly to persuade those they know. As the candidates can 
be expected to be well aware, the communicative potential of the candidates' speeches is 
great. The convention speeches may be regarded as political founding documents for a 
campaign. Many subjects are typically broached during a primary campaign, as those 
presumably most concerned with party orthodoxy take their prospective candidates for a trial 
run, only to fall by the wayside in the general campaign. Over the summer, as the 
presumptive nominees evaluate and vet potential running mates, the issues and themes 
coalesce into a (hopefully) unified whole as the conventions draw near. If the primary season 
is the prototype, the convention becomes the product launch: The chance to introduce the 
candidate, his or her running mate, and their political agenda as a complete package. Thus, 
the acceptance speech may be regarded as the candidates staking their territory, by stating 
their beliefs and what they see as the fundamental issues on which voters will need to decide 
at the polls. For this reason alone, the speeches are worth examining closely. Additionally, as 
has been noted, the convention speeches are more likely to reach potential voters in their 
original form, due to their comparatively high media coverage. 
 A final argument in favor of giving the nomination acceptance speeches special 
attention may be found in Anderson's theory of presidential legitimacy through rhetoric. 
Anderson proposes that, though the Constitution decentralizes power by undermining any 
possible sovereignty, presidents may yet become the "authors of their own legitimacy" (210) 
Through speech, presidents may lay claim to power and legitimacy which is strictly 
extraconstitutional: by aligning themselves with the legitimacy of previous presidents or 
events, the current president attempt to lay claim to a different, perhaps greater cause than 
that which they are actually concerned with, and legitimacy derived from a source which is 
not actually relevant. By way of example, Anderson cites President Wilson aligning his 
chosen cause with that of Revolutionary America: "[Wilson] thought that as revolutionary 
fathers had created a union of American states, he would found an international League of 
Nations with similar, though more general, purposes: 'As we once served ourselves in the 
great day of our Declaration of Independence', said Wilson, we will now 'serve mankind.' " 
(207) And though the theory concerns itself mostly with presidential speech, the principles 
also apply to pre-presidential speech, as when Franklin D. Roosevelt aligned his New Deal 
with Wilson's cause for "progress and justice" in his 1932 nomination acceptance speech 
(208). 
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Though the candidates have not yet attained the office of the President, by the point of 
their acceptance speeches, they tend to have shifted from "if" to "when". In other words, the 
presumptive nominees have already started discussing policy in terms of how they will 
govern, as though it is a given fact. Of course, only one candidate can win, but at the point of 
the conventions, both candidates may be said to exist in a state of being likely winners. In 
effect, this means that two different candidates are attempting to lay claim to the legitimacy 
and power of the same office. Under these terms, the acceptance speeches may be seen as a 
sort of proto-governing: the candidate, in their own terms and their own words, set forth not 
only their claim to the Presidency (for instance, that the current situation calls for a candidate 
such as them, or conversely, that the opponent is not a good fit for the present time) but also 
their intent for the office. The speech is a statement of who they are, why they ought to be 
elected President of the United States of America, and what they will do once this comes to 
pass, as it certainly must. Though the claims put forward in the nomination acceptance 
speech will be repeated countless times on the stump between the end of the conventions and 
Election Night, the spectacle of the conventions serve to make the claims more widely known 
and discussed. It is not unreasonable to expect that voters with even a passing interest in the 
election will know at least the general message of the convention speech, as they are given 
attention and analysis in many news media outlets. It is arguably more unlikely that they are 
aware of what the candidate said on the stump in some town on a long list of towns to visit 
before the election – unless, of course, it is their home town, or the speech or event itself 
proves to have some inherent newsworthiness. 
 
 
4.2 Senator Barack Obama's Speech: A Journey and a Promise 
The date itself was one of the most important references of the speech: it was delivered on the 
anniversary of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.'s "I Have A Dream" speech, and though an explicit 
reference was not made until the end of the speech, the comparison was implicit from the 
very beginning. The speech also coincided with a second anniversary, in that Barack Obama 
had gained national attention for his keynote speech at the previous Democratic National 
Convention in 2004. The keynote speech speech relied heavily on the narrative of his parents 
and grandparents, on how America had provided opportunity through government for those 
who were willing to work for it, as his grandparents had through the GI Bill and Federal 
Housing Administration. Moreover, the message was unity. The premise of American 
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greatness was not just the hard work of individuals to benefit themselves, but also of the 
many working together. The speech posits equality and unity as the bedrock of American 
values throughout: equality by providing education, health care, and opportunity to all who 
require it, regardless of whether they can pay for it. Strength is cast not in terms of 
achievement (be they economic, military or technological) but in terms of ideology: "e 
pluribus unum" is invoked as both justification for and defense of a Democratic social policy. 
Finally, the speech appeals to unity across party lines, attributing conservative touchstones 
such as community and religion to Blue States and giving Red States their share of 
subversiveness and openness to "gay friends". 
 Obama would return to these themes in the acceptance speech in 2008, but under 
much different terms. By this point, late August, the economy had started to show signs of 
sickness beyond the turmoil in the housing market and on Wall Street. Unemployment had 
been growing steadily for the third economic quarter in a row, and job losses had outpaced 
new job openings in all but three job sectors – natural resources and mining, health and 
education services, and utilities – totaling net loss of almost a million jobs. More businesses 
were closing than were opening in the private sector, which had only in five quarters during 
the previous 16 years ("Business Employment Dynamics..." 2-5).  In the speech, called "The 
American Promise", there are thematically coherent sections that reoccur throughout, creating 
a narrative flow.12 While each section has been given a name based on the overall theme, that 
does not mean that they do not somewhat overlap. For instance, a section about McCain may 
also discuss the economy: however, in such a case the economy is used to make a point about 
Senator McCain, rather than discussed in and of itself. Conversely, Senator McCain may also 
be invoked to make a point about the economy. Some sections repeat twice (Moment, 
McCain, Economy), Foreign Policy and Change occur only once, and the most potent 
section, Promise, occurs three times.13 The Promise sections are discussed separately, while 
the remaining sections will be discussed as a whole. 
The first section, Promise 1, called back to the speech given four years earlier, and 
restated the same ideas of equality creating unity, and reaffirmed this as the American 
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  The order is as follows: Promise I, Moment I, McCain I, Economy, Promise II, McCain II, Moment II, 
Economy II, Foreign Policy, Change, Promise III. The first paragraph that has been analyzed, for more ease of 
reference, begins "Four years ago..."	  
13	  The opening remarks of both speeches consist of formally accepting the nomination, and a thanking of 
supporters and opponents, friends and family, and have not been included in the analysis of either candidate's 
speech. The final remark of both speeches has also been omitted from analysis, as it is a customary blessing of 
the audience and the nation. 
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promise: "...that through hard work and sacrifice, each one of us can pursue our individual 
dreams and still come together as one American family, to ensure that the next generation can 
pursue their dreams as well."14 The discussion of the American promise was also an avenue 
to present character traits to the audience, both through the explicit callback to his own life 
history, but also by casting it within – and thereby providing definition to – the American 
Promise of opportunity for those who work for it, regardless of their social and economic 
standing. 
 This was followed by the first of the two Moment sections, so named because both 
revolve around how the 2008 election was unique and how, at the present time, this was the 
moment to act in order to secure the principles held dear by all. These two sections serve to 
tie the other four themes – McCain, Promise, The Economy and Foreign Policy – together, 
and serve as a metaphorical hub of sorts. The first section elucidated the pressing matters 
facing America: The American Promise was threatened by war and economic downturn, and 
there was a historic call to defend it. The threat was "not all of government's making", but the 
consequences are laid at the feet of Washington, D.C. and George W. Bush. This is a notable 
juxtaposition, as it implies that government and Congress, or government and the President, 
are not the same thing: rather, the idea and ideal of government is separate from a set of 
replaceable politicians. The next five paragraphs described how the preceding 8 years, i.e. the 
George W. Bush' presidency, have failed to meet the American promise, by allowing 
inadequate health care coverage, corporate offshoring of American jobs, and declining social 
services for those in need, punctuated by a direct reference to Bush's widely criticized 
response to Hurricane Katrina. In a counternarrative to the McCain-Palin campaign's efforts 
to distance itself from the previous administration, the speech continued: "...next week, in 
Minnesota, the same party that that brought you two years of George Bush and Dick Cheney 
will ask this country for a third."  The second section came a little over halfway through the 
speech, and recast the themes of the first section in terms of solutions instead of challenges. It 
began, "Now is not the time for small solutions" with each following paragraph starting with 
"Now is the time...". Now is the time to strengthen the education system; to enact health care 
reform; to strengthen the right of employees; to increase regulatory oversight in the financial 
sector; to ensure that women enjoy the same opportunities as men. While these are all fairly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  It is worth noting that, while an explicit reference is not yet made, the word "dream" occurs five times in the 
speech, but only in the first and last sections. Due to the historic nomination of a presidential candidate of color, 
those who were already primed to consider Martin Luther King, Jr. were likely to recognize the reference to his 
speech. The connection is made explicit in the last section. 	  
	   68	  
standard Democratic calling cards, they were all portrayed not only in terms of benefitting 
people involved, but also as proposals that would bolster the economy. Education is not only 
an opportunity to which everyone should have access, regardless of their financial situation, it 
is the way to compete in the global economy. Health care reform should not only provide 
adequate medical coverage for all who need it, it should lower the costs. Paid sick days and 
better medical leave is necessary so people may keep their jobs. Government oversight is 
necessary to protect pensions and Social Security benefits. Take-home pay should be based 
on the amount of work done, not the gender of those doing it. 
 The first section of the Economy block sought to reiterate economic concerns in terms 
of social policy, complementary to the view of social policy as economic concerns. Progress 
is measured by economic benchmarks, such as savings rates, job growth and average family 
income. Likewise, economic strength is measured in progressive terms: not by the number of 
wealthy citizens, but by the number of middle- and working-class citizens who are able to put 
their lives ahead of their jobs without losing their life savings or requiring seed money. The 
"fundamentals" – a key signal phrase for both campaigns, as is discussed closer in the context 
of the advertisements – of America's economy were whether or not America could live up to 
the promise of equal opportunity. Student loans, food stamps, and the GI Bill were mentioned 
in connection with higher education, depicting them all as assistance in reward to those who 
have worked hard, rather than as government handouts. The second Economy section was 
shorter, and somewhat more detailed on how to keep America's promise through economic 
measures, by closing unspecified tax loopholes and cutting unspecified government programs 
which no longer work, as well as streamlining those that do work. This concession was an 
important one, as cutting government spending is a GOP hobby horse: Any serious attempt to 
appeal across party lines must, at the very least, acknowledge that there is often room for 
improvement. Again, this was not depicteded as a weakness of government per se, but rather 
as a vestigial feature, unfit for the 21st century.  Again, economic progress was cast in terms 
of social concerns, and balanced between the public and the private, with a callback to John 
F. Kennedy: government cannot replace private action, and private actions cannot always 
substitute for government, and only through the proper balance of both can America regain 
its "intellectual and moral strength", 
But the American promise does not end at the water's edge, and in the section on 
Foreign Policy lay perhaps the biggest challenge to Obama's change from candidate to 
nominee. Due to his long Congressional career and well-known history of military service, 
foreign policy was clearly a topic that ran in John McCain's favor. Obama's task was to 
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distinguish himself on foreign policy in some way that did not rely on political experience or 
military service. This is done by creating distinctions: Afghanistan and Iraq are two different 
wars, and McCain was tied to the failed politics of the Republican party and George W. 
Bush, whereas Obama represented the Democrats, the party of Roosevelt and Kennedy. 
These are crucial references – John F. Kennedy is widely seen as having been tough on the 
Soviet Union during the Cuban Missile Crisis,15 and Franklin D. Roosevelt led America 
through not only the Great Depression and the New Deal, but also World War II – and 
challenged the Republican position as stronger on foreign policy. Moreover, Iraq was 
specifically cast as an economic problem rather than as a foreign policy issue: it was not 
about defeating terrorism, liberating Iraq, or keeping America safe, but rather a "misguided 
war" that took America from surpluses to deficits. Obama's foreign policy approach was most 
clearly stated under the phrase "tough, direct diplomacy" – tough and diplomacy are not 
words commonly associated with one another – where the traditional military would be 
bolstered by administration policy. America, the speech argued, is threatened not only by 
terrorism and nuclear proliferation, but also by problems which fall less obviously into a 
military context: "...poverty and genocide; climate change and disease." Guns offer little 
protection against climate change, for instance: if one accepts the threat of non-military 
foreign policy issues, then one must also accept the need for soft power. The section also 
explicitly referred back to the theme of unity from the 2004 speech: "[Soldiers] have not 
served a Red America or a Blue America – they have served the United States of America". 
Keeping America safe, the message went, is too important for partisan politics. Interestingly 
enough, this appeal came on the tail of ad hominem attack on John McCain by way of 
paralepsis, or mentioning something by saying it should not be mentioned: "But what I will 
not do is suggest that the Senator takes his positions for political purposes."  
 In fact, Obama's acceptance speech was a far more direct attack on McCain than 
McCain's was on Obama, as is discussed below. McCain had long enjoyed the Maverick 
moniker,16 and would use it extensively through his campaign. In Obama's speech, McCain 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  For a discussion on the pervasiveness and inaccuracy of the brinksmanship narrative of the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, see e.g. Sheldon M. Stern's The Cuban Missile Crisis in American Memory: Myths vs. Reality, Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2012 
16 The origins of the Maverick epithet are somewhat nebulous. It was certainly a calling card during the 2008 
campaign, but it is highly likely that part of the reason why it became so prevalent was due to the news and 
entertainment media latching on to it as a convenient label as well. Whereas McCain would ultimately be 
ambivalent on the term, he also cowrote a memoir with the title Worth the Fighting For: The Education of an 
American Maverick, and the Heroes Who Inspired Him in the paperback edition. 
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was tied to Bush, and most prominently so on economic issues: McCain had stated earlier in 
the year that America had experienced great economic progress during  Bush's terms. 
McCain's view – through his economic adviser Phil Gramm's July statements to the 
Washington Post that America had become a "nation of whiners" and was suffering a "mental 
recession" rather than an actual economic downturn (Hill) – was posited as the antithesis to 
the American Promise of just reward for hard labor, and the antithesis of the many Americans 
who were intimately connected with the ups and downs of the economy. McCain was 
portrayed as inherently out of touch with the middle class, because he "does not know" and 
"doesn't get it"  and remained ideologically endebted to the Republican political playbook. 
The second section on McCain was composed of a set of contrasting statements, with the 
intent of highlighting how McCain's policies are part of the GOP old hat, as it were. 
Comparing the policies of oneself and one's opponent is nothing new in politics, but the 
interesting aspect here is how all the subjects were invariably discussed in terms of their 
potential impact on the economy. Tax cuts would be enacted as an incentive to create and 
retain American jobs. America would become self-sufficient in oil, first and foremost for the 
sake of the economy. Investments and incentives for cleaner-running vehicles and renewable 
energy were not about pollution or carbon emissions, but about creating jobs: "five million 
new jobs that pay well and can't ever be outsourced", a clear appeal to those working in, or 
concerned about, the American manufacturing sector.  
 The section on Change started out with a similar set of contrasting statements, but the 
effect was now to find common ground rather than to display the distance between the 
positions. Traditional wedge issues – abortion, gun rights, gay rights, and immigration – were 
not treated as binary issues with a right and wrong position, but rather as areas where 
disagreement and consensus do not necessarily cancel each other out. Working toward a 
solution is not predicated on taking the exact same stance on policy. Furthermore, this section 
attempted a very important rhetorical shift: those who were opposed to the ideals of the 
Obama campaign were not opposed to its politics, but to the change it represented. The 
opposition was old Washington, career politicians, those with a vested interest to maintain 
politics as usual. Using this as a springboard, the speech reshaped one of Obama's arguable 
weaknesses – lack of political experience – as one of his key qualities. The overarching 
message was that Senator Obama did not bring change, but rather, change brought him. 
Furthermore, the evidence of change was not who the candidate was, but rather in the people 
themselves: Washington may be cynical and self-interested, but the people are not. The 
election was about the change that the people crave, and thus, momentum came from the 
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recognition that "the greatest risk we can take is to try the same old politics with the same old 
players and expect a different result". Again, Obama returned to an idea from his 2004 
speech, namely that America's strength is derived from its people and its culture, rather than 
financial or military institutions. The true nature of the strength and value of American is the 
American promise. 
 The American Promise may be seen as the conceptual framework of the speech. The 
idea of the American promise was the starting point of the speech, and this idea was then 
revisited at roughly the halfway point, and again as the conclusion. In this way, the idea of 
the American promise was connected to the other topics of the speech, both by being 
repeatedly brought to mind, and by being defined and reinterpreted. The first Promise section 
spelled out the American promise in general terms, namely that America is a country – 
perhaps the only country – where opportunity is available to anyone, no matter their creed or 
the color of their skin, no matter who their parents are or how wealthy they might be. The 
second Promise section followed a discussion on John McCain and the economy. It marked a 
shift from how it is now, to how it will be with Obama in office, from retrospective to 
prospective. The promise was then fleshed out from an ideal to a set of expectations, the sum 
of which being "the idea that we are responsible for ourselves, but that we also rise or fall as 
one nation; the fundamental belief that I am my brother's keeper; I am my sister's keeper". 
Underlying this was an assertion that there is a role for government beyond taxation and 
military defense: certain problems are beyond the scope of individuals to fix, and this is the 
sphere in which government action rightfully belongs. The promise of America is that the 
well being of the people, and thereby society is the most important value: individuals should 
not have to cast their lot with the market forces and hope for the best for their children, their 
jobs and the environment.  
The last section on the American Promise referred explicitly, though not by name, to 
Martin Luther King, Jr.'s historic speech, delivered 45 years earlier to the day. This deftly 
linked the American promise to the change discussed in the context of the campaign earlier in 
the speech: the time when black Americans lived segregated and disenfranchised is less than 
a lifetime removed from the black American candidate for the highest office in the nation. 
Moreover, it connected the tone of his own campaign to Dr. King's message of hope and 
aspiration of a better future. Though it was a daunting task, and a great departure from the 
status quo, it was by no means an impossible or unachievable dream: Obama's own 
candidacy stood in evidence of this. Progress is not only possible; it is the great calling of 
America in this vision: "... it is that American spirit – that American promise – that pushes us 
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forward even when the path is uncertain; that binds us together in spite of our differences; 
that makes us fix our eye not on what is seen, but what is unseen, that better place around the 
bend". The speech ended by invoking both a specific passage from Dr. King's speech and 
Scripture17 to underscore that the size and nature of the task is all the more reason to act, not 
only because it is necessary, but because those who would not act would find themselves 
(much like those who would not support desegregation) on the wrong side of history. 
The acceptance speech of Senator Obama made clear use of the kind of misreading 
that Anderson calls the authorship of presidential legitimacy. Not only did Obama invoke the 
legitimacy of John F. Kennedy and Franklin D. Roosevelt as wartime presidents for his own 
credibility as Defender in Chief, he also aligned his own campaign for the White House with 
Martin Luther King, Jr's campaign for racial equality. Now, this is by no means to say that 
Obama's White House run was separate from the battle for civil rights, as the former is 
undeniably founded on the latter. However, the prejudice faced by Obama (and there was no 
doubt prejudice, as there still is, in certain parts of the electorate) was hidden, rather than 
overt discrimination as that faced by Dr. King, Jr. No laws needed to be immediately passed 
or overturned before Barack Obama could be elected, though that is not to say that the 
challenge he faced was not tremendously daunting and unprecedented indeed. It is merely to 
point out that the challenges to the political system were of different natures. No one 
challenged the legality of whether a black American could stand for office, though some 
questioned the feasibility of the candidacy. 
 How does the speech parse according to Moral Foundations theory? Do the arguments 
appeal across the ideological divide, or do they remain within the liberal moral matrix? The 
American promise, and the change inherent within it, is largely tied to what Haidt calls 
equality of outcomes: that the government has a legitimate role to even the playing field, and 
to serve as a counterpoint to market forces when those forces work against the common good. 
The enduring connection between change (a central theme to Obama's candidacy) and social 
progress, as espoused by the Democratic party of the 1960s, reaffirms the liberal moral 
matrix. It weighs heavily on the ideals of Care, Fairness and Liberty: The moral capital of 
America rests on how it helps those who need it the most: children, single mothers, workers 
who suffer the layoffs and reduced incomes inherent in corporate cost-cutting measures. 
These services are not handouts, but rather, the moral obligation of a society to work for the 
good of all. More importantly, those moral foundations that fall outside of the liberal matrix 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Specifically, Hebrews 10:23 
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are addressed only in passing, if at all. Furthermore, when they are addressed, it takes the 
form of refutation: that is, the concerns are dismissed as untrue on their face. Of course 
government should not hinder private citizens in their daily lives; of course the market should 
be the prime generator of growth and that hard work and success should be duly rewarded; of 
course wasteful spending should be eliminated. Government cannot replace individual 
responsibility, but the enduring message is that government action is what is needed. To a 
listener whose morality weighs loyalty to nation and adherence to the tradition of their fathers 
and to the tradition of God, there is little to sate their concerns.  
 
 
4.3 John McCain's Speech: The Right Man for the Job 
One week after the Democratic National Convention in Denver, John McCain held his 
acceptance speech to the Republican National Convention in St. Paul, Minnesota. Unlike 
Obama, John McCain had a long career in politics behind him, and as such had the 
opportunity to run on his credentials: throughout the speech, he would return to his life 
experiences, allowing anecdotes to serve as rationale for and affirmation of his candidacy. 
Compared to Senator Obama's speech, the McCain speech leaned less on thematic repetition, 
visiting most topics once and only returning to Character and The Fight at the very end.18 
Moreover, the speech focused comparatively more on the candidate and less on the opponent. 
Where Obama would return to his opponent several times, McCain focused more on his own 
candidacy, keeping references to Obama almost entirely within the context of the standard 
contrasting passages, where the listener is told of the candidate's agenda compared to what 
their opponent will allegedly do.  
 The speech started with a broad appeal to the electorate: whether they support 
McCain or Obama, they are all Americans, and as such, had a common ground that was 
wider than gulf of their differences. This appeal to voters as Americans, responsible to 
something greater than their own partisan preferences, would recur throughout the speech. 
Those willing to work together across party lines are patriots, presumably motivated to work 
together for the good of America. The label of patriot is not insignificant, as it denotes 
sacrifice and service to a nation's cause above oneself. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 The sequence of the speech is coded as follows: Patriots, Character, The Fight, Values, New Governance, 
Foreign Policy, Washington, Character II and The Fight II. 
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 The next section served as an introduction of Sarah Palin's vice presidential 
candidacy, and is an important frame for understanding the McCain campaign as a whole. 
Sarah Palin was a relative unknown at the time of her being announced as vice presidential 
candidate for John McCain, the day after the Democratic National Convention. She was 
halfway through her first term as Governor for Alaska, after having served two terms as 
mayor of Wasilla, and unlike Joe Biden, had very little exposure on the national political 
scene before the nomination (Cooper and Bumiller). The list of accomplishments presented to 
her name are well tailored to appeal to a conservative voter: she is a tax-cutting, small 
business-running, executively experienced mother of five who knows what it's like to worry 
about mortgage payments. According to Brox and Cassels, the selection of Sarah Palin was 
made to satisfy four criteria for the vice president: to restore McCain's maverick image; to 
attract women voters; to distance the campaign from George W. Bush; and finally, to excite 
the Republican base (352). The attempt to bolster McCain's Maverick bona fides was obvious 
in this section. McCain defined the term "maverick" to mean that he understoods who he's 
working for, and credited Palin with the same quality: They were beholden not to lobbyists or 
party officials, but to those who would vote for them in the first place. On this basis, McCain 
and Palin claimed to be the change needed to overturn the "the old, big spending, do nothing, 
me first, country second Washington crowd". 
 McCain went on to lay out what he believed to be worth fighting for, the raison d'être 
of his campaign. The fight was, by and large, an extension of the maverick ideal described in 
the preceding section: to curb wasteful spending, to end corruption, to keep lobbyists from 
buying their way in Washington, without regard for the political fallout. Again, loyalty to the 
electorate and the good of the country went before most anything else, and the foremost task 
of Senator McCain and Governor Palin was to fight to restore Washington, to restore the 
principles of the Republican party, and to restore the people's trust in government by 
changing it for the better. This led into the section named Values, which went far in 
suggesting that the values of the Republican party are the true values of America, as the trust 
people ought to have in their government may only to be restored by returning to the core 
tenets of Republican conservatism. This section was notably rich in the kind of language that 
sacralizes the conservative moral foundations, to borrow Haidt's term: though the values 
espoused may be boiled down to fiscal frugality, small government, limited rights to abortion 
and judicial restraint, they were couched in a very different language. Low taxes and 
spending discipline was needed so that people would not be robbed of the fruits of their labor. 
A culture of life, faith, service, a strong defense and impartial judges were necessary to 
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protect families and communities. Government should be small so as not to impede the 
natural creativity and initiative of the American people: those encumbered by government 
will not reach their God-given potential. These are the true values of the Republican 
campaign, based on the party of Lincoln, Roosevelt and Reagan – a clear reference, and 
counterpart, to the forebears of Democratic values invoked by Obama in his speech.  
 Following on these values would create a new government, implicitly different from 
that of George W. Bush and explicitly different from that espoused by Barack Obama. 
Without getting into specifics, McCain contrasted his own policy proposals with those of his 
opponent, and whereas some were predictable – lowered taxes and job creation with McCain, 
higher taxes and job market constriction with Obama – others were less so, such as the 
discussion on energy independence. This term was largely a euphemism for increased 
domestic energy production in the form of expanded fossil fuel extraction. However, the 
impetus for this was solidly based in foreign policy: increased domestic energy production 
would allow America to "stop sending $700 billion to countries that don't like us very much". 
Moreover, the speech called for an increase in nuclear power and alternative fuels to foster 
new industry and "restore the health of our planet", which – while no clarion call for carbon 
emissions reduction – was a more direct reference to global climate change than the 
opposition would give. 
 Perhaps the strongest card in McCain's deck was his experience in foreign policy, due 
to a long and storied military service, which included a long period in captivity as a prisoner 
of war during the Vietnam War. These experiences would form a solid background upon 
which McCain drew to take sometimes-controversial stands (within the Republican party, at 
least) on issues such as torture – the so-called enhanced interrogation techniques – of 
detainees in American custody, which he opposed. The section on foreign policy attempted to 
strike a balance between military strength and diplomatic measures, highlighting the need for 
good relations with other nations to avoid future conflicts. The fact that Senator McCain 
personally knows the effects of war, both on those who serve and on their families, was 
offered as proof positive that he would avoid belligerence without sacrificing strength. The 
next section of the speech continued to appeal on the basis of personal character and 
experience: McCain's long career in Congress was offered as evidence of his willingness and 
ability to work across partisan lines. Both candidates would offer their version of why 
Washington was broken and why they were the ones to fix it, and both campaigns tried to co-
opt change. McCain put forward that partisan rancor and self-interested politicians had 
caused Government to stagnate in a 20th century slump: his would be the campaign to reach 
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out to all Democrats and Independents willing to work together – those willing patriots from 
the opening remarks – for the good of the nation. At the end of the speech, McCain revisited 
his wartime experiences to show how they shaped him as a man. Calling his capture by the 
North Vietnamese Army in Hanoi being "blessed by misfortune", McCain recounted how the 
kindness and support of his fellow captives and the strength of his convictions helped carry 
him through five years in captivity, and how the experience humbled and strengthened him to 
become a servant of his country above anything else. This very same dedication to America 
was what compelled Senator McCain to run. To serve as president was not a calling based on 
personal greatness or fate, but a calling to repay the nation for his own salvation. The last 
section of the speech revisited the theme of a fight, recasting it not as the personal fight of a 
politician on behalf of his constituents, but as a fight in which all Americans should join. The 
call to participation, whether in politics or in civil or military service, is not only one of 
personal improvement, but the call to serve a cause greater than oneself. 
 It is clear that McCain appealed strongly to the more conservative moral foundations. 
Drawing clear parallels between military and political service weighs heavily on the Loyalty 
foundation: military service, after all, is one of the greatest acts of loyalty to one's own group 
one may ever commit to. Furthermore, the speech regularly appeals to the religious 
convictions of the listener: the personal qualities, rights, and potential of Americans have 
their source in God rather than in secular values. The authority to rule comes from a free 
people, and those in power who violate that principle must be taken to task, whether they are 
a foreign power, like Russia, or those in power in Washington whose actions unjustly 
encroach on their constituents. Government is there to provide choice and opportunity for 
people in all areas of public life, from tax policy to the school system: "all you ever asked of 
government is to stand on your side, not in your way". Conversely, anyone rooted in the 
liberal moral matrix will find little to stoke their passions. Systemic challenges – failing 
schools, climate change, pollution, a shrinking job market, declining wages – will all be 
solved by the market, with very little government involvement, at the mercy of profits and the 
invisible hand. The panacea, as it were, is increased choice: the government should cut taxes 
to allow people to "save, spend and invest as [they] see fit", or allow parents to select a 
different school should the one their child attends not meet their standards. Contrary to the 
instincts of someone attuned to see oppression in terms of systems and structures, the access 
to opportunity is seen to be equal for all. If lack of choice is truly what keeps a failing system 
running, and the solution is more freedom and individual responsibility, then the implicit 
assumption is that an even playing field is the state of nature in a free country.  
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 Taking the acceptance speeches as the constitution of a campaign, so to speak, from 
which the important issues and overall themes may be derived, it is clear that both campaigns 
assumed the correct approach according to Vavreck's typology. Obama's speech focuses on 
the economic conditions to a great extent, and frames the election in economic terms. The 
moment is historic, and the challenges the nation faces demand action. The legitimacy of the 
candidacy is not primarily vested in Obama himself, but in the solution he champions. This is 
very much in line with the expectations of a clarifying campaign. McCain, on the other hand, 
stresses the value of character in politics: the failings of the system are due to those who are 
corrupt or neglectful of their responsibility to the electorate, and the legitimacy of his 
candidacy is rooted in his ability to fight for the values embodied in American society. He is 
a servant of the people and of the nation itself, humble and true to this cause above all. In this 
way, the campaign is true to the insurgent typology: the goal is to shift the focus from the 
faltering economy – which certainly does not go unmentioned, but is seen as a symptom of 
the failings of government – to an area which the campaign may successfully claim as their 
strength. However, though convention speeches are certainly an important way to 
communicate a campaign's political platform, it is also a single speech on a set point in time. 
In order to gain a more complete picture of the respective campaigns, a broader examination 
is necessary.  
 
 
4.4 The Stump Speeches: Aggregate Campaigning 
 Though they may not have the same reach as a convention speech, stump speeches are 
still an important political tool. Though they may often be more or less the same speech, 
slightly rejiggered and customized to fit the location and occation, in aggregate they become 
the "repository of the campaign main message" (Tuman 47). As such, they may be coded and 
analyzed to test whether or not the campaigns acted in accordance with their insurgent or 
clarifying principles. As with the other material used for this analysis, the speeches have been 
divided into two categories for either candidate: speeches delivered before September 15 
2008, the day of Lehman Bros.' bankruptcy, and speeches delivered between September 15 
and Election Day. For the speeches held before September 15, it was necessary to set a cut-
off date, as both candidates have speeches on record dating back well over a year and a half 
before the 2008 election. In order to make the two datasets as comparable as possible, the 
cut-off date was set to the day after the last of the other primary candidates for either party 
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withdrew from the race, as this was the point where the candidates could start focusing on the 
opposition rather than their fellow party members. As noted, this happened significantly 
earlier in the Republican primaries than in the Democratic race, and as such, there are more 
speeches in McCain's dataset. However, as the speeches are represented as percentages of the 
whole, this should not affect the analysis in any significant way.19 Though there were a 
number of interviews and question-and-answer sessions conducted with both candidates 
during this time, they have not been included in the source material, for the same reason that 
the debates are not part of the source material: the thesis is focused on the most deliberate 
political statements. Interviews, debates, and press conferences all have an element of the 
unpredictable and unplanned, and may be riddled with gaffes and misspoken statements. 
Though these are certainly interesting in and of themselves, the topic of interest for this thesis 
is what the candidates truly meant to say, rather than what they blurted out or 
miscommuncated. The speeches were coded according to majority content: most speeches 
contained references to several thematic areas, and as such, were classified according to the 
general theme of the speech. For instance, in a speech on foreign policy, the candidate may 
also discuss domestic policy issues such as veterans' benefits, or economic issues, such as the 
cost of war. However, when coding each thematic section – that is, each collection of 
sentences or paragraphs that deal with the same topic, using the same coherent argument – 
and keeping a tally for each speech, it is relatively easy to determine and quantify speech 
themes.20  
The themes are divided into four categories: Economy, Traits, Foreign Policy and 
Domestic Policy. The Economy category includes such themes as taxes, unemployment, job 
creation, prices, and markets, but it can also include themes such as energy, if it is discussed 
in an economic context. For instance, one may discuss drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife 
Refuge in several different contextual frames. If one argues that drilling should be undertaken 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 The other alternative would be to set a common cut-off point for both candidates and tally the speeches from 
that point onwards; however, this would be placing a fairly arbitrary artificial limit on John McCain's campaign. 
 
20 The subject of coding was one that required a great deal of consideration. On which level should one start 
counting, as it were? One way of coding is by simply analyzing the text in aggregate and counting how often a 
set of keywords (for instance, taxes or entitlements) appears in the text. However, this misses the critical 
dimension of context. Vavreck uses the example of creating a word count for war: one might find that war 
appears not only in the context of armed combat, but also as a war on drugs, war on poverty, et c. (54). Geer 
(1998) and Vavreck code based on "appeals", though it should be noted that Vavreck adds a slight tweak to 
reduce redundant coding (54). In the end, the approach taken here is one where coding is done on the basis of 
arguments: a sentence or paragraph carrying a single, coherent argument. 
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to foster job creation or lower prices on gas at the pump, this would be an economic frame; 
however, if the discussion is on increased drilling to avoid shoring up belligerent regimes 
abroad, this would be a foreign policy frame. Conversely, one may argue against increased 
drilling on the argument that that Arctic National Wildlife Reserve is a fragile ecosystem that 
may suffer grave and irreversible consequences from oil exploration, which would be a 
domestic policy frame. Thus, a single topic may end up aggregating several mentions, and 
thus getting counted several times, but allowing for context-based categories makes this 
possible without loss or distortion of information. In other words, though a candidate may 
discuss increased drilling in terms of creating jobs (economy) as well as in terms of energy 
independence from the Middle East (foreign policy), accurate coding will reflect these two 
different contexts, as opposed to simply noting two references to "increased exploratory 
drilling." Foreign and Domestic Policy are fairly straightforward; notably, global warming 
rests under domestic policy. Arguably, climate change is far more of a global concern than 
most domestic policy issues, but it has been arranged under this heading due to the fact that 
global warming is primarily discussed in terms of its potential impact on the United States in 
the source material.  
The categories were constructed based in part on Vavreck's coding scheme for 
insurgent campaign themes, with the exception that defense spending is folded into foreign 
policy, as this compressed category made comprehensive coding a bit more manageable 
without loss of information in the context of the 2008 campaign, where defense spending was 
not as prominent of a discussion topic as to warrant a separate category. The least clear-cut 
category is perhaps the one labeled Traits: speeches and ads falling within these categories 
appeal primarily either on the basis of the candidate's personal fitness for the office (such a 
policy experience or a long career in public service); the opponent's unsuitableness for the 
presidency (for instance based on age, or past political associations); or the particular 
demands of the job (e.g., spotlighting that the role of Commander in Chief calls for foreign 
policy experience). All speeches were coded twice, in separate sessions, in order to make up 
for the fact that there is only one person responsible for the coding. Though this would not 
weed out incongruous categories, it should at the very least avoid miscoding or inaccurate 
application of the categories. The results were later compared, and found to match to a high 
degree.  
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The aggregate analysis of McCain's speeches, from March 4 2008 until September 13 
2008, yields the following table:21 
 
Table 1.1 McCain Campaign Speeches prior to September 15, 2008 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
McCain's campaign follows the insurgent criteria prior to September 15: only 14% of the 
speeches were primarily about the economy, whereas foreign and domestic policy combined 
makes up over half of the speeches. However, it also shows that the spread is fairly wide: no 
single topic dominates the McCain campaign. Though domestic policy edges out the other 
insurgent themes, it does not do so by a striking majority. It is worth noting that in McCain's 
speeches, energy policy comes up in three contexts: economy, foreign policy, and domestic 
policy. Energy policy in terms of economy is mostly a discussion of the ramifications on the 
economy from soaring gas prices: increased expenditures for fuel has, according to McCain, 
led to hiring freezes, and companies found themselves forced to pass the cost on to 
consumers in the form of higher prices. The contextual frame for foreign policy is the same 
as discussed in his nomination speech: McCain objects to purchasing oil from OPEC, as it is 
tantamount to funding nations that are ambivalent, at best, towards the United States.22 The 
domestic policy angle is perhaps the most interesting, as McCain consistently links energy 
production with global warming, which is certainly not an orthodox position within the 
Republican Party.23    
An aggregate analysis of Obama's campaign speeches, from June 11 2008 until 
September 12 2008, reveals the following table: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 The tables represent the information gleaned from the dataset: the speeches were accessed from the American 
Presidency Project, hosted by the University of California, Santa Barbara; the ads are hosted by the Stanford 
University Political Communication Lab. Links to the collections may be found in the Works Cited list. 
22 See e.g. McCain: "Remarks on an Oil Rig Platform"; "Remarks at Fresno State University"; "Remarks in 
Jackson, Ohio" 
23 See e.g. McCain "Remarks at the Vestas Training Facility" 
Issue Total % of total speeches 
Economy 9 14 % 
Traits 18 28 % 
Foreign Policy 13 20.5 % 
Domestic Policy 24 37.5 % 
Total 64 100 % 
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 Table 1.2: Obama Campaign Speeches prior to September 15 2008 
   
 
As is evident from the numbers, Barack Obama's campaign speeches followed a well-known 
Democratic refrain: it's the economy, stupid. Over half of the speeches focused primarily on 
the economy, and only about 20% of the total speeches revolved around foreign policy or 
personal traits, which were arguably the weakest points of Obama's campaign. Moreover, 
most of the foreign policy speeches occured either at the American Israel Public Affairs 
Committee Policy Conference, in response to the Russian invasion of Georgia in early 
August 2008, or during travels abroad, all of which areas dictated that foreign policy was an 
inevitable topic. Like McCain, Obama tended to talk about energy production and energy 
needs within the United States; unlike McCain, Obama's energy discussion was primarily in 
the context of the economy. Research and development into alternative fuels was first and 
foremost an avenue to a new industrial boom in the United States (the beneficial effects on 
the climate tended to come in a distant second place). Moreover, the beneficial tax 
agreements established for Big Oil under George W. Bush were not only a potential source of 
much-needed government revenue, they were also allowing oil companies to post record 
profits while the common consumer paid increasingly more at the pump.24 As Vavreck points 
out, the clarifying candidate has the luxury of addressing the insurgent's chosen issues, 
should they so choose (67-69). The clarifying campaign has their groundwork already laid to 
a certain extent: as the electorate is already aware of the importance of the economy (be it 
ship shape or in tatters), the clarifying campaign need not spend all of their resources to bring 
the subject up. If the insurgent campaign has not chosen a campaign theme on which the 
clarifying candidate is barred from running – due to having already explicitly staked an 
unpopular stance on the subject, for instance – the clarifying candidate may expend some of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 For an example of this, see Obama: "Remarks at a Town Hall in Cedar Rapids"; "Remarks in St. Louis, 
Missouri" 
Issue Total  % of total speeches 
Economy 23 52.5 % 
Traits 2 4.5 % 
Foreign Policy 7 16 % 
Domestic Policy 12 27% 
Total 44 100% 
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their resources on splitting the vote on the insurgent topic. As an example, an insurgent 
campaign may choose to run on a domestic policy issue (e.g. welfare reform), but if the 
clarifying campaign has not already constrained themselves by choosing an unpopular 
position, they may then publicly state their position and surf along on the policy momentum 
created by the insurgent campaign's efforts to change the subject off of the economy. An 
example of this may be found in Obama's remarks in Dayton, Ohio on September 9, 2008. 
This was only a few days after McCain's Republican National Convention speech, wherein he 
championed his ability to enact reform in Washington, and called education reform the civil 
rights issue of the 21st century. Obama's speech focused on John McCain's long career in 
Congress, wherein he had not initiated the sort of reform he was calling for. Moreover, 
Obama took the opportunity to reinforce his claim that McCain was too out to touch to 
understand what was truly needed in Washington. In this way, Obama could afford to spend 
time elucidating his stance and ideas for change on a topic that the opposition had done all 
the groundwork to make salient to voters. 
 In all, the speeches given by both candidates prior to September 15 support the 
typology presented by Vavreck. Obama's speeches focused mainly on the economy, with 
some excursions to capitalize on a topic already brought to the public's attention by Senator 
McCain. Conversely, McCain for the most part avoided the economy, or at the very least 
skirted the issue, as a solid 86 percent of his speeches were primarily focused on a different 
subject other than the economy. Some speeches may have made the token effort to pay what 
amounts to political lipservice to the crumbling markets, only to then segue onto a different 
topic upon which an insurgent campaign may more successfully run. However, stump 
speeches are only part of the modern campaign. The far more controversial (as has been 
discussed) political advertisements are also considerable conveyors of political messaging. 
How, then, did the candidate's advertisements conform to the clarifying/insurgent dichotomy? 
 
4.5 The Campaign Ads: Accentuate the Negative 
In the three months leading up to September, both candidates spent a fortune on air time for 
their political advertising. Combined, the two campaigns purchased a total of 225,896 spot 
ads. These ads ran on local TV networks from the beginning of June until the end of August, 
of which Obama purchased a little under 120,500. In the same period, the candidates bought 
1217 spots on national TV: on this front, McCain outspent Obama by a significant margin, 
buying 833 spots to Obama's 384 ("How Obama's Local Buys Added Up"). However, the 
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voters' exposure to said ads do not necessarily follow naturally from the numbers, as the 
nationally aired ads potentially reach a much larger segment of the population. In total, from 
June until Election Night, the McCain dataset consists of 68 ads, while Obama's dataset 
consists of 76. Some clarifications should be made before proceeding: the advertisements 
included in this section consist solely of candidate-endorsed English-language ads. This 
means that third party advocacy groups, PACs, and national party committee ads are 
excluded from the data pool, as is the small handful of ads that the candidates had produced 
in Spanish. This, as with the data limitations on the speech dataset, is in order to get at what 
the candidates themselves wanted to communicate. If an ad did not include the mandatory 
approval ("I'm Candidate X and I approve this message") either at the beginning or the end of 
the advertisement, it was removed from the data pool. If it did include the approval, the ad 
was taken as a bona fide expression of the campaign's, and candidate's, deliberate political 
message.  
 The ads were coded along the same lines as the speeches, using the four categories of 
Economy, Traits, Domestic and Foreign Policy. To reiterate from earlier, political 
advertisements are generally short and to the point (the vast majority are about 30 seconds 
long), and were therefore also coded according to subcategories, as coding simply for 
thematic content misses the specific meaning of the message. Simply being an economy-
heavy advertisement says nothing about whether the ad focused on tax policy, or Social 
Security, or lobbyists in Washington. Therefore, reference content has also been coded (as 
mentioned, an ad may contain several references, and therefore the total number of references 
won't necessarily match up with the total number of ads). 
The total advertisements for the two candidates tally as follows: 
 
Table 1.3: General Campaign Advertisements Before September 15 2008 
 
 
 McCain Obama 
Ads Before September 15 27 37 
Issue No. of Ads % of total No. of Ads % of total 
Economy 6 22 % 23  62 % 
Traits 15 55.5 % 11  30 % 
Foreign Policy 4 15 % 0  
Domestic Policy 2 7.5 % 3  8 % 
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Again, both campaigns conform to the theory of insurgent and clarifying campaigns: Almost 
two-thirds of Obama's political advertisements focused on the economy, whereas over half of 
John McCain's advertisements focused on Traits. Interestingly enough, the most prominent 
category of one campaign also happened to be the second most prominent category for the 
other campaign. For both McCain and Obama's campaigns, the negative ads were the most 
prominent in either category. It could be argued that the Obama campaign's advertisements 
were more negative, as the contrast ads often fall on the more negative side of the spectrum: 
the McCain campaign produced either as many or more positive ads than constrastive ones. 
Taking a closer look yields the following: 
 
Table 1.4 Positive/Negative/Contrastive Major Theme Advertisements   
McCain Obama Issue 
Positive Negative Contrast Positive Negative Contrast 
Economy 16.5% 67% 16.5% 26% 56.5% 17.5% 
Traits 33.5% 46.5% 20% 18% 46% 36% 
 
 
Certain themes repeated themselves in the campaigns, and so too in the ads. For 
instance, McCain's Negative Traits ads about Barack Obama tended to follow the same 
narrative: Obama was an enigma, and the candidate he claimed to be was not a true reflection 
of him. Many of the ads featured a sound clip of a crowd chanting "O-ba-ma!" over and over 
in the background, and were variations on the theme of Obama being more of a celebrity than 
a politician: an idol that his supporters clung to more for appearance's sake than for the sake 
of policy or governance. Somewhat incongruously, McCain's campaign also released an 
advertisement on the eve of the Democratic National Convention, following several negative 
ads in which clips of Joe Biden and Hillary Clinton from the primary season were used as 
mouthpieces against Obama's candidacy. In this advertisement – the only positive ad of the 
election cycle that was not about the candidate himself, but rather about the opponent – 
McCain speaks into the camera: "Too often the achievements of our opponents go unnoticed. 
So I wanted to stop and say, 'congratulations'." ("Convention Night") The Positive Traits ads 
focused almost exclusively on John McCain's congressional work as a reformer and his 
military service until Sarah Palin's vice president candidacy was announced, at which point 
the message solidified into the Maverick brand: independent reformers who will always side 
with their constituents and do what's right for the country. The McCain campaign's Negative 
Economy ads were, unsurprisingly, focused on taxes. However, they also tap into the 
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negative message from the Traits advertisements, with tag lines such as "Higher Taxes, 
Higher Gas Prices, Economic Disaster: That's the Real Obama" ("Tax Man") and "That's the 
Real Obama: Ready to Tax, Not Ready to Lead" ("Maybe").  
As for the Obama campaign advertisements, they were no less venomous. The 
Negative Traits ads certainly responded in kind: In one ad, McCain was called "Washington's 
Biggest Celebrity" and was shown hugging George W. Bush in a succession of clips 
("Embrace"). The Maverick image also came under fire, as the Obama campaign accused 
McCain and Palin of being beholden to special interests in Washington, and of being political 
carbon copies of George W. Bush. The Positive Traits ads from the Obama campaign focused 
strongly on Senator Obama's patriotism and love for America, as well as Joe Biden's zeal for 
the cause of working class Americans.  The Obama Economy Positive ads focused almost 
entirely on job creation, either through the expansion of new labor markets, such as 
renewable energy, or through the modernization of current labor markets. In "Hands", 
workers in hard-hit industries such as construction and the automotive industry are revisioned 
as engineers and high-tech machinery operators, promising that the Obama campaign will 
create 5 million new jobs this way. The Negative Economy advertisements go far in repeating 
the claim made in Obama's speeches, both on the trail and at the Democratic National 
Convention: McCain just doesn't get it. One ad juxtaposes the struggles of the collapsing 
housing market with McCain seemingly struggling to remember just how many houses he 
owns ("Seven"); in another, McCain's statement that the "fundamentals of [the] economy are 
still strong" is followed by an assertion that his policies are no different from those of George 
W. Bush ("No Change"). 
All told, the two campaigns adhered to the insurgent and clarifying campaign 
typology both in advertising and in speechmaking. Obama, favored as the non-incumbent 
party representative in a tottering economy, ran the clarifying campaign to a T: the vast 
majority of his campaigning was rooted in economic concern, and when the campaign 
strayed, it did so on the same topics as the McCain campaign's insurgent effort. As for the 
McCain campaign, they wisely left the economy to the side and attempted to run on the 
strength of John McCain's character – both politically and otherwise – and the younger, more 
conservative Sarah Palin. However, both the Obama and McCain campaigns would soon find 
themselves in a situation in which their ability to set the topic for the political conversation 
was all but gone. 	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Chapter Five: The Mid-September Surprise 
 
Though the signs of economic downturn were growing ever more pressing, as they had been 
so far that year, few Americans on Main Street could have foreseen what they would wake up 
to on Monday, September 15, which became known as Black Monday. As mentioned in 
Chapter Three, both Wall Street and financial regulators had sprung into action when Bear 
Stearns collapsed: the hope was that this would be enough. However, over the weekend of 
September 12, trouble was yet again brewing. The collapse of Bear Stearns had caused many 
in the market to start examining their books more closely, and unrest grew in the market, as 
fewer and fewer on Wall Street could gauge with any confidence exactly how much their 
assets – in derivatives, CDOs, and credit default swaps – were actually worth.   
By Friday September 12, the federal regulators and Lehman Brothers' own financial 
experts could no longer agree on whether the company was solvent or not: if the financial 
assets that backed the bank's investments were worth as much as Lehman itself claimed, the 
bank was solvent; its debt obligations, while considerable, did not outweigh its value. 
However, if the math were off, even by a little bit, the bank would be in far above its head 
(FCIC 324-26). If the market grew wary about Lehman's solvency, investors would likely set 
off a run of the same sort that gutted Bear Stearns, and that would be akin to a self-fulfilling 
prophecy: once investors started trying to get their money out, Lehman would have to sell off 
assets at firesale rates, and that would cause its value to plummet on the market. If investor 
confidence evaporated, all hell would break loose. After a deal with Korea Investment Bank 
fell through on September 9, Lehman's stock prices dropped 55% overnight. Behind the 
scenes, those in the know started bracing for the worst: top regulators and government 
officials convened to discuss the possible demise of Lehman Brothers (FCIC 329-30). The 
last week of Lehman's existence was one of furious activity behind the scenes: while 
executives on Wall Street maneouvered to try and limit their own potential losses at the 
expense of others, Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson was trying desperately to broker a deal 
for someone to acquire Lehman before it went under. Bank of America declined on 
Wednesday; Merrill Lynch backed out on Saturday; on Sunday, September 14, the last hope 
for a solution went under as British law kept Barclay's from taking Lehman over, as had been 
the last-minute agreement the night before (FCIR 332-37). As the markets opened for 
business on Monday September 15, 2008, Lehman Brothers had already filed for bankrupcty. 
As a result,  
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... the Dow plummeted more than 500 points; $700 billion in value from retirement 
plans, government pension funds, and other investment portfolios disappeared. As for 
Lehman itself, the bankruptcy affected about 8,000 subsidiaries and affiliates with 
$600 billion in assets and liabilities, the firm's more than 100,000 creditors and about 
26,000 employees. (FCIC 339-40) 
 
Meanwhile, Merrill Lynch narrowly escaped the same fate by brokering a last-minute deal 
with Bank of America. The effects of this tumultuous weekend would reverberate throughout 
the financial markets world wide, and set off unintended consequences that eventually 
plummeted the world economy into a deep, dark, and very long valley.  
 As Hank Paulson attempted to broker a lifeline for Lehman Brothers, it was becoming 
increasingly apparent that AIG – a far larger company than Lehman Brothers, with far more 
exposure in the market – was also in trouble. This caused the ratings agencies to downgrade 
AIG from super-safe Triple A to Double A, A, and A- which allowed investors to make good 
on so-called automatic collateral calls: if the company's ratings fell below a certain point, all 
its investors could automatically demand their money back. However, AIG did not have that 
money: through diversification and creative investments, it had supposedly spread its risk so 
thin that it was not required to keep very much capital to its name at all. AIG, unlike Lehman 
Brothers, had the dubious honor of being too big to fail: the potential systemic risk of an AIG 
collapse was so great that the government was forced to step in. Taxpayer funds, to the tune 
of $182 billion, were shunted into AIG in order to keep it afloat (FCIC 346-50). Amidst all of 
this, Barack Obama and John McCain were trying to win an election. 
 
5.1 The Candidates Respond 
Though Lehman Brothers had clearly been troubled, few outside of the inner circle of 
Lehman executives and government regulators had expected a bankruptcy filing so suddenly; 
in fact, even the Lehman representatives themselves were taken aback, as they were more or 
less forced to declare bankruptcy before even assembling the full board of directors, as 
normal procedure would demand (FCIC 336-37). As Wall Street attempted to come to terms 
with the turmoil in the markets, so did the news media and the electorate. According to 
research done by the Pew Research Center's Project for Excellence in Journalism, the 
financial crisis was by far the most dominant item in the news:  
The crisis not only became the week's top news story -- marking only the second time 
this year that an event other than the campaign emerged as the No. 1 topic of the week 
-- but also raised the possibility that a major policy issue, the economy, might emerge 
as the decisive factor of the campaign. (Jurkowitz) 
 
	   88	  
The week prior, the economy – as noted, ever an important topic to the electorate – had in 
fact not been a significant component of campaign coverage. Between September 8 and 
September 14, the economy had accounted for only 4% of campaign coverage in the news, 
and it had exceeded 5% only once in the previous eight weeks. Almost overnight, however, 
the economy became the dominant theme. Not only did 46% of all news coverage focus on 
the financial crisis, the second-most important topic – the election – was also dominated by 
the financial crisis. According to the Pew research, the financial crisis alone covered 43% of 
the campaign newshole – that is, the space allotted for campaign coverage in the news media 
once advertisements have been placed or aired (Jurkowitz). Clearly, there was little left to do 
for the candidates to respond, whether it would serve their campaigns or not: to ignore the 
issue would be tantamount to pretending that it had not happened at all.  
 In a speech in Tampa, Florida, on September 16, McCain tackled the issue head-on. 
He blamed greed and corruption on Wall Street: in the endless quest for wealth, the principles 
of sound finance had fallen by the wayside. Reforms, according to McCain, would be the 
answer: reforms to expose the questionable practices of Wall Street, which had ended up 
gutting the financial system; reforms to ensure that people's pensions and savings aren't at 
risk without them knowing about it; reforms to curb financial speculation and force banks to 
reduce risk and perform their transactions responsibly. Though severely constrained on 
insurgent issues, McCain still managed to revive some of the calling cards from his pre-Black 
Monday campaign: Main Street needed a strong fighter to protect it from the excesses of 
Wall Street, and the Maverick ticket would remember who it was working for: "...the public 
interest will always come first." However, this was not McCain's first response to the 
Financial Crisis: the day before, on Black Monday itself, McCain had spoken at a town hall 
meeting Jacksonville, Florida, and told the attendees: "The fundamentals of our economy are 
strong." The economy, he claimed, was not in jeopardy (Bentley). Considering the 
unprecedented bailout of AIG only a few days later, and the credit squeeze – that is, the 
increasing reluctance of banks to issue credit or loans – moving from Wall Street to the 
economy in general, it would not be particularly surprising if McCain's comments sounded 
incongruous to many. They looked at a financial market that was collapsing under its own 
weight, seemingly overnight, and then to the candidates for an explanation, and a way 
forward. 
 For Obama, his clarifying campaign was far more capable not only of addressing the 
economy – as he had already been doing on the campaign trail for months – but of placing 
him in a better position to profit politically from the resurgence of the economy as a mainstay 
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of the election. In his speech in Golden, Colorado, on September 16 2008, Obama attributed 
the financial crisis not simply to greed on the part of investors and bankers, or excessive 
deregulation on the part of government: the financial crisis was "...the final verdict on an 
economic philosophy that has completely failed." The financial crisis was the last, violent 
dirge for the modern Republican fiscal philosophy, but McCain could only be trusted to try to 
keep it alive should he be elected President. The financial crisis was not simply a big 
financial crash, nor was it an "historical anomaly," but rather, it was the direct result of the 
Republican excesses of the past eight years: tax cuts, deregulation, wartime spending and 
tightly knit relationships with lobbyists. The solution was not to elect the same party that had 
caused the mess to begin with, or to put the economic well being of the country into the 
hands of someone whose fiscal philosophy drew from the same sources as those who had let 
the crisis happen while in power. The solution would be to elect someone different, to 
commit to change. 
 
5.2 McCain, Interrupted 
For McCain's insurgent campaign, there seem to have been two possibilities: either abandon 
the insurgent campaign themes and focus on the economy, potentially losing whatever gains 
had been made by changing the subject to non-economy issues. Alternatively, the campaign 
could keep going with the insurgent strategy, focusing on foreign policy and traits, all the 
while running the risk of seeming out of touch or unconcerned with the financial meltdown. 
It is important to return to the point that running on a theme other than the economy is not 
what classifies a campaign as insurgent: that status is decided ahead of the race, based on 
general economic trends and party incumbency. Vavreck's typology would dictate that the 
latter option, maintaining the campaign themes from before the crisis, ought to be the most 
rational course of action – as in, the course of action most appealing to a campaign whose 
motivation is to win. However, there is no accounting for crises: when the normal order 
seems (at least temporarily) thrown out, the less rational choice may ultimately prove more 
appealing. Whichever the case may be, the McCain campaign altered course.  
From the speech on Black Monday until, ultimately, his concession speech on 
November 4, the economy became the dominant theme of the McCain campaign speeches.  
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Table 1.5: McCain Campaign Speeches After September 15 
Issue Number of Speeches % of Total 
Economy 19 58 % 
Traits 12 36 % 
Foreign Policy 2 6 % 
Domestic Policy 0 - 
Total 33 100 % 
 
 
Clearly, the balance has shifted in favor of the economy, though not entirely. Traits are still 
an important part of the McCain campaign message. This also fits the explanatory frame 
McCain chose for most of his campaign speeches: that the financial crisis was a failure of 
individuals. It was a failure of those on Wall Street who did not heed the rules and chose not 
to invest wisely and prudently in order to turn a quick profit; it was the failure of individuals 
in government for not regulating and punishing those who put the financial system at risk; 
and it was the failure of those in Congress for being too close to lobbyists on either side of 
the aisle. However, simply addressing the failures which led to the financial crisis is not 
enough: one must also provide for those who have already been harmed, to make sure that 
they are not done further harm by the greed and negligence of others.  
 McCain would do this in two ways. First, McCain announced that he would 
temporarily suspend his campaign for the presidency on September 24, 2008 (and thereby 
postpone the presidential candidate debate scheduled two days later) in order to return to 
Congress and oversee legislation to address the financial crisis, which drew no small amount 
of criticism (Bumiller and Cooper; Nagourney and Bumiller). Secondly, McCain published 
an economic plan on October 14, entitled Jobs for America: The McCain Economic Plan.25 
In this plan, McCain sketched out his solution for the economic crisis: Tax credits, tax cuts 
and reforms for immediate help; energy and health care reform in the longer term. Moreover, 
the economic plan carries some signs of having been cobbled together in a hurry: the first 
half, which covers emergency relief measures for struggling families hit hard by the 
economic crisis, consists mostly of a series of bullet points with very little in the way of 
actual policy suggestions. The second half, however, is far more comprehensive. The bullet 
points have been replaced by paragraphs containing fully formed policy suggestions, backed 
up by facts and figures. This second half is mostly concerned with health care reform and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 This plan was retrieved from an archived, "frozen" version of John McCain's campaign homepage, through 
Archive.org's Internet Wayback Machine. 
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McCain campaign's comprehensive energy reform plan, called the Lexington Project. This 
suggests that prior to the economic crisis, McCain was planning on continuing to run on his 
reform-based insurgent agenda, focusing   
 The biggest shift in McCain's campaign themes, however, is evident in the political 
advertising, where the economic ads truly outnumbered the insurgent issues, as can be seen 
below: 
Table 1.6: McCain Campaign Political Advertising after September 15 
Issue Number of Ads % of Total 
Economy 28 67 % 
Traits 9 21.5 % 
Foreign Policy 4 9.5 % 
Domestic Policy 1 2 % 
Total 42 100% 
  
 
Now, two-thirds of McCain's advertising falls within the Economy category. Traits are still 
an important topic, but this issue is now a far distant second, while Foreign and Domestic 
Policy have fallen more or less by the wayside. These new Economy ads are highly 
concerned with tax policy, especially after the man who became known as Joe the Plumber 
questioned Obama on his tax plan. Joe the Plumber confronted Senator Obama about his 
taxes going up under Obama's plan, to which Barack Obama replied: "I think that when you 
spread the wealth around, it's good for everybody" (Rother). As it would turn out, Joe the 
Plumber was really Samuel Wurzelbacher, he was not a licensed plumber, and his tax return 
was nowhere near the level it would have to have been in order to incur a tax increase under 
Obama's plan (Rother). Nonetheless, Joe the Plumber became a tack on which the McCain 
campaign could hang their attacks on Obama's economic plan: Obama's tax policy was little 
more than taking from those who work hard to give to those who do not. In "Joe the 
Plumber", an edited exchange between Wurzelbacher and Obama is played, wherein Obama 
comments: "It's not that I want to punish your success. ... I think when you spread the wealth 
around, it's good for everybody." This is followed by a male announcer: "Everybody? 
Leading papers call Obama's taxes 'welfare' [pause] 'government handouts.' Obama raises 
taxes on seniors, hard working families to give 'welfare' to those who pay none. Just as you 
suspected, Obama's not truthful on taxes." The next ad, released the week after, repeats the 
message: An annoyed-looking man looks into the camera and incredulously asks, "Obama 
wants my sweat to pay for his trillion dollars in new spending?" ("Sweat Equity") 
 Based on the evidence from the survey of speeches and ads, the conclusion is that 
McCain moved away from his established insurgent campaign issues to focus on the 
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economy. However, considering how completely the economy eclipsed all other campaign 
and news coverage in the weeks after the crisis, it is quite possible that not moving away 
from the established issues and on to the economy would have been political suicide. It is 
quite possible that the lack of relevant campaigning resulting from a strategy packing no 
economic punch might have garnered McCain very little attention at all, and certainly no 
beneficial attention.  It may just be that the McCain campaign, under the circumstances, was 
caught between a rock and a hard place, and chose the route which gave them the most room 
to maneouver politically, which would be to switch focus and participate fully in the 
discussion of the faltering economy. 
 
5.3 Obama and the Continued Campaign 
There is no question that Obama benefitted more, politically, from the economic crisis. 
Campaigning as a non-incumbent means having to convince the electorate that the country is 
due for a change of leadership, which may be a daunting task in the face of prosperity, peace, 
or simply an unusually charismatic and well-liked President. However, none of this was a 
factor in the 2008 election: As has been noted earlier, George W. Bush was notoriously 
unpopular in his last term as President; the country was engaged in two different military 
conflicts, both of which had turned out long and exceedingly costly; and – as was becoming 
painfully evident – the economy was coming apart at the seams. The prosperity, which had 
been built up during Wall Street's last boom, was revealed as illusory as soon as the bubble 
burst. Therefore, the task for Obama was not so much to change the subject, or to ensure that 
the economy remained an important topic: history had already seen to that. Obama's 
campaign task was to remain convincing, to remain seen as politially viable, and most of all, 
to derail any attempt by the McCain campaign to return to their insurgent campaign issues. 
 How could Obama not continue to campaign on the economy? His speeches 
continued to focus primarily on the economy, as can be seen below: 
Table 1.7: Obama Campaign Speeches after September 15 
Issue Number of Speeches % of Total 
Economy 25 61 % 
Traits 15 36.5 % 
Foreign Policy 1 2.5 % 
Domestic Policy 0 - 
Total 41 100% 
 
Obama maintained his ratio of nearly two-thirds of the campaign speeches revolving around 
the economy. However, Traits were also notably present – with only one Foreign Policy 
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speech and none on the issue of Domestic Policy – nearly every speech that did not primarily 
involve the economy discussed Traits. Moreover, many of these speeches did not appear until 
at the very tail end of the campaign. From one week out until Election night, the speech 
narrative switched from one in which the economy played a major part, to one in which traits 
were almost predominantly the issue. There are two possible reasons for this. The first is that 
the Obama campaign discovered (or decided) that they had already hammered home their 
points on the economy, and could therefore broaden their appeal a little more. A second 
possible reason is that the McCain campaign was simply growing so unpopular on the topic 
of the economy that the Obama campaign saw their opportunity to try to nip any insurgent 
issues in the bud. Certainly, the Obama campaign received some unintended help from their 
opponent: for instance, in an interview with the New York Daily News, an unnamed "top 
McCain aide" stated that if the McCain campaign kept talking about the economy, they 
would lose the election (DeFrank). Moreover, McCain's plan to deregulate health care in the 
same manner as Wall Street banks acquired an unpleasant aftertaste, to say the very least, 
after the bottom fell out of the investment banks and countless billions of dollars disappeared 
down the drain with it. As Obama remarked in a speech in Asheville, North Carolina:  
... Senator McCain wrote that we need to open up health care to - and I quote - "more 
vigorous nationwide competition as we have done over the last decade in banking." 
That's right, he wants to deregulate the [health] insurance industry just like he fought 
to deregulate the banking industry. And we've all seen how well that worked out. 
(para. 31) 
 
Additionally, in Chillicothe, Ohio, Obama mentioned that McCain seemed to be worried 
about the fate of his campaign, whereas Obama was concerned about the electorate's fate 
rather than his own ("Remarks in Chillicothe, Ohio"). McCain was not alone in releasing an 
economic plan; in fact, the Obama campaign scooped him and released its own version the 
day before McCain had planned his release. In his economic plan, called A Rescue Plan for 
the Middle Class, job creation and economic relief are the most important steps, both of 
which would be achieved mainly through tax cuts and tax credits, as well as a temporary 
moratorium on regulations that serve to hinder the flow of cash where it is needed, such as 
small business investment caps (1-4).  
 In the last two months leading up to Election Night, Obama not only had the 
advantage on the economy on his clarifying campaign, he also had a tremendous edge on 
McCain in terms of ad buys. According to Nielsen, Obama outbought McCain almost 2:1 on 
local ad buys. National ad buys were less discrepant, but Obama edged McCain out by a solid 
margin there, as well ("How Obama's Local Buys Add Up"). The distribution of Obama's ads 
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in the categories needs to table, as they were overwhelmingly dominated by the economy: 
save for Traits-based advertisements, all 38 ads were related to the economy, one way or the 
other. The ads tended to fall into one of two explanatory subcategories. The first kind 
elucidated how Obama's planned tax cuts would help the middle class and stimulate 
economic growth. The second kind attempted to hammer home the point that McCain was 
hopelessly out of touch on the economy: he gave tax breaks to big oil; he supported 
companies that sent jobs overseas; he wanted to tax health care benefits "for the first time 
ever"; and, perhaps most damning of all, he voted with George W. Bush ("Rearview 
Mirror").  
 
5.4 Troubled Assets 
Five days after the financial crisis struck, in the wee small hours of the morning, the Treasury 
Department sent a three-page draft to to Congress, outlining what would become the 
Troubled Asset Relief Program, or TARP. By then, Wachovia had succumbed to the financial 
crisis, and was bought up by a government-assisted Citigroup. The TARP draft, which would 
eventually enable the Treasury to purchase up to $700 billion in toxic assets from the market, 
was greeted with suspicion in Congress: this would be a much larger financial intervention on 
the part of the government than the AIG bailouts. As the House of Representatives rejected 
the proposal, the markets responded by plunging ever downwards (FCIC 371-372). The 
lawmakers seemed to realize that they could not afford to go without TARP or some 
analogous reponse, and added measures intended to sweeten the deal for taxpayers. By 
October 3, 2008, the three-page proposal had grown into a 169-page bill, and passed in both 
Houses by a comfortable margin. Though it was signed into law less than a month after the 
financial collapse, the TARP plan did not stymie the unraveling of the markets, and even 
those firms who had survived the initial crash relatively unscathed were now starting to feel 
the heat. The Treasury Department offered a sweetheart to the nine biggest financial 
institutions, who held 75% of the assets in the United States between them, offering a capital 
injection of $250 billion through the purchase of non-voting stock, which was meant to head 
any possible complaints about nationalization off at the pass (FCIC 372-74). Though TARP 
became arguably the most well-known of the governmental financial crisis responses, it was 
neither the largest, nor the most comprehensive, of the government measures to shore up the 
financial system. 
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 The candidates both responded to the TARP measures in the following days. And 
while both supported the plan, Obama called for a more aggressive response: the government 
should force banks to accept a three-month moratorium on foreclosures, as well as move 
aggressively and fast to correct the market, including by purchasing other types of debt 
alongside mortgage loans. In addition, he called for increased, "common-sense" regulation to 
avoid a similar financial meltdown from ever occuring again ("Remarks in Toledo"). 
McCain, on his part, called for the government to buy and refinance mortgages, in an attempt 
to put a lid on the housing crisis. Furthermore, McCain, like Obama, called for the 
government to regulate businesses more closely. Unlike Obama, however, McCain argued 
that government should essentially streamline failing businesses and then "... get government 
out of the business of bailouts and equity stakes, and back in the business of responsible 
regulation." ("Remarks in Blue Bell") 
 Both candidates, naturally, focused their attention on measures that would help the 
everyday voter, such as the foreclosure moratorium and the federal mortgage refinancing 
plan. Both candidates also quickly returned to what had emerged as their end-stage campaign 
messages. Barack Obama called for unity in the nation, that the country move as one towards 
a shared purpose and a shared future. Though times would certainly be rough, there was also 
more hope now than ever before. McCain returned to his message of cutting taxes and 
regulation to foster growth and spending, and appealing on the strength of his character and 
record that he was the true candidate of change. 
 
5.5 The Economy and the Electorate 
Common sense dictates that a financial crisis of this scale ought to affect voters, both in terms 
of their personal lives and in terms of their decision to vote. Though the causes of the 
financial crisis were long in the running and slow to build, the effects of the crisis were 
sudden and detrimental. As Paola Sapienza and Luigi Zingales wrote in January 2009: 
If a modern Rip Van Winkle had fallen asleep two years ago and woken up now, he 
would wonder what had happened to the U.S. economy. Two years ago, we were in 
the middle of an economic boom. Banks were eager to lend even at the cost of 
forgoing important covenants, and corporate America (and the entire world) was 
producing at full steam, so much so that commodities prices were rising in 
anticipation of a future scarcity. Today we are quickly sliding into a deep recession. 
Banks are not lending and commodity prices are plummeting in expectation of a 
dramatic slowdown of production throughout the world. (Sapienza and Zingales) 
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In the Financial Trust Index, Sapienza and Zingales periodically measure the public's trust in 
financial institutions and the government in order to track changes over time and document 
their causes or correlations. They found that, after the Lehman collapse, trust in the financial 
market and the economic system at large decreased sharply. Moreover, this decrease in trust 
was correlated with a decreased intention to participate in the market and increased risk of 
pulling investments and money out of the market. In other words, lack of trust correlates with 
bank runs and credit freezes, which further exacerbate adverse market conditions.26 More 
importantly, in the context of the election, was the cause: "While the heavy losses suffered 
can in part explain this reduced trust, a crucial factor seems to be the way in which the 
government has intervened." (Sapienza and Zingales) The loss of trust in the markets 
coincided with a loss of trust in government, largely based on the government's performance 
in the aftermath of the Lehman bankruptcy. Notably, the respondents who chalked the 2008 
financial crisis up to large-scale changes in the global economy, rather than government or 
institutional failure, were the least likely to indicate a loss of trust. 
 Extant research on the topic of how voters respond to the economy in an election 
tends to divide voters into two categories: pocketbook voters and sociotropic voters. 
MacKuen, Erikson and Stimson call them peasants and bankers, respectively: Peasants 
evaluate the economy based on their experience and the immediate past, punishing the 
incumbent party in meagre times and rewarding the incumbent party during good times. 
Bankers, on the other hand, rely less on the immediate past and more on their evaluation of 
the future: they may vote for the incumbent even during bad times, if they believe that the 
incumbent party will still bring prospority in the future. They conclude that the electorate 
responds "with the sophistication of the banker" (606). Rather than myopically checking their 
recent past, voters rely on an informated imagination and act upon what they expect will 
happen tomorrow, rather than what happened yesterday. Others, e.g. Norpoth, largely support 
this view. 
5.6 And the Winner Is... 
Before the dust had settled, it was clear that Barack Obama was the winner. He had won the 
majority of the female vote, as well as the majority of the minority vote. Additionally, only 
the demographic of 65 and older had favored McCain over Obama; those who identified as 
Independents also favored Obama over McCain. Liberals and moderates all swung in favor of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 For evidence of how trust (or the lack thereof) affects market participation, see also Guiso, Sapienza and 
Zingales (2004); Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2008)  
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Obama, as well as both those in the highest and the three lowest income brackets registered 
by the National Election Survey (CNN, "Exit Polls"). 
 In his concession speech, McCain joined in Obama's campaign theme of unity among 
Americans, to stand behind their country and their president ("Address in Phoenix"). In his 
victory speech, Obama hailed the idea that had brought him so far: that there was still hope, 
even for a nation battered by an economic crisis of a size and scope not seen in generations; 
that there was still hope, even for a woman born into slavery and denied her civic rights for 
half of her adult life; that there was still hope, even for a young man, born of a black African 
father to a middle-class, mid-Western mother in Hawaii, to attain the highest office in the 
land. That, despite all the adversity in the world, a united and inspired citizenry can do what 
has not been done before, achieve what was often thought of as impossible, even in the face 
of the greatest challenges of a lifetime: Yes we can. Through hard work and the American 
promise, the equality of outcomes is possible ("Address in Chicago"). 
 
5.7 The Insurgent and the Clarifier 
Vavreck predicts that the campaign that inhibits the clarifying role historically has a much 
higher chance of success, if they choose to campaign on the economy (69-71). Conversely, 
she predicts that the insurgent campaign is already fighting an up. hill battle, but that given a 
savvy choice of campaign issue, they may yet manage to haul the victory ashore, as Jimmy 
Carter did in 1976 (90). McCain's campaign clearly followed the typology before the 
financial crisis, only to violate the rules set forth for a successful insurgent candidate, namely 
to steer wide and clear of the economy when selecting an issue. However, there is good 
reason to think that continuing to avoid the economy as a campaign mainstay in the tumult 
following Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy would have tantamount to writing one's own 
campaign off, as the financial crisis become the end-all and be-all of both the news media and 
their election coverage.    
 
5.8 Moral Foundations in a Crisis 
As the campaigns spun into high gear, first to tackle the financial crisis and then simply to 
keep up with one another, both campaigns seem to have buckled down in their respective 
moral matrices. Despite earlier appeals for a new and less partisan Washington from both 
campaigns, they seemed to take the opposite approach as Election Day grew nearer. For 
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example, a speech held by John McCain in Dayton, Ohio, on October 27 includes the 
following quote: 
He said, and I quote, "One of the tragedies of the Civil Rights movement was because 
the Civil Rights movement became so court-focused I think that there was a tendency 
to lose track of the political and community organizing and activities on the ground 
that are able to put together the actual coalitions of power through which you bring 
about redistributive change." That is what change means for Barack the Redistributor: 
It means taking your money and giving it to someone else. He believes in 
redistributing wealth, not in policies that grow our economy and create jobs. He is 
more interested in controlling wealth than in creating it, in redistributing money 
instead of spreading opportunity. (para. 3-4) 
A radio address on October 18 was even more explicit, calling Obama's tax plan socialist and 
saying: "At least in Europe, the Socialist leaders who so admire my opponent are upfront 
about their objectives. They use real numbers and honest language. And we should demand 
equal candor from Senator Obama" ("Senator McCain's Weekly Radio Address" para. 10) 
This seems almost to be a case of morality-baiting: nothing about Obama's tax policy could 
even remotely be called socialist, but by attaching that red flag of morality to Obama's 
policies, it seems as though McCain tried to rile up his conservative base enough that they 
would vote just to avoid the scourge of redistribution. Considering the venomous rhetoric that 
would surface along with the Tea Party's relative ascendancy towards the 2010 midterm 
elections, it seems notable that they were not the first to brand then-Senator Obama a 
Socialist. One should note that Obama was no innocent lamb himself, but the link between 
George W. Bush and John McCain was, and is, rather less tenuous than the imagined link 
between Barack Obama and Karl Marx. Regardless, Obama's relentless campaigning on what 
Haidt terms equality of outcomes nonetheless cemented him firmly within the liberal moral 
matrix, and as firmly outside the sphere of influence for those who regard the world through 
conservative glasses. 
 
5.9 Did the McCain Campaign Drown in the Economic Crisis? 
Yes, and no. Those who believe wholeheartedly in the power of fundamentals, as with Fair 
and Hibbs, would likely argue that McCain's ship was sunk, even before it set sail. Due to the 
incumbent President's low popularity and approval ratings, the ongoing wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, as well as the state of the economy – slow, and getting slower! – most voters 
would evaluate their current situation, take a look at the current circumstances, and vote the 
incumbent out. Others, such as pundits and news professionals, would likely argue that there 
	  99	  
is more to a campaign than numbers: anything can happen – such as the near-total collapse of 
a modern banking industry – and that the best way to know who's going to win, is to hang on 
for the whole ride, all the way until the Tuesday after the first Monday in November. Yet 
others – such as Vavreck, or Erikson and Wliezen – might argue that yes, anything can 
happen, but that the fundamentals are important enough that it would take quite the event to 
cancel the effects of the fundamentals out.  
 The fact of the matter is, the economy was not the only thing working in Barack 
Obama's favor (or to McCain's disadvantage). Barack Obama's campaign managed to create a 
broad coalition of young liberal women and minority voters, who were energized and 
dedicated enough not only to go to the polls, but to encourage others to do the same – the 
same coalition who, as of this writing, have just secured Barack Obama his second term as 
President of the United States of America. Obama's campaign used the Internet judiciously to 
fundraise and recruit supporters and canvassers – as anyone who signed up with their email 
address would know, one would hear from David Plouffe or David Axelrod about five times 
a day, with news or solicitations for matching funds donations. Furthermore, though Sarah 
Palin was chosen in order to bolster the Maverick brand and secure women voters for the 
campaign, she did not do particularly well at either task (Brox and Cassels). To add insult to 
injury, the McCain campaign seemed to blunder more than the Obama campaign, with 
careless statements that would then be played on heavy repeat by the media-savvy Obama 
campaign. Furthermore, the sudden focus on the economic collapse, and the causes thereof, 
allowed the Obama campaign to bring into sharp focus the fact that fiscal policy was not John 
McCain's strongest suit: In ads such as "His Choice" and "New Subject", McCain was more 
or less mocked for his lack of fiscal policy finesse. 
 Additionally, John McCain suffered from what the Project for Excellence in 
Journalism calls the snowball effect. In the media, campaign events have three phases: first, 
they happen and the event is covered in the media; then, the effect of that media coverage is 
measured; and third, the reporting then turns to the measured effects. If the campaign event is 
significant enough, this tends to become like the snowball running down the proverbial hill. 
The effect is essentially sustained by its own momentum, and the unlucky candidate is 
trapped inside. For McCain, the snowball was the largely negative media coverage he 
received after the financial crisis hit (Project for Excellence in Journalism, "Winning the 
Media Campaign").  
 Nonetheless, the sudden and dramatic collapse of the financial sector undoubtedly 
hindered McCain's campaign. Whether by interfering with McCain's ability to run an 
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insurgent campaign, or by hijacking the election coverage, or perhaps even by simply 
throwing the campaign a curveball it was not prepared for, the financial crisis of 2008 
irrevocably dimmed John McCain's presidential prospects.  
 
5.10 Concluding Remarks 
The subject for this thesis was chosen due to an enduring interest in political psychology and 
economy. It seemed clear that the economic crisis – as huge, sudden, and globally significant 
as it was – must have affected the Presidential race in some way. As has been shown, the 
campaigns fit well within Vavreck's campaign typology up until September 15, 2008, when 
McCain shifts strategies from insurgent on Traits to insurgent on the Economy. As such, the 
McCain campaign violates the principles of the successful insurgent campaign, and as 
Vavreck's typology predicts, lost the election. Moreover, McCain did not utilize a morally 
inclusive set of narrative frames or arguments which could have possibly swayed 
disillusioned Independents and conservative Democrats to his side; rather, the language 
choice utilized towards the end of the campaign seemed to get more, not less, ensnared in the 
conservative moral matrix of Haidt's Moral Foundations theory.  
Hopefully, the thesis has shown how this may have happened, as well as given an in-
depth look at the ways both campaigns attempted to use the situation to their advantage 
through their campaign rhetoric.  
However, the subject is certainly not without further intrigue: Might there, for 
instance, be a connection between the Tea Party insurgents, clad as they were in the rhetoric 
of liberty and opposition to the tax tyrants in the federal government, and Obama's rhetorical 
strategy of sacralizing equal outcomes and defending the clasically liberal notion of big 
government for big problems? Such topics are still ripe for exploration by anyone willing to 
take the plunge.  
 
	  101	  
 
Works Cited: 	  
Adams, James and Samuel Merrill, III. "Voter Turnout and Candidate Strategies in American 
 Elections". The Journal of Politics 65.1 (2003): 161-89. Web. 9 Oct 2012. 
 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3449860> 
---. "Candidate and Party Strategies in Two-Stage Elections Beginning with a Primary". 
 American Journal of Political Science 52.2  (2008): 344-59. Web. 9 Oct 2012. 
 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25193817> 
"Advertising Money: McCain vs. Obama." FactCheck.org. Annenberg Public Policy Center
 3 Nov. 2008. Web. 6 Apr. 2012. <http://www.factcheck.org/2008/11/advertising
 money-mccain-vs-obama/> 
Anderson, Dwight G. "Power, Rhetoric and the State: A Theory of Presidential Legitimacy". 
 The Review of Politics 50.2 (1988): 198-214. Web. 4 Oct 2012. 
 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1407647> 
Ansolabehere, Stephen and Shanto Iyengar. Going Negative: How Political Advertisements
 Shrink and Polarize the Electorate. New York: Free Press, 1995. Print. 
Ansolabehere, Stephen, Shanto Iyengar, Adam Simon and Nicholas Valentino. "Do Attack
 Ads Demobilize the Electorate?" The American Political Science Review 88.4 (1994):
 829-838. Web. 4 Apr. 2011. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2082710> 
Appleman, Eric M. "The 527 Page". Democracy in Action. George Washington University,
 n.d.  Web. 12 Mar. 2012. <http://www.gwu.edu/~action/2004/money/527page.html> 
"Banking on Becoming President." OpenSecrets.org. Center for Reponsive Politics, n.d. 
 Web. 30 Mar. 2012. <http://www.opensecrets.org/pres08/index.php> 
Bentley, John. "McCain Says Taxpayers Should Not Bail Out Wall Street, Criticizes Obama 
 for 'Nasty' Campaign" CBS News, 15 Sep 2008. Web. 2 Nov 2012. 
 <http://www.cbsnews.com/>  
"Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002." Federal Election Commission. Federal Electio
 Commission, n.d.  Web. 17 Mar. 2012
 <http://www.fec.gov/press/bkgnd/bcra_overview.shtml> 
"Bush and Public Opinion". Pew Research Center for the People and the Press. Pew
 Research Center. 18 Dec 2008. Web. 3 Sept 2012. <http://www.people-
 press.org/2008/12/18/bush-and-public-opinion/> 
	   102	  
Brox, Brian J. and Madison L. Cassels. "The Contemporary Effects of Vice-Presidential 
 Nominees: Sarah Palin and the 2008 Presidential Campaign". Journal of Political  
Marketing 8 (2009): 349-363. Web. 02 Oct 2012. 
 <http://www.tulane.edu/~bbrox/BroxCassels.pdf> 
Bumiller, Elisabeth and Michael Cooper. "McCain to Suspend Campaign to Work on 
 Economy." New York Times, 24 Sept 2008. Web. 29 Oct 2012.	  	   <http://www.nytimes.com/> 
Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes. The American
 Voter. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1976. Print. 
"Candidate Summary Reports, 2007-2008 Cycle, Barack Obama." Federal Election 
 Commission, Federal Election Commission, n.d. Web. 2 Apr. 2012. 
 <http://herndon1.sdrdc.com/cgi-bin/cancomsrs/?_08+P80003338> 
"Candidate Summary Reports, 2007-2008 Cycle, John S. McCain." Federal Election 
 Commission, Federal Election Commission, n.d. Web. 2 Apr. 2012. 
 <http://herndon1.sdrdc.com/cgi-bin/cancomsrs/?_08+P80002801> 
Carney, Dana R., John T. Jost, Samuel D. Gosling and Jeff Potter. "The Secret Lives of 
 Liberals and Conservatives: Personality Profiles, Interaction Styles, and the Things 
 They Leave Behind." Political Psychology 29.6 (2008): 807-840. Web. 
 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20447169> 
Clinton-Gore Creative. "Journey." Living Room Candidate. n.d. Web. 2 Apr 2012. 
 <www.livingroomcandidate.org/commercials/1992/journey> 
CNN. "Exit Polls – Election Center 2008". CNN.com, n.d. Web. 6 Nov 2012. 
 <http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2008/results/polls/#USP00p1> 
Cohen, Marty, David Karol, Hans Noel and John Zaller. The Party Decides: Presidential 
 Nominations Before and After Reform. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
 2008. Print. 
Cooper, Michael. "McCain Wins Big on Super Tuesday". The New York Times, 6 Feb 2008. 
 Web. 12 Aug 2012. <http://www.nytimes.com> 
Cooper, Michael and Elisabeth Bumiller. "Alaskan is McCain's Choice; First Woman on
 GOP's Ticket." New York Times, 29 Aug 2008. Web. 23 Sep 2012. 
 <http://www.nytimes.com/> 
Downs, Anthony. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy". The Journal of 
 Political Economy 65.2 (1957): 135-150. Web. 3 Mar. 2012. Available through 
 http://www.jstor.org 
	  103	  
DeFrank, Thomas M. "Insults Fly as Barack Obama and John McCain Prepare for Second 
 Debate." Daily News, 5 Oct 2008. Web. 29 Oct 2012. 
 <http://www.nydailynews.com> 
Druckman, James N. "The Implication of Framing Effects for Citizen Competence." 
 Political Behavior 23.3 (2001): 225-256. Web. 20 Apr. 2012. 
 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1558384> 
Fair, Ray C. "Econometrics and Presidential Elections". Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
 10.3 (1996): 89:102. Web. 19 Aug 2012. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2138521>  
---.  "The Effects of Economic Events on Votes for President". Review of Economics and 
 Statistics 60 (1978): 159-73. Print. 
Erikson, Robert S. and Christopher Wliezen. The Timeline of Presidential Elections: How 
 Campaigns Do (and Do Not) Matter. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012. 
 Print. 
"Fakta om Kringkastingsavgiften". NRK Lisensavdelingen, Norsk Rikskringkasting. 02 Jan 
 2012. Web. October 28 2012. <http://www.nrk.no> 
"FAQs: Sesame Workshop." Sesame Workshop, Sesame Workshop. n.d. Web. October 28 
 2012. <http://www.sesameworkshop.org/faqs.html#faq2> 
"FEC Litigation – Court Case Abstracts – B." Federal Election Commission. Federal Election 
 Commission, n.d. Web. 2 Mar. 2012. 
 <http://www.fec.gov/law/litigation_CCA_B.shtml#buckley> 
"Federal Election Commission Record October 2004." Record 30.10 (2004): 1-20. Web. 4 
 Mar. 2012. < http://www.fec.gov/pdf/record/2004/oct04.pdf#page=4> 
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report: Final Report of 
 the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the 
 United States. January 2011. Web. 15 Aug 2012. <http://fcic.law.stanford.edu/report> 
Freedman, Paul, Michael Franz and Kenneth Goldstein. "Campaign Advertising and 
 Democratic Citizenship". American Journal of Political Science 48.4 (2004): 723-
 741. Web. 4 Apr. 2011. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2082710> 
Furgeson, Joshua R., Linda Babcock and Peter M. Shane. "Behind the Mask of Method: 
 Political Orientation and Constitutional Interpretive Preferences." Law and Human 
 Behavior 32.6 (2008): 502-510. Web. 20 Apr. 2012. 
 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/30219002> 
Gallup. "Presidential Approval Ratings – George W. Bush".  n.d. Web. 2 Sep. 2012.  
 <http://www.gallup.com> 
	   104	  
Geer, John G. "Campaigns, Competition and Political Advertising. New Perspectives on 
  Party Politics. Ed. John G. Geer. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1998. 186-217. 
 Print.  
---. "Fanning the Flames: The News Media's Role in the Rise of Negativity in Presidential 
 Campaigns". Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy 
 Discussion Paper Series D-55 (2010): n.pag. Web. 3 Apr. 2012. 
 <http://www.hks.harvard.edu/presspol/publications/papers/discussion_papers/d55_
 geer.pdf > 
---. In Defense of Negativity: Attack Ads in American Campaigns. Chicago: University of 
 Chicago Press, 2006. Print. 
Gerber, Alan S., Gregory A.Huber, David Doherty, Conor M. Dowling and Shang E. Ha. 
 "Personality and Political Attitudes: Relationships Across Issue Domains and Political 
 Context." American Political Science Review 104.1 (2010): 111-133. Web. 12 Mar. 
 2012. <http://sites.duke.edu/niou/files/2011/06/gerber-huber-etal.pdf> 
Graham, Jesse, Jonathan Haidt and Brian Nosek. "Liberals and Conservatives Rely on 
 Different Sets of Moral Foundations". Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 
 96 (2009): 1029-1046. Web. 2 Apr. 2012. 
 <http://people.virginia.edu/~jdh6n/politicalpsych.html> 
Greenhouse, Linda and David D. Kirkpatrick. "Justices Loosen Ad Restrictions in Campaign 
 Finance Law." New York Times 26 Jun. 2007. Web. 3 Mar. 2012. 
 <http://www.nytimes.com> 
Guizo, Luigi, Paola Sapienza and Luigi Zingales. "The Role of Social Capital in Financial 
 Development". The American Economic Review 94.3 (2004): 526-56. 
 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3592941> 
---. "Trusting the Stock Market". The Journal of Finance 63.6 (2008): 2557-2600. Web. 29 
 October 2012. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20487944> 
Haidt, Jonathan. The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and 
 Religion. London: Penguin Books, 2012. Print. 
Haidt, Jonathan and Jesse Graham. "When Morality Opposes Justice: Conservatives Have
  Moral Intuitions that Liberals may not Recognize". Social Justice Research 20 
 (2007): 98-116. Print. 
Hetherington, Marc J. and Michael Nelson. "Anatomy of a Rally Effect: George W. Bush 
 and the War on Terrorism". PS: Political Science and Politics (January 2003): 37-42.
  Print. 
	  105	  
Herrnson, Paul S. and Ronald A. Faucheux. "Candidates Devote Substantial Time and Effort 
 to Fundraising". The Department of Government and Politics, University of 
 Maryland, 7 Jul. 2000. Web. 4 Feb. 2012. 
 <http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/herrnson/reporttime.html> 
Hibbs, Jr., Douglas A. "Bread and Peace Voting in U.S. Presidential Elections". Public 
 Choice 104.1 (July 2000): 149-180. Web. 27 Oct 2012. 
 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/30026466> 
Hill, Patrice. "McCain Adviser Talks of 'Mental Recession' ". The Washington Times 9 Jul 
 2008. Web. 25 Oct 2012. <http://www.washingtontimes.com/> 
Hollihan, Thomas A. Uncivil Wars: Political Campaigns in a Media Age, Second Ed. 
 Boston: Bedfords/St.Martin, 2009. Print. 
"How Obama's Local Buys Added Up." Nielsen Wire, The Nielsen Company. 25 Nov 2008. 
 Web. 26 Aug 2012. <http://blog.nielsen.com> 
"Huckabee bows to 'inevitable', ends GOP run." CNN Politics, Cable News Network. 5 Mar 
 2008. Web. 20 Sep 2012. <http://www.cnn.com> 
Iyengar, Shanto and Jennifer A. MacGrady. Media Politics: A Citizen's Guide. New York: 
 Norton, 2007. Print. 
Iyengar, Shanto, Mark D. Peters and Donald R. Kinder. "Experimental Demonstrations of the 
 'Not-So-Minimal' Consequences of Television News Programs." Political 
 Psychology. Ed. John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius. New York: Psychology Press, 2004. 
 139-149. Print. 
Jablonka, Eva and Marion J. Lamb. Evolution in Four Dimensions: Genetic, Epigenetic, 
 Behavioral, and Symbolic Variations in the History of Life. Cambrigde: The MIT 
 Press, 2006. Print. 
Jackson, Robert A., Jeffery J. Mondak and Robert Huckfeldt. "Examining the Possible 
 Corrosive Impact of Negative Advertising on Citizens' Attitudes toward Politics". 
 Political Research Quarterly 62.1 (2009): 55-69. Web. 4 Apr. 2011. 
 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27759845> 
John McCain 2008. Jobs for America: The McCain Economic Plan. 16 Oct 2008. Web.  25 
 Oct 2012. 
 <http://web.archive.org/web/20081017025256/http://www.johnmccain.com/Images/
 Issues/JobsforAmerica/briefing.pdf> 
---. "Convention Night." Stanford University Political Communication Lab. 28 Aug 2008. 
 Web. 2 Sep 2012. <	  http://pcl.stanford.edu/campaigns/2008/jmgen.html> 
	   106	  
---. "Joe the Plumber." Stanford University Political Communication Lab. 15 Aug 2008. 
 Web. 2 Sep 2012. <	  http://pcl.stanford.edu/campaigns/2008/jmgen.html> 
---."Maybe." Stanford University Political Communication Lab. 15 Aug 2008. Web. 2 Sep 
 2012. <	  http://pcl.stanford.edu/campaigns/2008/jmgen.html> 
---. "Sweat Equity". Stanford University Political Communication Lab. 15 Aug 2008. Web. 2 
 Sep 2012. <	  http://pcl.stanford.edu/campaigns/2008/jmgen.html> 
---. "Tax Man." Stanford University Political Communication Lab. 15 Aug 2008. Web. 2 Sep 
 2012. <	  http://pcl.stanford.edu/campaigns/2008/jmgen.html> 
Jost, John T. and Jim Sidanius. "Political Psychology: An Introduction." Political Psychology
 . Ed. John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius. New York: Psychology Press, 2004. 1-17. Print. 
---. "Mass Media and Candidate Perception." Political Psychology. Ed. John T. Jost and Jim 
 Sidanius. New York: Psychology Press, 2004. 135-138. Print. 
 Jurkowitz, Mark. "Financial Fallout Pops Palin Media Bubble, Drives Campaign Coverage." 
 Project for Excellence in Journalism, Pew Research Center. 23 Sep 2008. Web. 
 November 2 2012. <http://pewresearch.org/pubs/962/financial-fallout-pops-palin-
 media-bubble-drives-campaign-coverage> 
Kelly, Michael. "The 1992 Campaign: The Democrats – Clinton and Bush Compete to be 
 Champion of Change; Democrat Fights Perception of Bush Gain." The New York 
 Times 31 Oct. 1992. Web. 20 Feb. 2012. <http://www.nytimes.com> 
"Key Findings". Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD. 
 Central Intelligence Agency. Web. September 2 2012. 
 <https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-
 1/iraq_wmd_2004/Comp_Report_Key_Findings.pdf> 
Koch, Jeffrey W. "Campaign Advertisements' Impact on Voter Certainty and Knowledge of 
 House Candidates' Ideological Positions". Political Research Quarterly 61.4 (2008): 
 609-621. Web. 4 Apr. 2011. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20299764> 
Krosnick, Jon A. and Donald R. Kinder. "Altering the Foundations of Support for the 
 President through Priming." Political Psychology. Eds. John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius. 
 New York: Psychology Press, 2004. 150-162. Print. 
Lewis-Beck, Michael S., William G. Jacoby, Helmut Norpoth and Herbert F. Weisberg. The
  American Voter Revisited. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2008. 
 Print. 
Lusardi, Annamaria. "Americans' Financial Capability." Forum to Explore the Causes of the 
 Financial Crisis, Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission. 26 Feb 2010. Web. n.p. 12 
	  107	  
 Sep 2012. <http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-testimony/2010-0226-
 Lusardi.pdf> 
MacKuen, Michael B., Robert S. Erikson and James A. Stimson. "Peasants of Bankers? The 
 American Electorate and The U.S. Economy". The American Political Science Review 
 86.3 (1992): 597-611. Web. 15 Sep 2012. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1964124> 
Mankiw, N. Gregory. Principles of Microeconomics: Fourth Edition. Mason: Thomson 
 Higher Education, 2007. Print. 
Mason, David M. "Letter to Senator John McCain, February 19 2008." Federal Election 
 Commission, Federal Election Commission, n.d. Web. 2 Mar. 2012. 
 <http://www.fec.gov/press/press2008/FECtoMcCain.PDF> 
Maverick Media. "Priorities." Living Room Candidate, n.d. Web. 2 Apr. 2012.  
  <www.livingroomcandidate.org/commercials/2000/priorities> 
---. "Successful Leader." Living Room Candidate, n.d. Web. 2 Apr. 2012. 
 <www.livingroomcandidate.org/commercials/2000/successful-leader> 
"McCain attacks Obama for opting out of public financing." CNN Politics. Cable News 
 Network, 19 Jun. 2008. Web. 2 Mar. 2012. <http://www.cnn.com> 
McCain, John. "Address Accepting the Presidential Nomination at the Republican National 
 Convention in Saint Paul". 4 Sep 2008. Web. Oct 25 2012. Online by Gerhard Peters 
 and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, The University of California,
  Santa Barbara. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=78576> 
---. "Address in Phoenix Conceding the 2008 Presidential Election." 4 Nov 2008. Online by 
 Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, The 
 University of California, Santa Barbara. 
 <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=84749> 
---. "Remarks in Blue Bell, Pennsylvania." 14 Oct 2008. Web. 21 Aug 2012. Online by 
 Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. 
 <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=84559> 
---. "Remarks at Fresno State University," 23 Jun 2008. Web. 21 Aug 2012. Online by 
 Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. 
 <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=77551> 
---. "Remarks at the Vestas Training Facility in Portland, Oregon." 23 May 2008. Web. 21 
 Aug 2012. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency 
 Project. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=77300> 
	   108	  
---. "Remarks in Dayton, Ohio". 27 Oct 2008. Web. 12 Nov 2012. . Online by Gerhard Peters 
 and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. 
 <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=84604> 
---. "Remarks in Jackson, Ohio". 6 Aug 2008. Web. 21 Aug 2012. Online by Gerhard Peters 
 and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. 
 <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=77793> 
---. "Remarks in Tampa, Florida". 16 Sep 2008. Web. 12 Oct 2012. Online by Gerhard 
 Peters  and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. 
 <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=78645> 
---. "Remarks on an Oil Rig Platform in the Gulf of Mexico". 19 Aug 2008. Web. 21 Aug
 2012. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency 
 Project. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=78055> 
---. "Senator McCain's Weekly Radio Address". Oct 18 2012. Web. 29 Oct 2012. Online by 
 Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. 
 <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=84563> 
McCain, John and Mark Salter.Worth the Fighting For; The Education of an American 
 Maverick, and the Heroes who Inspired Him. Random House: New York, 2003. 
 Paperback Edition. Print. 
"McCain Tops Obama's Record-Breaking Ratings." Nielsen, The Nielsen Company, 5 Sep
  2008. Web. 12 Oct 2012. <http://blog.nielsen.com> 
McDonald, Michael P. "2008 General Election Turnout Rates." United States Election 
 Project, George Mason University. n.d. Web. 15 Feb 2012. 
 <http://elections.gmu.edu/Turnout_2008G.html> 
---. "Voter Turnout Frequently Asked Questions." United States Election Project, George 
 Mason University. n.d. Web. 15 Feb 2012. <http://elections.gmu.edu/FAQ.html> 
McGuire, William J. "The Poly-Psy Relationship: Three phases of a Long Affair." Political 
 Psychology. Ed. John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius. New York: Psychology Press, 2004. 
 22-31. Print. 
McLean, Bethany and Joe Nocera. All the Devils Are Here: The Hidden History of the 
 Financial Crisis. London: Portfolio/Penguin, 2010. Print. 
"Marriage Talking Points". National Organization for Marriage. National Organization for 
 Marriage. n.d. Web. 29 Oct 2012. <	  http://www.nationformarriage.org> 
Nagourney, Adam and Elisabeth Bumiller. "McCain Leaps into a Thicket". New York Times, 
 25 Sep 2008. Web. 29 Oct 2012. <http://www.nytimes.com>  
	  109	  
National Bureau of Economic Research. Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers. 
 17 Feb 2012. Web. 23 Feb. 2012.
 <http://www.nber.org/erp/ERP_2012_Complete.pdf> 
National Bureau of Economic Research. Determination of the December 2007 Peak in 
 Economic Activity. 13 Mar 2010. Web. 20 Feb. 2012. 
 <http://www.nber.org/dec2008.pdf> 
Nielsen. Television Audience 2008. 17 Jul. 2009. Web. 20 Feb. 2012. 
 <http://blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/wp-
 content/uploads/2009/07/tva_2008_071709.pdf> 
Norpoth, Helmut. "The Economy." In Comparing Democracies: Elections and Voting in a 
 Global Perspective, eds. Lawrence LeDuc, Richard G. Niemi and Pippa Norris. 
 Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1996. Print. 
Obama, Barack. "Address Accepting the Presidential Nomination at the Democratic National 
 Convention in Denver: 'The American Promise'," 28 Aug 2012. Web. Obctober 21 
 2012. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency 
 Project, The University of California, Santa Barbara.     
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=78284> 
---. "Address in Chicago Accepting Election as the 44th President of the United States". 4 
 Nov 2008. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency 
 Project, The University of California, Santa Barbara. 
 <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=84750> 
---. "Keynote Address at the 2004 Democratic National Convention". 27 Jul 2004. Web. 
 August 29 2012. Online by Gerhard  Peters and John T. Woolley, The American 
 Presidency Project, The University of California, Santa Barbara.   
 <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=76988> 
---. "Remarks at a Town Hall in Cedar Rapids, Iowa." 31 Jul 2008. Web. 29 Aug 2012.
 Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, 
 The University of California, Santa Barbara.   .
 <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=77738> 
---. "Remarks in Asheville, North Carolina." 5 Oct 2008. Web. 20 Oct 2012. Online by 
 Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, The 
 University of California, Santa Barbara.   .
 <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=84480> 
	   110	  
---. "Remarks in Chillicothe, Ohio." 10 Oct 2008. Web. 29 Oct  2012. Online by Gerhard 
 Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, The University of 
 California, Santa Barbara.   .
 <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=84556> 
---. "Remarks in Dayton, Ohio." 9 September 2008. Web. 21 August 2012. Online by 
 Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, The 
 University of California, Santa Barbara. 
 <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=78610> 
---. "Remarks in St. Louis, Missouri." 7 Jul 2008. Web. 21 Aug 2012. Online by Gerhard 
 Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, The University of 
 California, Santa Barbara. 
 <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=77600> 
---. "Remarks in Toledo, Ohio." 13 Oct 2008. Web. 21 Aug 2012. Online by Gerhard 
 Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, The University of 
 California, Santa Barbara. 
 <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=84562> 
Obama Biden. Barack Obama and Joe Biden: A Rescue Plan for the Middle Class. 13 
 October 2008. Web. 25 October 2012. Accessible by link from the Public 
 Broadcasting Service's website. 
 <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/vote2008/reportersblog/2008/10/obama_pitches_
 fourpart_economi.html> 
---. "Embrace". Stanford University Political Communication Lab. 10 Aug 2008. Web. 2 Sep 
 2012. <http://pcl.stanford.edu/campaigns/2008/bogen.html> 
---. "Hands". Stanford University Political Communication Lab. 7 Aug 2008. Web. 2 Sep 
 2012. <http://pcl.stanford.edu/campaigns/2008/bogen.html> 
---. "His Choice." Stanford University Political Communication Lab. 7 Aug 2008. Web. 2 
 Sep 2012. <http://pcl.stanford.edu/campaigns/2008/bogen.html> 
---. "New Subject". Stanford University Political Communication Lab. 7 Aug 2008. Web. 2 
 Sep 2012. <http://pcl.stanford.edu/campaigns/2008/bogen.html> 
---. "No Change". Stanford University Political Communication Lab. 29 Aug 2008. Web.  2 
 Sep 2012. <http://pcl.stanford.edu/campaigns/2008/bogen.html> 
---. "No Mavericks". Stanford University Political Communication Lab. 8 Sep 2008. Web. 2 
 Sep 2012. <http://pcl.stanford.edu/campaigns/2008/bogen.html> 
	  111	  
---. "Rearview Mirror". Stanford University Political Communication Lab. 21 Aug 2008. 
 Web. 2 Sep 2012. <http://pcl.stanford.edu/campaigns/2008/bogen.html> 
---. "Seven". Stanford University Political Communication Lab. 21 Aug 2008. Web. 2 Sep 
 2012. <http://pcl.stanford.edu/campaigns/2008/bogen.html> 
Partnoy, Frank. "How and Why Credit Rating Agencies are Not Like Other Gatekeepers". 
 Financial Gatekeepers: Can They Protect Investors? Eds. Yasuyuki Fuchika and 
 Robert E. Litan. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2006. 59-99. Print. 
Polsby, Nelson W. Consequences of Party Reform. New York: Oxford University Press, 
 1983. Print. 
"Political Advertising in 2008". University of Wisconsin Advertising Project. University of 
 Wisconsin, 17 Mar. 2010. Web. 3 Mar. 2012. 
 <http://wiscadproject.wisc.edu/wiscads_report_031710.pdf> 
Project for Excellence in Journalism. "The Color of News", Pew Research Center. 29 Oct 
 2008. Web. 23 Sep 2012. <http://www.journalism.org/node/13436> 
---. "Winning the Media Campaign". Pew Research Center. 22 Oct 2008. Web. 23 Sep 2012. 
 <http://www.journalism.org/node/13307> 
"Racicot/Gillespie Joint Statement on 527s – May 13 2004" Democracy in Action. George
  Washington University, n.d. Web. 12 Mar. 2012. 
 <http://www.gwu.edu/%7Eaction/2004/money/bushrnc051304st.html>  
Rohter, Larry. "Real Deal on 'Joe the Plumber' Reveals New Slant". New York Times, 16 Oct 
 2008. Web. 29 Oct 2012. <http://www.nytimes.com> 
"Romney suspends presidential campaign." CNN Politics, Cable News Network. 7 Feb 2008. 
 Web. 19 Sep 2012. <http://www.cnn.com> 
Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation. "1980 Presidential Candidate Debate: Governor
 Ronald Reagan and President Jimmy Carter – 10/28/80." Youtube. 23 Apr. 2009. 
 Web. 23 Feb. 2012. <http://youtu.be/_8YxFc_1b_0> 
Rudalevige, Andrew. The New Imperial Presidency: Renewing Presidential Power after 
 Watergate. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2006. Print. 
Salant, Jonathan D. "Public Financing: A 'Scarlet Letter' for Presidential Candidates." 
 BloombergBusinessweek. Bloomberg L.P., 20 Feb. 2012. Web. 1 Mar. 2012. 
 <http://www.businessweek.com> 
Sapienza, Paola and Luigi Zingales. "The Results: Wave 1" Financial Trust Index, The 
 University of Chicago Booth School of Business and Northwestern University 
	   112	  
 Kellogg School of Management, 27 Jan 2009. Web. October 29 2012.  
 <http://financialtrustindex.org/resultswave1.htm> 
Simon, Herbert A. "Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology with Political 
 Science." The American Political Science Review 79.2 (1985): 293-304. Web. 20 
 Aug 2007. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1956650> 
Scherer, Michael. "The Luck of John McCain" Time Magazine, Time Inc. 5 Mar 2008. Web. 
 September 12 2012. <http://www.time.com> 
Skeel, David A. and Frank Partnoy. "The Promise and Perils of Credit Derivatives." 
 University of Cincinatti Law Review 75 (2007): 1019-1051. Web. 19 Sep 2012. 
 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=929747> 
Smith, Larry David. "The Party Platforms as Institutional Discourse: The Democrats and 
 Republicans of 1988". Presidential Studies Quarterly 22.3 (1992): 531-543. Web. 1 
 May 2012. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27550995> 
Sobel, Carolyn P. The Cognitive Sciences: An Interdisciplinary Approach. London: Mayfield, 
 2001. Print. 
Political Communication Lab. "Campaign 2008: Barack Obama." Stanford University. n.d. 
 Web. 25 August 2012. <http://pcl.stanford.edu/campaigns/2008/bogen.html> 
---. "Campaign 2008: John McCain." Stanford University. n.d. Web. 25 August 2012. 
 <http://pcl.stanford.edu/campaigns/2008/jmgen.html> 
Steger, Wayne P. "Who Wins Nominations and Why? An Updated Forecast of the 
 Presidential Primary Vote". Political Research Quarterly 60.1 (2007): 91-99. Web. 28
  Oct 2012. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4623809> 
Stern, Sheldon M. The Cuban Missile Crisis in American Memory: Myths vs. Reality. 
  Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012. Print. 
Sunstein, Cass. Echo Chambers: Bush v. Gore, Impeachment, and Beyond. Princeton: 
 Princeton University Press, 2001. Web. 4 Mar. 2012. 
 <http://press.princeton.edu/sunstein/echo.pdf?q=echo> 
Taber, Charles S. and Milton Lodge. "Motivated Skepticism in the Evaluation of Political 
 Beliefs". American Journal of Political Science 50.3 (2006): 755-769. Web. 29 Jan.
  2012. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3694247> 
"Take the Money and Run for Office." This American Life. Chicago Public Radio. WBEZ, 
 Chicago.  30 Mar. 2012. Radio. 
The American Presidency Project. "2008 Election Speeches and Remarks: John McCain". 
 n.d. Web. 15 Sep 2012. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The 
	  113	  
 American Presidency Project, The University of California, Santa Barbara. 
 <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/2008_election.php> 
---. "2008 Election Speeches and Remarks: Barack Obama". n.d. Web. 15 Sept 2012. 
 Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, 
 The University of California, Santa Barbara. 
 <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/2008_election.php> 
"The Most (and Least) Lucrative Committees in Congress." Morning Edition. National Public 
 Radio. 6 Apr. 2012. Radio. 
Tuman, Joseph S. Political Communication in Political Campaigns. Los Angeles: Sage, 
 2008.  Print. 
Tversky, Amos and Daniel Kahneman. "Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases".
  Science 185.4157 (1974): 1124-1131. Web. 29 Feb. 2012. 
 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1738360>  
Twin, Alexandra. "Stocks Get Pummeled." CNNMoney. Cable News Network, 21 Sep 2008.
  Web. February 25 2012. <http://money.cnn.com> 
"Two-Thirds of U.S. Households Tuned In To Dems' and GOP's Conventions." Nielsen. The 
 Nielsen Company, 18 Sep 2008. Web. 12 Oct 2012.  
 <http://blog.nielsen.com> 
United States. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Business Employment Dynamics: Third Quarter 
 2008. May 19, 2009. Web. 3 Oct 2012. 
 <http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/cewbd_05192009.pdf>  
---. Department of Housing and Urban Development. Blueprint for the American Dream. 
 n.d.Web. 29 Aug 2012. <http://archives.hud.gov/initiatives/blueprint/blueprint.pdf> 
---. National Telecommunications and Information Administration. "Households Using the 
 Internet." n.d. Web. 20 Feb. 2012. 
 <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/table_householdinternet2007.pdf> 
---. The White House. "George W. Bush" n.d. Web. 29 Oct 2012. 
 <http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents/georgewbush> 
---. The White House. "National Security Strategy". September 2002. Web. 30 Aug. 2012. 
 <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/nss3.html> 
Vavreck, Lynn. The Message Matters: The Economy and Presidential Campaigns. Princeton: 
 Princeton University Press, 2009. Print. 
	   114	  
Waldman, Stephen. Federal Communications Commission. The Information Needs of 
 Communities. July 2011. Web. 2 Mar. 2012. <http://www.fcc.gov/info-needs-
 communities> 
Wattenberg, Martin P. and Craig Leonard Brians. "Negative Campaign Advertising: 
 Demobilizer or Mobilizer?" The American Political Science Review 93.4 (1999): 891-
 899. Web. 23 Jul. 2008. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2586119> 
"Where Money Meets Power in Politics." All Things Considered. National Public Radio. 4 
 Apr. 2012. Radio. 
Wood, Stephen C. "Television's First Political Spot Ad Campaign: Eisenhower Answers 
 America". Presidential Studies Quarterly 20.2 (1990): 265-283. Web. 12 Apr. 2011.
  <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27550614> 
Yoon, Robert. "McCain lags in fundraising, cuts staff" CNN Politics Political Ticker, Cable 
 News Network. 2 Jul 2007. Web.  28 Aug 2012. <http://www.cnn.com> 
Yoon, Yeosun, Gülen Sarial-Abi and Zeynep Gürhan-Canli. "Effects of Regulatory Focus on 
 Selective Information Processing". Journal of Consumer Research 39 (2012): n.pag. 
 Web. 4 Mar. 2012 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/661935> 
Zuidervaart, Lambert. "Theodor W. Adorno." The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
 (Winter 2011 Edition). Stanford University, 10 Oct. 2011. Ed. Edward N. Zalta. Web. 
 03 Feb. 2012. <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/adorno/> 	  
 
 
